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Security Affairs

Homeland Security Archive

BORDER PATROL: CHECKPOINTS CONTRIBUTE TO BORDER PATROL’S MISSION, BUT MORE CONSISTENT DATA COLLECTION AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT COULD IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. August 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 147 pages]

The U.S. Border Patrol, part of the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP), operates checkpoints on U.S. roads, mainly in the southwest border states where most illegal entries occur. As part of a three-tiered strategy to maximize detection and apprehension of illegal aliens, Border Patrol agents at checkpoints screen vehicles for illegal aliens and contraband. GAO work includes a review of Border Patrol data and guidance; visits to checkpoints and communities in five Border Patrol sectors across four southwest border states, selected on the basis of size, type, and volume, among other factors; and discussions with community members and Border Patrol officials in headquarters and field locations.

KEEP GITMO GOING: THE CASE FOR RETAINING THE VITAL DETENSION AND INTERROGATION FACILITY AT GUANTANOMO BAY.
Center for Security Policy. E. J. Kimball and Benjamin Lerner. May 28, 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 9 pages]

The white paper identifies the national security, public safety, and legal and economic challenges associated with closing Guantánamo and transferring detainees to the United States or to foreign custody. Anywhere from 10-20 percent of the nearly 500 detainees released from Guantanamo have returned to the battlefield in some capacity, says the paper. These were the “benign” detainees, one can only imagine the rate of recidivism of the 240 hardened terrorists still detained at Guantánamo.

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IMPORTED OIL AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY.
RAND Corporation. Keith Crane et al. May 11, 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 127 pages]

While on a net basis the United States imports nearly 60 percent of the oil it consumes, this reliance on imported oil is not by itself a major national security threat, according to the study. The study finds that the economic costs of a major disruption in global oil supplies pose the greatest risk to the United States. The study evaluates commonly suggested links between oil imports and U.S. national security, and assesses the economic, political and military costs and benefits of potential policies to address threats to U.S. national security associated with imported oil.

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SOCIAL SOFTWARE AND NATIONAL SECURITY: AN INITIAL NET ASSESSMENT.
National Defense University. Mark Drapeau and Linton Wells II. April 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 42 pages]

Social software connects people and information via online, informal Internet networks. It is appearing in increasingly diverse forms as part of a broad movement commonly called Web 2.0. Social software can be used by governments for content creation, external collaboration, community building, and other applications. The proliferation of social software has ramifications for U.S. national security, spanning future operating challenges of a traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive nature. Governments that harness its potential power can interact better with citizens and anticipate emerging issues.

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WHITE PAPER OF THE INTERAGENCY POLICY GROUP’S REPORT ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN.
The White House. March 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 6 pages]

The United States has a vital national security interest in addressing the current and potential security threats posed by extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Pakistan, al Qaeda and other groups of jihadist terrorists are planning new terror attacks. Their targets remain the U.S. homeland, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Europe, Australia, our allies in the Middle East, and other targets of opportunity.

IS IT TIME TO RETHINK U.S. ENTRY AND EXIT PROCESSES?
RAND Corporation. C. Richard Neu. March 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 23 pages]

Managing the entry and exit of individual travelers at U.S. borders is an important aspect of border and homeland security, particularly given the longstanding difficulties the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. border protection apparatus has had in meeting legislatively mandated standards for identifying travelers and documenting their arrivals and departures. The paper outlines a number of questions regarding current entry and exit policies and procedures the answers to which may lead to helpful modifications.

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NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN: PARTNERING TO ENHANCE PROTECTION AND RESILIENCY.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. February 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 188 pages]

The plan provides the unifying structure for the integration of a wide range of efforts for the enhanced protection and resiliency of the nation’s into a single national program.The goal of the Plan is to build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by preventing, deterring, neutralizing, or mitigating the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit elements of our nation’s infrastructure and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery of it in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency.

DIRECTOR BLAIR HIGHLIGHTS GLOBAL THREATS TO THE NATION.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. February 12, 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 2 pages]

The statement outlines the most significant global security threats facing the nation. Recognizing that global threats comprise a diverse set of issues and factors, Director Blair framed the analysis by identifying key areas of risk, concern and opportunity that could have direct effects on the quality of life and security for Americans. The hearing also marked the first occasion where the Director, the leader of the nation’s Intelligence Community, was the sole witness providing comprehensive analysis from all 16 intelligence agencies.

CISCO 2008 ANNUAL SECURITY REPORT: HIGHLIGHTING GLOBAL SECURITY THREATS AND TRENDS.
CISCO. December 15, 2008.
Full Text [PDF format, 52 pages]

The report warns that Internet-based attacks are becoming increasingly sophisticated and specialized as profit-driven criminals continue to hone their approach to stealing data from businesses, employees and consumers. The 2008 edition identifies the year’s top security threats and offers recommendations for protecting networks against attacks that are propagating more rapidly, becoming increasingly difficult to detect, and exploiting technological and human vulnerabilities.

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CHINA, SPACE WEAPONS, AND U.S. SECURITY.
Council on Foreign Relations. Bruce W. MacDonald. September 2008.
Full Text [PDF format, 71 pages]

China’s successful test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007, followed by the U.S. destruction earlier this year of an out-of-control U.S. satellite, demonstrated that space may soon no longer remain a relative sanctuary from military conflict. The author illuminates the strategic landscape of this new military space competition and highlights the dangers and opportunities the United States confronts in the space arena.

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FACT SHEET: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS SINCE 9/11.
U.S. Department of Justice. Web posted September 12, 2008.
Full Text [HTML format, various paging]

Since September 11, 2001, the highest priority of the Justice Department has been to protect America against acts of terrorism. The Justice Department, working with its federal, state, and local partners as well as international counterparts, has significantly improved its ability to identify, penetrate, and dismantle terrorist plots as a result of a series of structural reforms, the development of new intelligence and law enforcement tools, and a new mindset that values information sharing, communication and prevention.

“TO PROTECT AND DEFEND”: CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY FACING THE NEXT PRESIDENT.
National Association of Chiefs of Police. Web posted August 28, 2008.
Full Text [PDF format, 13 pages]

Because every 22.2 seconds, an American is a victim of a violent crime, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) is calling on the next president of the United States to establish a National Commission on criminal justice and homeland security. The Commission would be charged with conducting a comprehensive review of the criminal justice system, and would be required to provide the nation with a strategic plan to guide public safety and homeland security efforts in the years ahead.

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BUILDING AN INTERAGENCY CADRE OF NATIONAL SECURITY PROFESSIONALS: PROPOSALS, RECENT EXPERIENCE, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS.
Congressional Research Service, RL34565, Library of Congress. Catherine Dale. July 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 30 pages]

There is a growing consensus among many national security practitioners and scholars across the political spectrum broadly in favor of reforming the interagency system to encourage a more effective application of all elements of national power. The reform debates have included proposals to establish and foster an interagency cadre of national security specialists from all relevant departments and agencies. According to proponents, cadre members, through a long-term career development program that might include education, training, and exchange tours in other agencies, would gain a better understanding of the mandates, capabilities, and cultures of other agencies.

BORDER SECURITY: KEY AGENCIES AND THEIR MISSIONS.
Congressional Research Service, RS21899, Library of Congress. Web posted June 22, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 6 pages]

After the massive reorganization of federal agencies precipitated by the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), there are now four main federal agencies charged with securing the United States’ borders: the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Bureau of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the United States Coast Guard, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The report serves as a primer on the key federal agencies charged with border security, briefly describing each agency’s role in securing our nation’s borders.

MANAGING THE NEXT DOMESTIC CATASTROPHE: READY (OR NOT)?
Center for Strategic & International Studies. Christine E. Wormuth and Anne Witkowsky. June 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 103 pages]

America is not ready for the next catastrophe. Years have passed since the 9/11 attacks and the response to Hurricane Katrina, but there are still no government-wide plans to respond to a catastrophe. There is still considerable confusion over who will be in charge during a disaster. There are still almost no dedicated military forces on rapid alert to respond to a crisis here at home. Readying America to face the threats of the post– September 11 era is an enormous task. The key for the next administration will be to take the building blocks of the national preparedness system that already exist and bring them together, fill in gaps, and provide the resources to make the system work.

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MARITIME SECURITY.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. June 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 36 pages]

The safety and economic security of the United States depends on the secure use of the world’s seaports and waterways. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 (HSPD-13, also referred to as National Security Presidential Directive-41) directs the coordination of U.S. maritime security policy. The report discusses: (1) the extent to which the strategy and its supporting plans contain desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy, and (2) the reported status of the implementation of these plans.

REAL ID IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW: FEW BENEFITS, STAGGERING COSTS.
Electronic Privacy Information Center. May 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 38 pages]

Throughout its history, the United States has rejected the idea of a national identification system. The REAL ID Act mandates that State driver's licenses and ID cards follow federal technical standards and verification procedures issued by Homeland Security. REAL ID also enables tracking, surveillance, and profiling of the American public. May 11, 2008 was the statutory deadline for implementation of the REAL ID system, but not one State is in compliance with the federal law creating a national identification system. The report details the many problems with the plan to implement this vast national identification system. The REAL ID system remains filled with threats to privacy, security and civil liberties that have not been resolved.

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SMALL VESSEL SECURITY STRATEGY.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Web posted May 1, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 57 pages]

As the maritime security efforts have primarily focused on large commercial vessels, the security efforts in the small vessel environment have been limited to traditional safety and law enforcement concerns. Small vessels are vulnerable to potential exploitation by terrorist, smugglers of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics, aliens, and other contraband, and other criminals. The Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) addresses these concerns, providing a coherent framework to improve maritime security and safety.

DATA MINING AND HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW.
Congressional Research Service, RL31798, Library of Congress. April 3, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 41 pages]

Data mining has been often used as a means for detecting fraud, assessing risk, and product retailing, which involves the use of data analysis tools to discover previously unknown, valid patterns and relationships in large data sets. For homeland security, it can be a potential means to identify terrorist activities, such as money transfers and communications, and to identify and track individual terrorists themselves, such as through travel and immigration records. However, since there are limitations on its scope and use, successful data mining requires skilled technical and analytical specialists who can structure the analysis and interpret the output to expand its potential.

SUSTAINABLE SECURITY: DEVELOPING A SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE LONG HAUL.
Center for a New American Security. Jim Thomas. April 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 24 pages]

Thomas looks at the countries in the developing world and their lack of ability to govern and police themselves to secure their regions and how the lack of global security threatens U.S. interest. In order to maintain America’s values, interests, and commitments, the security deficit needs to be effectively addressed with a new approach that is more indirect and prevention focused.

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BORDER SEARCHES OF LAPTOPS AND OTHER ELECTRONIC STORAGE DEVICES.
Congressional Research Service, RL34404, Library of Congress. Yule Kim. March 5, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 11 pages]

The Fourth Amendment generally requires a warrant to support most searches and seizures conducted by the government. Federal courts have long recognized that one of the many exceptions to this general presumption is the border search exception. The border search exception permits government officials, in most routine circumstances, to conduct searches with no suspicion of wrongdoing though in some “non-routine” and particularly invasive situations customs officials are required to have “reasonable suspicion” in order to conduct a search.

HOMELAND SECURITY: DHS HAS TAKEN ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN BORDER SECURITY PROGRAMS AND OPERATIONS, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN.
Government Accountability Office, GAO-08-542T. Richard M. Stana. March 6, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 25 pages]

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has stressed the importance of effective inspections and trained CBP supervisors and officers in interviewing travelers at U.S. ports of entry. Weaknesses in travel inspection procedures and lack of physical infrastructure, however, have hampered CBP’s ability to inspect travelers thoroughly and detect fraudulent documents. CBP is implementing an initiative requiring citizens of the United States, Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico to present certain identification documents when entering the United States. As of December 2007, actions taken to meet the initiative’s requirements include selecting technology to be used at land ports of entry and developing plans to train officers to use it.

REMARKS BY HOMELAND SECURITY SECRETARY MICHAEL CHERTOFF AT ROUNDTABLE WITH BLOGGERS.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. March 3, 2008.
Full Text

The DHS hopes that this interview/roundtable will be the first of many such programs during which the Secretary takes questions over the internet. It provides an overview and the Secretary’s evaluation of various aspects of the mission of the DHS.

VISA WAIVER PROGRAM: LIMITATIONS WITH DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S PLAN TO VERIFY DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN NATIONALS.
U.S. Governmental Accountability Office; testimony before Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Statement of Jess T. Ford. Web posted February 28, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 18 pages]

On December 12, 2007, DHS reported that it will match records of foreign nationals departing the country, as reported by airlines, to the department’s existing records of any prior arrivals, immigration status changes, or prior departures from the United States. Using this formula, DHS stated that it can attain a match rate above 97 percent to certify compliance with the legislative air exit system requirement. As of February 21, 2008, DHS had not finalized its decision on the methodology the department would use but confirmed that the basic structure would not change. The speaker’s statement examines the limitations of this methodology.

SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE: OBSERVATIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED TO FUTURE PROJECTS.
Government Accountability Office; testimony before House Committee on Homeland Security. Richard Stana. February 27, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 26 pages]

On February 22, 2008, DHS announced final acceptance of Project 28, a $20.6 million project to secure 28 miles along the southwest border, and is now gathering lessons learned to use in future technology development. The project was to provide a system with the capabilities required to control 28 miles of border in Arizona. Officials responsible for the program said that although Project 28 will not be replicated, they have learned lessons from their experience that they plan to integrate into future technology development.

NATIONAL AVIATION SECURITY POLICY, STRATEGY, AND MODE-SPECIFIC PLANS: BACKGROUND AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS.
Bart Elias. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. January 2, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 27 pages]

Prior to 9/11, the U.S. lacked a comprehensive national policy and strategy for aviation security. After the attack, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71) that called for sweeping changes to passenger airline security operations. In 2006, President Bush directed the Department of Homeland Security to establish and implement a new security strategy and supporting plans.

However, Congress has concerns whether these plans are comprehensive, adaptable, sustainable, and within budget and resource allocation. Another concern is whether the 9/11 Commission recommendations were considered when developing the plans.

This report provides an outline of the strategy, the plans, and Congressional concerns. It will not be updated.

DATA MINING AND HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW.
Jeffrey W. Seifert. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. Updated December 5, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 41 pages]

Data mining is “the use of data analysis tools to discover previously unknown, valid patterns and relationships in large data sets.” Data mining has become one of the key features of homeland security to identify terrorist activities and track individual terrorists. However, there are limitations to its capabilities and there are issues of Congressional oversight. This report outlines the technological capabilities, limitations, and oversight objectives of data mining.

AA08022
Shapiro, Jacob; Cohen, Dara Kay COLOR BLIND: LESSONS FROM THE FAILED HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM (International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2, Fall 2007, pp. 121-154)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

Noting that the point of a terrorism alert system is to get people to take measures to thwart terrorism, the authors regard the Department of Homeland Security's color-coded advisory system as a failure. For an alert system to succeed, the authors note, the issuing government must either share the information behind the alert, or operate the system with so much success that people always trust the government's word when an alert is issued. They believe that the "color-coded" system has come to be perceived by the public as neither particularly confiding nor trustworthy, and that as a result the public and local governments have marginalized a system they now consider to be politically manipulated. Not all of this is the Department of Homeland Security's fault, they add, but even so, a diminished popular reputation has crippled its warning system. As an alternative system, the authors propose the federal government negotiate in advance a set of measures to be taken at each alert level by business and local government. This new system would enable the government to specify a threat in a single geographic area; in return, federal authorities would have to be more specific about how serious they thought the threat was. Negotiating in advance with the private sector and smaller governments will enhance confidence in the system, the authors assert.

NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS. Harold C. Relyea. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. Updated August 30, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 25 pages]

The U.S. President has certain powers that can be exercised in the event of a national “crisis, exigency, or emergency. . .” However, there are limits and restraints to these powers. This report examines the developments of the regulatory statutes and past declarations of national emergency.

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY. Homeland Security Council, U.S. Office of the President. October 5, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 62 pages]

The U.S. is at war with terrorist who are intent on attacking our way of life. This report serves as a guide to organize and unify the U.S.’s security efforts. The report focuses on four goals:

• Preventing and disrupting terrorist attacks;
• Protecting Americans and America's critical infrastructure and resources;
• Responding to and recovering from incidents; and
• Ensure long-term success.

This guide updates the first report issued in July 2002.

AA07365
THE TERRORISM INDEX (Foreign Policy, no. 162, September-October 2007, pp. 60-68)
Full text [html format]

Foreign Policy magazine and the Center for American Progress conducted its third in a series of surveys of over 100 former U.S. government officials, retired military and intelligence officers, as well as distinguished foreign policy academics, who reported increasing trepidation about national security and America’s place in the world. FP magazine reports that they “see a world that is growing more dangerous, a national security strategy in disrepair, and a war in Iraq that is alarmingly off course." Fully 91 percent say the world is becoming more dangerous for Americans; 84 percent do not believe the U.S. is winning the war on terror; only 6 percent believe that U.S. is winning the war on terrorism; and over 80 percent expect a terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11 within a decade. Nearly every foreign policy initiative of the U.S. government -- from domestic surveillance activities, renditions of terrorist suspects, and detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to U.S. energy policies and efforts in the Middle East peace process -- was sharply criticized by the experts. Above all, 92 percent agreed that the war in Iraq harms U.S. national security; over half disagree with the surge of additional troops; and a bipartisan 68 percent majority would support draw-down and redeployment of U.S. forces out of Iraq.

PROVIDING LONG-TERM SERVICES AFTER MAJOR DISASTERS. Carol J. De Vita and Elaine Morley. Urban Institute. Web posted August 16, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 8 pages]

Nonprofit organizations provide a crucial link to the U.S. emergency preparedness and disaster response. For example, after 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, nonprofit organizations supplied immediate and long-term assistance to help people cope with these events and their emotional aftermath. This report highlights some of the lessons learned from the Red Cross’ September 11th Recovery Program that offered “grants to community-based organizations to provide longer-term case management, mental health services, and other services to facilitate recovery to eligible individuals.”

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Carter, Ashton; May, Michael; Perry, William THE DAY AFTER: ACTION FOLLOWING A NUCLEAR BLAST IN A U.S. CITY (Washington Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 4, Autumn 2007, pp. 19-32)
Full text [pdf format, 14 pages]

Carter, professor at Harvard University and former assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration; May, professor at Stanford University and former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; and Perry, also a professor at Stanford University and former secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, warn that events such as nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea, instability in Pakistan, and insufficiently guarded nuclear materiel in the former Soviet Union have increased the likelihood of terrorists’ obtaining nuclear weapons or fissile materials which could be used to attack the U.S. It is therefore imperative that we plan for such a contingency. Actions will fall into two categories -– recovery from the first detonation and prevention of another. A ten-kiloton groundblast would destroy everything within a one-mile radius. Because nothing could be done to help people within five to ten square miles, responders would “concentrate on minimizing the radiation dose to the population further downwind and preventing chaos among the rest of the population, which would be physically unaffected but traumatized and deprived of whatever utilities and services were located in the affected area.” The authors list more details and ideas for planning, stressing the need for the federal government to assume responsibility and authority for dealing with the catastrophe. Well-considered contingency plans and careful action by the government can “save thousands of lives and billions of dollars, prevent unnecessary panic, help maintain trust in the government, and help preserve democratic institutions in a time of emergency.”

SECURITY AND PROSPERITY PARTNERSHIP OF NORTH AMERICA: AN OVERVIEW AND SELECTED ISSUES. M. Angeles Villarreal and Jennifer E. Lake. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. August 2, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 6 pages]

“The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) is a three-country initiative that is intended to increase cooperation and information sharing in an effort to increase and enhance prosperity in the United States, Canada, and Mexico.” The SPP was endorsed but not signed by the three countries; therefore, it is not legally binding. The security portion of SPP will coordinate security efforts to better protect citizens from terrorist threats while promoting safe and efficient movement of people and goods.

BORDER SECURITY: SECURITY OF NEW PASSPORTS AND VISAS ENHANCED, BUT MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE TO PREVENT THEIR FRAUDULENT USE. U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO). Web posted July 31, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 79 pages]

The Department of State (State) developed new, more secure passports, visas, and border crossing cards; but, after review, the General Accountability Office (GAO) found that State does not have a structured process to reassess these security features. “GAO recommends that State and DHS [Department of Homeland Security] better plan for new generations of passports and visas, address potential vulnerabilities in the acceptance process of U.S. passport applications, utilize the electronic features of the new e-passports. . .” GAO also suggests better training for inspectors.

AVIATION SECURITY: FEDERAL EFFORTS TO SECURE U.S.-BOUND AIR CARGO ARE IN THE EARLY STAGES AND COULD BE STRENGTHENED.
U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO). Web posted May 1, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 107 pages]

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has primary responsibility for air cargo transported into the U.S. The GAO examined what action DHS has taken to ensure inbound cargo safety and if these procedures needed to be strengthened. GAO also examined the practices of the air cargo industry and foreign governments.

GAO recommends that DHS develop a risk-based inbound air cargo security system and foster a systematic process to improve interagency communication. GAO also recommends that DHS analyze air cargo security practices used by the air cargo industry and foreign governments.

SECURE FENCE ACT OF 2006. [H.R. 6061]
United States House of Representatives. Signed into law by the President on October 26, 2006.
Full text [pdf format, 3 pages]

This legislation directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, within 18 months of enactment of this Act, to take appropriate actions to achieve operational control over U.S. international land and maritime borders, including: (1) systematic border surveillance through more effective use of personnel and technology, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, ground-based sensors, satellites, radar coverage, and cameras; and (2) physical infrastructure enhancements to prevent unlawful border entry and facilitate border access by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, such as additional checkpoints, all weather access roads, and vehicle barriers.

It also directs the Secretary to provide at least two layers of reinforced fencing, installation of additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors extending:

1. from ten miles west of the Tecate, California, port of entry to ten miles east of the Tecate, California, port of entry;
2. from ten miles west of the Calexico, California, port of entry to five miles east of the Douglas, Arizona, port of entry (requiring installation of an interlocking surveillance camera system by May 30, 2007, and fence completion by May 30, 2008);
3. (3) from five miles west of the Columbus, New Mexico, port of entry to ten miles east of El Paso, Texas;
4. from five miles northwest of the Del Rio, Texas, port of entry to five miles southeast of the Eagle Pass, Texas, port of entry; and
5. 15 miles northwest of the Laredo, Texas, port of entry to the Brownsville, Texas, port of entry (requiring fence completion from 15 miles northwest of the Laredo, Texas, port of entry to 15 southeast of the Laredo, Texas, port of entry by December 31, 2008).

This legislation directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, within 18 months of enactment of this Act, to take appropriate actions to achieve operational control over U.S. international land and maritime borders, including:

1. systematic border surveillance through more effective use of personnel and technology, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, ground-based sensors, satellites, radar coverage, and cameras; and (2) physical infrastructure enhancements to prevent unlawful border entry and facilitate border access by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, such as additional checkpoints, all weather access roads, and vehicle barriers.
2. It also directs the Secretary to provide at least two layers of reinforced fencing, installation of additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors extending: (1) from ten miles west of the Tecate, California, port of entry to ten miles east of the Tecate, California, port of entry;
3. from ten miles west of the Calexico, California, port of entry to five miles east of the Douglas, Arizona, port of entry (requiring installation of an interlocking surveillance camera system by May 30, 2007, and fence completion by May 30, 2008);
4. from five miles west of the Columbus, New Mexico, port of entry to ten miles east of El Paso, Texas;
5. from five miles northwest of the Del Rio, Texas, port of entry to five miles southeast of the Eagle Pass, Texas, port of entry; and
6. 15 miles northwest of the Laredo, Texas, port of entry to the Brownsville, Texas, port of entry (requiring fence completion from 15 miles northwest of the Laredo, Texas, port of entry to 15 southeast of the Laredo, Texas, port of entry by December 31, 2008).

REGULATING ACCESS TO AND CONTROL OF DANGEROUS PATHOGENS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY.
Rita Grossman-Vermaas, Brian Finlay and Elizabeth Turpen. Henry L. Stimson Center. September 2006.
Download [pdf format, 40 pages]

Research addressing the threat posed by dangerous pathogens has focused almost exclusively on controlling access to the most hazardous pathogens, and monitoring research on a defined list of potentially dangerous agents. Relatively little attention has focused on the movement of these dangerous pathogens beyond their collection and R&D stages. The authors argue that the rapidly expanding market for biologics for therapeutic uses generally, and medical bioagents and toxins specifically, may present new avenues for bioterrorists to attack the United States.

The study represents the culmination of intensive research and discussions with the private sector, industry and security experts on the national security implications of potentially dangerous biological agents and products. The report offers a wide spectrum of proposals and recommendations designed to provide a layered defense against the misuse or misapplication of 'select agents,' as well as pharmaceuticals derived from another category of biological materials - 'select products.'

PROTECTION OF SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION.
Gina Marie Stevens and Todd B. Tatelman. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS). September 27, 2006.
Download [pdf format, 29 pages]

The terrorist attacks of September 11 prompted a reevaluation of how to balance public access to information with the need for safety and security. The accumulation of confidential business information from owners and operators of the nation's critical infrastructures, 85 percent of which is reportedly owned by the private sector, continues to be a critical component of homeland security efforts.

The Freedom of Information Act of 1974 (FOIA) along with other statutes and regulations provide legal authorities for the protection of various types of security-related information. Nevertheless, some owners and operators are hesitant to voluntarily share security-related information with the government because of the possible disclosure of this information to the public.

To prohibit public disclosure of security-related information under the Freedom of Information Act and other laws, Congress has drafted and passed legislation designed to remove legal obstacles to information sharing. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA); the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 in section 214 of the Homeland Security Act; the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA); and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), as amended by the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, each exempt certain types of security-related information from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. These statutes are examples of what are referred to as FOIA exemption 3 statutes; separate federal statutes prohibiting the disclosure of a certain type of information and authorizing its withholding under FOIA subsection (b)(3).

This report describes the current state of the law with regard to the protection of security-related information. This report does not apply to the maintenance, safeguarding, or disclosure of classified national security information.

CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS: ENHANCED LEADERSHIP, CAPABILITIES, AND ACCOUNTABILITY CONTROLS WILL IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NATION'S PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY SYSTEM.
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). September 6, 2006.
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Hurricane Katrina was a catastrophic disaster whose scope and destruction severely tested all levels of governments in the affected areas and the nation as a whole. It almost immediately overwhelmed state and local first responders, and the response required outside action and support from many sources. Heroic efforts by many people saved thousands of lives. The federal government, many states, local governments, plus nonprofit and private sector organizations provided substantial personnel and resources to assist in the response, but these proved insufficient to meet the immediate challenges posed by Hurricane Katrina's effects.

Appropriate controls and accountability mechanisms for the use of resources during a catastrophic disaster are essential to ensure that the resources are used appropriately. However, says GAO, there is always a tension between normal controls and accountability mechanisms and the need to deliver assistance expeditiously, especially when responders and governments are providing emergency life-saving and life-sustaining services.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and state and local governments all face a significant challenge in ensuring that relief payments and services are only sent to valid registrants while also distributing those relief payments and services as fast as possible. Thus, all levels of governments must further develop and strengthen controls to ensure accountability, because-as FEMA has learned from prior experience-pursuing collection activities after disaster relief payments have been made is costly, time-consuming, and ineffective. Given the estimated billions of dollars in erroneous or excessive payments related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, it is clear that upfront goals must be in place from the outset.

In the report GAO makes several recommendations related to strengthening training and inter-agency communication and coordination during large and sudden crises.

MOBILIZING INFORMATION TO PREVENT TERRORISM: ACCELERATING DEVELOPMENT OF A TRUSTED INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT.
Markle Foundation, Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. July 2006.
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In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Markle Foundation established the Task Force on National Security in the Information Age to address the question of how best to mobilize information and intelligence to improve domestic security while protecting established civil liberties. The Task Force members include some of the nation's leading experts on national security from the administrations of Presidents Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush, as well as leading experts on information technology and civil liberties.

This is the Task Force's third report. The Task Force's previous reports were titled "Protecting America's Freedom in the Information Age"

(October 2002) and second "Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security"

(December 2003).

This third report offers recommendations on how to reconcile national security needs with civil liberties requirements. It offers a new "authorized use" standard for government handling of legally collected information that bases authorization to view information on how the information is going to be used, rather than on the nationality of the subject or the location of the collection. The Task Force also proposes a new risk management approach to sharing classified information that balances the risk of compromising classified information with the security risk that can come from failing to share information with those who need it to understand the threats to national security. The Task Force also identifies examples of effective technology for providing appropriate oversight and accountability.

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN (NIPP): 2006.
United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS). June 29, 2006.
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The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is a comprehensive risk management framework that defines critical infrastructure protection roles and responsibilities for all levels of government, private industry, nongovernmental agencies and tribal entities. The intent is to build an overarching structure that integrates critical infrastructure security efforts, sets protection goals and supporting objectives, and focuses resources according to risk.

Among the areas of continued efforts outlined in the NIPP are:

• Ensure Compatibility of Communications Systems With Interoperability Standards.
• Explore Methods to Authenticate and Verify Personal Identity.
• Coordinate Development of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR) Protection Consensus Standards.
• Improve Technical Surveillance, Monitoring, and Detection Capabilities.

TRANSATLANTIC HOMELAND DEFENSE. National Defense University (NDU), Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS). May 2006.
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This report proposes that enhanced transatlantic homeland defense be a major initiative for adoption at the 2006 Riga Summit and completion at the 2008 summit. The initiative would include four categories of homeland defense:

• Guarding the approaches and achieving border security for the NATO region.
• Pursuing enhanced/integrated and linked continental early warning and air/missile defense capabilities.
• Preventing and managing terrorist incidents.
• Strengthening transatlantic capabilities for consequence management, ranging from terrorist use of WMD to large-scale natural disasters.

NATIONWIDE PLAN REVIEW: PHASE 2 REPORT. [Catastrophic Event Preparedness]
United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in cooperation with the United States Department of Transportation. June 16, 2006.
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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conducted a nationwide review of government preparedness for catastrophic events. DHS looked at whether existing emergency operations plans for states and urban areas are sufficient for managing a catastrophic event. Reviewers examined nearly 2,800 emergency operations plans and related documents with participation from more than 1,000 emergency managers and homeland security officials.

The report rates ten states as having sufficient disaster response plans: Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont. But DHS found that the majority of U.S. states, cities, and territories are far from ready for huge natural disasters, or other wide-reaching emergencies.

Among the conclusions on actions needed by the government to improve and coordinate planning are the following:

• The Federal Government should provide the leadership, doctrine, policies, guidance, standards, and resources necessary to build a shared national homeland security planning system.
• Clear guidance should be developed on how state and local governments plan for coordinated operations with Federal partners.
• Collaboration between government and non-governmental entities should be strengthened at all levels.
• Federal, State, and local governments should increase the participation of people with disabilities and disability subject-matter experts in the development and execution of plans, training, and exercises.

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY ORGANIZATION: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS.
Henry B. Hogue and Keith Bea. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated June 1, 2006.
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Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast states of Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi on August 29, 2005, resulting in severe and widespread damage to the region. The response of the federal government, especially the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in the aftermath of the storm has been a matter of considerable controversy among elected officials and in the media. Some of the criticism has focused on FEMA's organizational arrangements at the time of the disaster. Prior to these events, in July 2005, Secretary Michael Chertoff had announced a reorganization of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including FEMA. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Administration proceeded with the reorganization initiative after Congress signaled its approval.

Congress is continuing to rethink the organizational arrangements for carrying out federal emergency management functions. Legislation has been introduced in Congress bearing upon these arrangements. As of May 30, 2006, 11 bills related to federal emergency management had been introduced. Before its incorporation into DHS in 2003, FEMA was an independent agency, and eight of the 11 bills would reestablish FEMA as such. The three remaining bills would reorganize emergency management functions within DHS, bringing preparedness and response functions under one directorate, as they were prior to the July 2005 reorganization.

This report provides background information about the establishment and evolution of federal emergency management and related homeland security organization since 1950. Post-Katrina assessments of current arrangements by Congress and the White House are also discussed. Finally, the report provides a brief summary of related legislation that had been introduced as of May 30, 2006.

HOMELAND SECURITY: MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION PROBLEMS INCREASE THE VULNERABILITY OF U.S. AGRICULTURE TO FOREIGN PESTS AND DISEASE. [GAO-06-644]. United States General Accounting Office (GAO). Web-posted May 19, 2006
Report [pdf format, 74 pages]

U.S. agriculture generates over $1 trillion in annual economic activity, but concerns exist about the sector's vulnerability to a natural or deliberate introduction of foreign livestock, poultry, and crop pests and disease. Under the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program, international passengers and cargo are inspected at U.S. ports of entry to seize prohibited material and intercept foreign agricultural pests. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred AQI inspections from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and left certain other AQI responsibilities at USDA.

GAO examined:

1. the extent to which USDA and DHS have changed the inspection program since the transfer.
2. How the agencies have managed and coordinated their responsibilities.
3. How funding for agricultural inspections has been managed since the transfer.

GAO recommends, among other things, that DHS identify and assess the major risks posed by foreign pests and disease, and develop and implement a national staffing model to ensure that staff levels are sufficient to meet those risks. It recommends that DHS and USDA analyze the full cost of performing AQI inspections and ensure that user fees cover the program's costs. USDA and DHS generally agreed with the report's recommendations.

DATA MINING AND HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW.
Jeffrey W. Seifert. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated, January 27, 2006.
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Data mining, a key feature of many homeland security initiatives, involves the use of data analysis tools to discover previously unknown, valid patterns and relationships in large data sets. According to the author of this CRS report, limitations to data mining's capabilities include:

• It does not tell the user the value or significance of the patterns it reveals - those determinations must be made by the user.
• It does not necessarily identify a causal relationship in the connections it identifies between behaviors and/or variables.

Data mining is becoming increasingly common in both the private and public sectors. Industries such as banking, insurance, medicine, and retailing commonly use data mining to reduce costs, enhance research, and increase sales. In the public sector, data mining applications are used to detect fraud and waste, and measure and improve program performance. However, some of the homeland security data mining applications represent a significant expansion in the quantity and scope of data to be analyzed, and have attracted a higher level of congressional interest.

The author outlines various implementation and oversight issues that can influence the success of a data-mining project's outcome, including:

• Data quality - the accuracy and completeness of the data being analyzed.
• Interoperability of the data mining software and databases being used by different agencies.
• Mission creep - using the data for purposes other than those for which the data were originally collected.
• Privacy - the degree to which government agencies should use and mix commercial data with government data.

The author surveys legislative proposals introduced during the 108th Congress that would restrict data mining activities by some parts of the federal government, and/or increase the reporting requirements of such projects to Congress. He reports that data mining has continued to be a subject of interest in the 109th Congress. This CRS report will be updated as events warrant.

AA06097
Flynn, Stephen E. PORT SECURITY IS STILL A HOUSE OF CARDS
(Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 169, no. 1, January/February 2006, pp. 5-12)
View article on publisher's website

The author analyzes one of America's weakest areas of counterterrorism, port security, noting that "it is only a matter of time before terrorists breach the superficial security measures in place to protect the ports, ships and the millions of intermodal containers that link global producers to consumers." He argues that the importance of improving trade security is not only a public safety imperative, but also an economic precautionary measure; any attack to a major port could shut down all international trade activity. While measures from the Coast Guard and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency are in place, the actions have been "piecemeal," because "each agency [is] pursuing its signature program with little regard for other initiatives." Flynn finds the solution in a multilateral approach involving ASEAN, the EU and the U.S., which would allow for validation audits to occur. He foresees that this change will result in small economic differences on a corporate level, and large improvements against the possibility of a terrorist attack.

STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT.
United States Department of Defense. June 2005.
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Directed by the Strategic Planning Guidance (March 2004), this Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support focuses on achieving the Defense Department's paramount goal: securing the United States from direct attack.

The Strategy is rooted in the following:

• Respect for America's constitutional principles
• Adherence to Presidential and Secretary of Defense guidance
• Recognition of terrorist and state-based threats to the United States
• Commitment to continue transformation of US military capabilities.

The document states that protecting the United States in the ten-year timeframe covered by this Strategy requires an active, layered defense. This active, layered defense is global, seamlessly integrating US capabilities in the forward regions of the world, the global commons of approaches to US territory, and within the United States. It is a defense in depth.

In developing this Strategy, the Department took into account its likely force structure, resource, and technology implications. Because DoD's forces and resources are finite, the Strategy recognizes the need to manage risks in the homeland defense and civil support mission areas. It therefore prioritizes DoD's efforts, focusing on the requirement to fulfill DoD's lead responsibilities for homeland defense. The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support is not a static document. Even as the Department of Defense implements this Strategy, it will continue to adapt to changes in the strategic environment, incorporate lessons learned from operational experience, and capitalize on emerging technology and operational concepts.

FEDERAL COUNTER-TERRORISM TRAINING: ISSUES FOR CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT. [RL32920]
Shawn Reese. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. May 16, 2005.
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This report provides an overview of the major training activities and facilities of the federal departments and agencies that provide counter-terrorism training. The mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to secure the nation from terrorist attacks gives it primary federal responsibility for providing counter-terrorism training to federal, state, and local emergency responders. Other departments and agencies provide counterterrorism training, but these programs focus either on specific critical infrastructure sectors, such as energy and transportation, or on specific emergency responders, such as Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) training for medical personnel and Department of Justice (DOJ) training for law enforcement personnel. DHS provides training to a wide range of critical infrastructure personnel, law enforcement and other emergency responders, government (federal, state, and local) personnel, and medical personnel.

The author identifies issues associated with the training, including:

• Possible duplication of federal counter-terrorism training programs.
• Determination of Department of Homeland Security counterterrorism training priorities.
• Coordination of DHS counter-terrorism training programs with those of other agencies.

ON THE GROUND: PROTECTING AMERICA'S ROADS AND TRANSIT AGAINST TERRORISM.
Arnold M. Howitt and Jonathan Makler. Brookings Institution. Web-posted April 26, 2005.
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The U.S. federal government, states, and localities have spent considerable funds on transportation security since September 11, 2001. The authors note that only a small percentage of that funding has addressed needs outside of the air travel system and equipment for the "first responders" of public safety agencies. However, from 1991 to 2001, 42 percent of all terrorist attacks worldwide have targeted surface transportation systems - rail systems or buses. This report examines the regulatory, financial, and logistical landscape of surface transportation security, making policy recommendations while counseling decision-makers to weigh carefully the trade-offs between accessibility and security.

The report reviews some of the initiatives in place in state and local jurisdictions, and explores options for increasing local means for protecting surface transportation.