Embassy of the United States

Security Affairs

Defense Policy Archive

DEFENSE CONTRACTING INTEGRITY.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. September 22, 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 49 pages]

Until recently, ethics programs and practices of defense contractors were self-policed. Given the significant sums spent to acquire goods and services, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) was amended twice starting in December 2007 to first mandate and later amplify contractor ethics program rules. GAO recommends actions aimed at improving oversight of ethics programs.

FACT SHEET ON U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY: A “PHASED, ADAPTIVE APPROACH” FOR MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE.
The White House. September 17, 2009.
Full Text [HTML format, various paging]

President Obama has approved the recommendation of Secretary of Defense Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe. The approach is based on an assessment of the Iranian missile threat, and a commitment to deploy technology that is proven, cost-effective, and adaptable to an evolving security environment.

DETER, DEFEND, REPEL, AND PARTNER: A DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR TAIWAN.
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy. Dan Blumenthal et al. Web posted August 3, 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 28 pages]

The report is designed to help generate serious reflections on how best to preserve the ROC's own accomplishments as a people and a government and to enable it to choose its own future as free of coercion as possible.

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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITH PARTNER AIR FORCES.
RAND Corporation. Jennifer D. P. Moroney et al. May 4, 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 156 pages]

The U.S. Air Force faces a challenging environment as it devises an approach to managing security cooperation with partner countries. The important mission of countering terrorist and insurgent groups abroad requires working closely with allies and partner countries to strengthen security. Accordingly, current U.S. defense strategy emphasizes that the U.S. armed forces should prepare to do more to work “by, with, and through partners” to accomplish their missions.

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RELEASE OF DECLASSIFIED NARRATIVE DESCRIBING THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIVE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S OPINIONS ON THE CIA’S DETENTION AND INTERROGRATION PROGRAM.
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. April 22, 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 17 pages]

The Senate Intelligence Committee releases a document describing the early approval of the CIA interrogation program by the Bush Administration, and the preparation of the Office of Legal Counsel opinions that gave legal approval for the use of specific interrogation techniques. The Committee, under then-Chairman Jay Rockefeller’s leadership, has been working with the Bush and Obama Administrations since August 2008 to have this document declassified, long before the decision to release four OLC legal opinions last week.

IMPROVING CAPACITY FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS.
RAND Corporation. Nora Bensahel et al. April 3, 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 105 pages]

Recent stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq have underlined the need for the United States to shift the burden of these operations away from the Defense Department and onto other government agencies better suited to the work, according to the study. The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, the agencies best suited for this type of work, are not set up for large-scale, rapid deployment, leaving the bulk of the work in the hands of the Defense Department, whose main mission is war fighting.

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Gates, Robert M. A BALANCED STRATEGY: REPROGRAMMING THE PENTAGON FOR A NEW AGE (Foreign Affairs, vol. 88, no. 1, January/February 2009, pp. 28-40)
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Defense Secretary Gates writes that U.S. credibility would be dealt a disastrous blow if we were to fail, or be perceived to fail, in Iraq or Afghanistan. As an active participant in U.S. national security decisions for 42 years, the author writes that the U.S. is unlikely to pursue another “forced regime change followed by nation-building under fire anytime soon.” In the future, he says the U.S. should take an indirect approach, whenever possible, by building up the capacity of partner governments and security forces “to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention.” Whenever possible, he also says, military operations should be subordinated to efforts designed to promote better governance, economic development, and programs to address grievances of the discontented -- a ready pool from which terrorists recruit. He laments the wholescale downsizing of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the folding of the U.S. Information Agency “into a corner of the State Department.” Gates says the military and civilian elements of national security are out of balance, and that the cultural, political, psychological and human dimensions of warfare must not be neglected. While the military’s global reach is an indispensable contributor to ensuring peace, the secretary also concludes that “not every act of aggression or crisis can or should elicit a U.S. military response.”

JAPAN’S DECISION FOR WAR IN 1941: SOME ENDURING LESSONS.
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Jeffrey Record. February 9, 2009.
Full Text [HTML format with link to PDF file, 78 pages]

The author takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war in 1941, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decisionmakers.

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AA09025
Kerton-Johnson, Nicholas JUSTIFYING THE USE OF FORCE IN A POST-9/11 WORLD: STRIVING FOR HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (International Affairs, Vol. 84, no. 5, September 2008, pp. 991-1007)
Full text available from your nearest American Library

The author, lecturer at the University of Bristol (UK), argues that, following 9/11, the United States has sought to unilaterally replace the international community as the guarantor and definer of global values. Although President Bush could have sought justification for the war in Afghanistan by using international law arguments, his administration largely used what Kerton-Jones calls an “egoist morality” such as promoting the spread of American freedom and democracy verses the evils of terrorism in the run-up to war. In Iraq, “egoist morality” again was prominent, with statements portraying the United States as standing up to global security threats and assisting those aspiring to greater freedom in contrast to perceived inaction by the United Nations. In both cases, the Bush administration’s arguments for war were targeting the American public, rather than seeking international legitimacy. References to human rights abuses by the Taliban and Saddam Hussein were more for the purpose of demonization than justification, Kerton-Johnson argues.

AA08452
Johnson, Reuben F. TENNIS SHOES AND STOLEN TOILETS: RUSSIA’S MILITARY ‘RENAISSANCE’ (Weekly Standard, Vol. 14, no. 10, November 24, 2008)
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While Russia has announced several grandiose plans to restore its military in recent years, economic realities -– specifically its overdependence on energy exports -– assure that these lavish promises are unlikely to materialize. While President Medvedev has announced increases in military spending, these sums are dwarfed by defense spending in the United States and Europe and will be largely absorbed in maintaining its existing assets. Russia’s success in its August 2008 conflict in Georgia was the result of superior numbers, says the author, who relates anecdotes of Russian troops wearing sneakers into battle and their awe at the sight of Georgia’s U.S.-built military facilities. The wasteful naval maneuvers in Venezuela and a recent accident aboard a next-generation nuclear submarine also reflect the massive economic, political, intelligence and administrative chasms that Russian defense policymakers will need to bridge in the coming years.

AA08411
Flournoy, Michele; Brimley, Shawn THE DEFENSE INHERITANCE: CHALLENGES AND CHOICES FOR THE NEXT PENTAGON TEAM (Washington Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 4, Autumn 2008, pp. 59-76)
Full Text [PDF format, 18 pages]

The authors, both with the Center for a New American Security, note that when Barack Obama is inaugurated in January, he will face “the most daunting defense inheritance in generations” -– wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; the search for bin Laden; the increasing power of China, Russia, India, and Pakistan; changes in the nature of war, as shown by the Israeli experience in Lebanon; cyberspace warfare; instability on the world’s oceans; and broader systemic problems such as climate change and increased competition for resources, including food. This dire situation is compounded by American budgetary woes made worse by the economic crisis, the spiraling costs of entitlements, and the exploding costs of the two wars. The Pentagon will be forced to make tough choices regarding personnel and weapons programs. The authors note that the Defense Department “cannot afford to continue hemorrhaging taxpayer dollars because of its broken acquisition system.” Other problems facing the new administration include countering weapons of mass destruction, reducing the U.S. nuclear posture, reexamining the U.S. global military posture, sustaining the all-volunteer force, fixing dysfunctional management processes, and improving interagency cooperation.

FUTURE U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS WITH IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: U.S. AIR FORCE ROLES.
RAND Corporation. David E. Thaler et al. Web posted August 12, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 183 pages]

The United States is heavily invested in Iraq and Afghanistan, and developments in these two nations will affect not only their own interests but those of their neighbors and the U.S. as well. The authors emphasize that the U.S. must clarify its long-term intentions to the governments and peoples in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the surrounding regions. They describe possible regional security structures and bilateral U.S. relationships with both countries. The authors recommend that the U.S. provide increased, sustained resources for development of the Iraqi and Afghan airpower, because the greater the emphasis on building these capabilities now, the faster indigenous air forces will be able to operate independently and the operational demands on the U.S. Air Force will diminish.

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STANDING DOWN AS IRAQ STANDS UP.
Brookings Institute. Stephen Biddle et al. August 7, 2008.
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The Iraq war has become one of the most polarizing issues in American politics. Most Democrats, including Senator Barack Obama (D-Ill.), want large, early troop cuts; most Republicans, including Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.), want U.S. troops to stay until Iraq’s stability is guaranteed. A series of positive developments in the past year and a half offers hope that the desire of so many Americans to bring the troops home can be fulfilled without leaving Iraq in chaos. The right approach, in other words, can partly square Obama’s goal of redeploying large numbers of U.S. forces sooner rather than later with McCain’s goal of ensuring stability in Iraq.

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MULLAHS, MONEY, AND MILITIAS.
United States Institute of Peace. Barbara Slavin. June 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 24 pages]

Iran has been a significant player in the Middle East, influencing and being influenced by its neighbors. In the past five years, Iran’s regional power has expanded considerably more. Iran’s reach remains constrained by an open-ended U.S. military presence in the region, domestic weakness, and historic divisions between Arabs and Persians, Sunnis and Shiites, and among Shiites. According to the report, Iran neither wants nor is able to recreate the Persian Empire, nor is it about to become a second Soviet Union. Iran’s goals appear to be largely defensive. To achieve its goals, Iran exerts influence in three major ways: through ties with Shiite clerics, or mullahs, financial aid for humanitarian and political causes, and weapons and training supplied to militant groups.

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DEPLOYING FEDERAL CIVILIANS TO THE BATTLEFIELD: INCENTIVES, BENEFITS, AND MEDICAL CARE.
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations. Web posted April 30, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 77 pages]

The recent survey by the American Foreign Service Association provides some insight into what motivates Foreign Service Officers to volunteer to serve in a combat zone. In response to the question, “If you have served in Iraq or would be willing to serve there, what factors would motivate you to do so?” The largest percentage (68%) of the nearly 4,300 respondents said “Extra pay and benefits,” 59% said “Patriotism/duty,” and 48% said “Career enhancement.” A motivated and qualified all-volunteer force must be preferred to one populated by reluctant draftees. Tomorrow’s potential civilian volunteers will note how today’s deployed members are supported and compensated for these risky assignments.

AA08120
Cooley, Alexander U.S. BASES AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN CENTRAL ASIA (Orbis, vol. 52, no. 1, Winter 2008, pp. 65-90)
Full text available from your nearest American Library

Cooley, assistant professor of political science at Barnard College, Columbia University, asserts that under the Pentagon’s current Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR), the U.S. is reducing its forces at several major Cold War bases and is establishing a global network of smaller, more flexible facilities in new areas such as Central Asia, the Black Sea and Africa. Drawing upon recent experience in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the author cautions that these new U.S. overseas bases, despite their lighter footprint and regardless of the prevailing security situation, risk becoming enmeshed in the local struggles and political agendas of elites within these host countries. Periods of turbulent political transition and regime instability may encourage host country politicians to challenge the legitimacy and terms of the U.S. basing presence for their own political purposes. These are important lessons for U.S. planners who are simultaneously promoting democratization while they negotiate basing and military access agreements in politically volatile countries.

AA08098
Bowman, Bradley L. AFTER IRAQ: FUTURE U.S. MILITARY POSTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (Washington Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 2, Spring 2008, pp. 77-91)
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The author, a former Council on Foreign Relations fellow and former professor at the U.S. Military Academy, believes that as forces are withdrawn from Iraq, the U.S. should resist the temptation to increase or redeploy troops to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. The U.S. can deter Iran and reassure its GCC allies by other means without expanding military bases. A large U.S. regional military presence is unnecessary and often counterproductive as the American experience during the Cold War proved, when the presence of U.S. troops in the region was limited and infrequent. Today, the U.S. needs only a minimal military in the Middle East to counter threats to its three key interests: to guarantee a reliable flow of oil from the Persian Gulf region; to ensure that regional states and non-state actors do not obtain weapons of mass destruction; and to prevent the region from becoming a haven for extremism.

AA08105
Yoshihara, Toshi; Holmes, James R. CHINA'S ENERGY-DRIVEN 'SOFT POWER' (Orbis, vol. 52, no. 1, Winter 2008, pp. 123-137)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

Yoshihara and Holmes, associate professors at the U.S. Naval War College, assert that energy security has prompted China to turn its strategic gaze to the seas for the first time in six centuries. For now, Taiwan remains Beijing’s uppermost priority, but there are signs that the Chinese leadership is already contemplating the “day after” in the Taiwan Strait to resolve them to their satisfaction. The authors believe in n the meantime, China is attempting to shape the diplomatic environment in vital regions such as Southeast and South Asia using “soft power.” By invoking the voyages of Zhen He, the Ming Dynasty’s “eunuch admiral,” the authors say Beijing sends the message that it is a trustworthy guarantor of Asian maritime security.

SECURING THE HIGH SEAS: AMERICA'S GLOBAL MARITIME CONSTABULATORY POWER.
Heritage Foundation Maritime Security Working Group; Heritage Special Report # 20. Mackenzie M. Eaglen, et. al. March 12, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 25 pages]

This report identifies the roles and missions that are related to global maritime constabulary power, describes the respective roles of allied nations and the private sector, and recommends a division of responsibilities between the Navy and the Coast Guard.

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OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: STRATEGIES, APPROACHES, RESULTS, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS.
Congressional Research Service, RL34387, Library of Congress. Catharine Marie Dale. Web posted February 29, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 120 pages]

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was launched on March 20, 2003. The immediate goal was to remove the regime, including destroying its ability to use or disseminate weapons of mass destruction. The broad, longer-term objective is now more open-ended; to help an emerging new Iraqi leadership improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. This report considers various options for the U.S. government.

PLANNING FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS: THE USE OF CAPABILITIES-BASED APPROACHES.
Kathleen Hicks and Eric Ridge. International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Web posted December 18, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 57 pages]

Since 2001, “the Department of Defense (DOD) has placed a high priority on institutionalizing capabilities-based planning (CBP).” CBP is helpful for “optimizing forces across a broad range of mission sets and within fiscal constraints.” This study was conducted from March 2007 through August 2007, and included a scenario-based workshop to test the “validity and utility of CBP-derived capability packages.” This report presents the findings and recommendations of this study.

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THE U.S.-AUSTRALIA TREATY ON DEFENSE TRADE COOPERATION.
Bruce Vaughn. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. December 12, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 6 pages]

In September 2007, the U.S. and Australia signed a treaty on Defense Trade Cooperation. This treaty will facilitate defense trade and cooperation and will strengthen ties between two close allies who have fought together most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. Australia has also worked closely with the U.S. in its efforts to contain militant, anti-Western Islamists. This treaty must be ratified by the U. S. Senate to come into force.

INTEGRATING 21ST CENTURY DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE: FINAL REPORT.
Task Force on Non-Traditional Security Assistance, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Web posted December 12, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 61 pages]

The Task Force on Non-Traditional Security Assistance was charged with:

• Identifying the drivers behind the Department of Defense’s (DOD) development assistance functions;
• Assessing the Pentagon performance in these non-traditional areas;
• Examining what is occurring in the diplomatic and development spheres;
• Evaluating the implications of DOD’s enlarged national security role, foreign policy, and development objectives; and
• Offering concrete recommendations for a balanced and sustainable division of responsibilities between the Pentagon and civilian agencies.

This report summarizes the Task Force’s findings and recommendations.

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WAR BY OTHER MEANS -- BUILDING COMPLETE AND BALANCED CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY. RAND COUNTERINSURGENCY STUDY -- FINAL REPORT.
By: David C. Gompert, John Gordon, IV, Adam Grissom, David R. Frelinger, Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, Edward O'Connell, Brooke K. Stearns, Robert E. Hunter. Rand Corporation, February 2008.
Press Release [html format]

Document Information [html format], including link to Summary and Full Report

This report, commissioned by the Pentagon, is critical of U.S. military intervention and occupation in the Muslim world, suggesting that there are more effective means for diffusing insurgencies, such as helping to build effective and legitimate local governments and military and police forces.

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McFate, Sean U.S. AFRICA COMMAND: A NEW STRATEGIC PARADIGM? (Military Review, January-February 2008, pp. 10-21)
Full Text [pdf format, 12 pages]

Useful overview of the U.S.’s 10th united combatant command, Africa Command, or AFRICOM as it is better known.

WHAT ARE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR? RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESTRUCTURING U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby. Arms Control Association. Revised and Updated October 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 42 pages]

On November 13, 2001, the U.S. and Russia adopted a policy of cooperation against (1) new threats of terrorists, and (2) unstable governments acquiring nuclear weapons. The authors contend, based on an analysis of present and prospective threats, that the strategic arsenal required by the U.S. can be considerably reduced; and conclude by stating that “a world without nuclear weapons should be the ultimate goal.”

AA07416
Posen, Barry R. STABILITY AND CHANGE IN U.S. GRAND STRATEGY (Orbis vol. 51, no. 4, Fall 2007, pp. 561-571)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

The author, professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, notes that, while globalization has made for economic growth and improved standards of living in many countries, it has also greatly increased economic inequality and made millions of people susceptible to appeals by extremist groups. Global communications links have also allowed transnational extremist groups to spread their message easily. Posen writes that while the collapse of the Soviet Union may have left the U.S. as the premier global military power, it has masked the limits of the U.S. military’s ability to control zones of conflict. The unilateralist policies of the current administration, whom the author terms “national liberals”, over the last seven years have precipitated a tug-of-war debate with the Democrat-leaning “liberal internationalists”, who favor legitimacy, and with advocates of restraint, over how to project U.S. military power overseas. Posen notes that the conflict in Iraq has left proponents of primacy in both camps in some disrepute; he predicts that a strategy of restraint will prevail by default, and the U.S. Navy will be key in carrying it out.

IRAN’S REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS, THE AL QUDS FORCE, AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE AND PARAMILITARY FORCES. Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). August 16, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 18 pages]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) was formed after the Iranian Revolution of 1979 to protect the new government’s Islamic order. It has since evolved “to be a major political, military, and economic force in Iran.” This report describes the various parts and interactions of the IRGC, and who it supports with warfare and covert operations both covertly and openly.

RETHINKING WESTERN STRATEGIES TOWARD PAKISTAN: AN ACTION AGENDA FOR THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE. Frédéric Grare. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. July 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 60 pages]

“This report makes the case that the Pakistani state bears responsibility for the worsening security situation in Afghanistan, the resurgence of the Taliban, terrorism in Kashmir, and the growth of jihadi ideology and capabilities internationally.” In the past, the U.S. and most western countries have dealt with Pakistan on short-term interests, and Pakistan has taken advantage of this by assisting in urgent U.S. objectives. “This report calls for a new strategy designed to encourage Pakistanis, particularly the military, to reestablish the preeminence of civilian government according to the Pakistani constitution.”

Archive

 

AMERICA AND THE USE OF FORCE: SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY. Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan. Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide Project, Stanley Foundation. June 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 12 pages]

Many American and foreign observers believe that due to the “unsuccessful intervention in Iraq,” the U.S. will be reluctant to go to war in the future. The authors offer an opposing viewpoint and suggest three factors to support their analysis. The factors are: (1) the character of U.S. foreign policy is that we use force willingly and frequently on behalf of principles and interests; (2) the distribution of power in the world invites military intervention by a dominant force; and (3) the current international system considers the use of force necessary and proper.

The authors assert that “[w]hen it comes to the use of force, the American and global debates often present a narrow choice between going with the United Nations or going it alone. This is a false choice. There is an effective and viable alternative to multilateral paralysis and unilateral action—working with our democratic partners in NATO and around the world to meet and defeat the global challenges of our age.”

AA07207
Levitt, Matthew PUTIN'S NEW FRIENDS: MOSCOW HOSTS HAMAS (Weekly Standard, Vol. 12, No. 26, March 19, 2007, pp 14-15)
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The author, a scholar at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and author of HAMAS: POLITICS, CHARITY AND TERRORISM IN THE SERVICE OF JIHAD, writes that that Russia is pursuing an increasingly assertive foreign policy at odds with U.S. interests. Levitt notes that for the second time in a year, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has hosted a visit to Moscow by Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal. “The red carpet visit occurred despite Hamas's refusal to recognize Israel, renounce violence, or accept previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements as required by the Quartet, comprising the United States, European Union, United Nations, and – yes -- Russia,” Levitt writes. At the same time, according to the author, Russia is weighing selling advanced anti-tank weapons systems to Syria, which supplied Hezbollah with Russian-made weapons that were used in the 2006 attacks against Israel. For Levitt, the Russian courtship of Hamas is “particularly strange” because Hamas has ties to the Chechen Muslim insurgents who have been fighting Russia for years. Meanwhile, Hamas has established its own standing militia of 6,000 fighters to rival mainstream Palestinian security forces.

THE UNCERTAIN “METRICS” OF AFGHANISTAN (AND IRAQ). Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). May 18, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 9 pages]

Afghanistan is scarcely a “forgotten war,” but it has never received the same level of attention as Iraq. Canada, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. are on the offensive, and so far there is little evidence of a corresponding offensive by the Taliban. Mullah Dadullah Lang, the Taliban's best-known military commander, was killed in fighting in Southern Afghanistan in May. He was the third key Taliban leader to be killed in the last six months. 

However, there is growing evidence that Afghans resent the U.S. and NATO military activity. The central government in Afghanistan “is ineffective (and often simply not present), it is corrupt and making little progress in providing services and effective governance.” The author argues that the U.S., NATO, and the Afghan government still have opportunities for victory, but the campaign in Afghanistan must become “a major exercise in armed nation building;” not just a counterinsurgency campaign.

AA07160
Cumings, Bruce. THE AMERICA WAY OF GOING TO WAR: MEXICO (1846) TO IRAQ.
(2003) (Orbis, vol. 51, no. 2, Spring 2007, pp. 195-215)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

The author, professor of history at the University of Chicago, asserts that, prior to the Iraq War, there had been a long series of American wars in which U.S. leaders often maneuvered the other side into “firing the first shot.” This strategy of “passive defense” amounts to an American way of going to war, and it dates back at least to the U.S.-Mexican War. The United States thus retained moral and legal legitimacy, but Cumings argues that the Iraq War represents a fundamental departure from this path. He believes that it might be the worst crisis since Vietnam, but that it was just the latest entry in the U.S. playbook for how to go to war. The Iraq War not only contradicts longstanding practices in American foreign policy, but it has the potential to create far greater international disorder than the Vietnam War. He believes that it may make future presidents more heedful of John Quincy Adams’ prophetic words: “go not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.”

AA07137
Feldstein, Martin. THE UNDERFUNDED PENTAGON
(Foreign Affairs, vol. 86, no. 2, March/April 2007, pp. 134-140)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

Even with current U.S. defense expenditures totaling more than the combined military budgets of the next 40 nations, a significant increase in American military spending is needed, argues Feldstein, a professor of economics at Harvard University and CEO of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Deterring other great powers, such as Russia and China, requires the U.S. to maintain its current spending level, while three new threats -– small regional powers with weapons of mass destruction like North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan; global non-state terrorist networks like al-Qaida; and independent terrorists and extremist groups –- require expansion of intelligence capabilities, increased manpower in the Army and Marine Corps (reserving the National Guard solely for homeland security), and new rapid-deployment weapon systems for conducting urban warfare. Feldstein says today’s defense budget, even with the inclusion of Iraq and Afghanistan operations, is just 4 percent of the gross domestic product and believes it should be 6 percent, as it was under President Reagan. He makes the case that this increase can be met through the rise in personal tax revenues that happens naturally during economic growth, by holding spending on non-defense discretionary programs to current levels, and closing tax loopholes. Political leadership, he says, is needed to make the financial commitment necessary for effective national security.

AA07136
Blumenthal, Dan; Friedberg, Aaron. NOT TOO LATE TO CURB DEAR LEADER: THE ROAD TO PYONGYANG RUNS THROUGH BEIJING
(Weekly Standard, Vol. 12, No. 21, February 12, 2007, pp 12-14)
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The authors, both of whom worked for the current Bush administration, believe the president should press China now "to use its very considerable leverage to bring Kim Jong Il to heel." They assert that the Six-Party Talks, including China, Japan, Russia, the U.S. and both Koreas, could have worked if the five seeking to curb Pyongyang had been willing to "squeeze" the DPRK while talking. Though Japan and the U.S. did that, they say, China and South Korea did not. China gains by a continuation of the status quo, they assert, and so persuading Beijing to change course requires convincing it that "continued passivity is riskier than action." The authors recommend three steps: impose further financial sanctions on the DPRK; tell Beijing clearly that with a Democratic majority in Congress, failure to resolve the North Korean issue satisfactorily will hurt U.S.-China relations; and a clear U.S. statement that it will do whatever is necessary to defend its interests and those of its Asian allies. A nuclear North Korea could result in a nuclear Japan, among several other possibilities.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, AND TRADE: KEY ISSUES FOR THE 110TH CONGRESS.
Clare M. Ribando and Bruce Vaughn. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. December 20, 2006.
Full Text [pdf format, 80 pages]

“This report identifies major issues most likely to be on the legislative agenda, discusses critical policy choices at stake, and summarizes some of the major alternatives that Congress may consider.” This report also identifies CRS reports that address these issues. Some of the issues confronting the new Congress are: (1) what to do with Iraq; (2) Afghanistan’s progress, (3) defense spending, and (4) trade issues.

RECONSTRUCTION IN IRAQ: THE UNCERTAIN WAY AHEAD.
Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Web posted January 19, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 33 pages]

The author believes that past economic and reconstruction plans in Iraq have been inadequate and new plans will need to be totally restructured during 2007 and 2008. He raises several issues and suggests a number of actions which will encourage foreign investment and development.

LOOKING BEYOND THE SURGE: THE TESTS A NEW US STRATEGY IN IRAQ MUST MEET.
Anthony H. Cordesman and Arleigh A. Burke. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). January 4, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 44 pages]

“The current debate over surging US military manpower has steadily lost focus on the real issue: Providing more US troops can only serve a purpose if it is tied to a new and comprehensive approach to providing stability and security in Iraq.”

“The problem is not total US force levels or the security of Baghdad. It is the ability to reverse the current drift toward a major civil war and separation of the country by finding a new approach to US intervention in Iraq.”

AA07025
Crook, Clive NO EASY EXIT FROM IRAQ
(National Journal, posted online January 12, 2007)
Full text (HTML format)

The author presents an analysis of the current situation in Iraq, opining that “The president’s plan to send a ‘surge’ of troops into Iraq seems a clear instance of too little, too late.” He also warns against a precipitate retreat, which “would make things worse, and maybe much worse.” He believes that the best course of action “would be a much bigger commitment of extra forces, of the kind that Sen. John McCain has advocated from the beginning, together with an undertaking that they would remain until security had been re-established.” Recognizing that this is politically unsustainable, he suggests that the “least-bad feasible option” is to follow the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, “minus the indication of a prompt withdrawal, whether or not preceded by one last push.” He criticizes “the egregious intelligence failure over Iraqi weapons of mass destruction” but also acknowledges that he and other supporters of the war made serious mistakes, including underestimating the ferocity of the sectarian animosity in Iraq. He concludes, “the direct and indirect costs of the war —- including, not least, the costs to America’s reputation and security —- have greatly exceeded the benefits. And the world is a far more dangerous place as a result.”

AA07012
Heinze, Eric A. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE WAR IN IRAQ: NORMS, DISCOURSE, AND STATE PRACTICE
(Parameters, vol. 36, no. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 20-34)
Full text [HTML format]

Dr. Heinze, Political Science Professor at the University of Oklahoma, analyzes the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as justification for the exercise of military power, specifically in the war in Iraq. With the failure to find weapons of mass destruction, the resort to force in Iraq has been justified on human rights grounds. The six factors that Heinze uses to determine if a war is a legitimate humanitarian intervention, include, motive, level of human suffering, war as a last resort, prospects for success, proportionality and right authority.

REGIONAL FEARS OF WESTERN PRIMACY AND THE FUTURE OF U.S. MIDDLE EASTERN BASING POLICY.
W. Andrew Terrill. Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College. Web posted December 15, 2006.
Full Text [pdf format, 112 pages]

The U.S. has a core interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East; however, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait shocked the Arab system. As a result, Saudi Arabia allowed U.S. troops to be stationed on its soil while Bahrain and Oman strengthened their security agreements with the U.S.

Large and important Arab states find it embarrassing to rely too publicly on the West for their military security, and “these same states may have difficulty presenting themselves as important voices within the Arab World if they appear to be disproportionately influenced by the West…” Egypt and Jordan maintain close military relations with the U.S., but stop short of allowing bases.

The paper emphasizes that it is important to continue to nurture basing arrangements with friendly Arab countries that accept an American presence. During times of crisis, these nations might assist the U.S. with their political influence, intelligence sharing, and temporary use of military facilities.

“It should be emphasized further that the United States must not place serious hope in the prospect of long-term military bases in Iraq unless there is overwhelming political sentiment within that country favoring these bases. The development of such sentiment appears extremely unlikely.” “Moreover, Iraq is a large and prominent Arab state which seeks a voice in regional politics.” A U.S. presence in Iraq could undermine this voice.

Despite strong and important relations with Gulf Arab allies, the U.S. can not make the mistake of treating these relationships casually. A number of these states respond to high level consultation and a willingness to listen to their points of view. “None of these states trust Iran, and while the U.S. approach to regional security may sometimes be a source of aggravation, it is viewed widely as an indispensable presence.”

ALLIANCES AND AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY.
Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall. United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). October 2006. Web-posted November 1, 2006.
Full text [pdf format, 49 pages]

This monograph makes the case that existing U.S. alliances need to be modernized and strengthened, and that new alliances should be established. The author stresses the value of peacetime security cooperation, which builds partnerships that may become alliances. /> She describes the need to evolve the concept of alliances to fit 21st century security threats that may not be confined to a particular region, such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or pandemic disease.

The paper contends that some traditional allies no longer depend on the United States for their survival as they did during the Cold War, and that the United States may depend more rather than less on its allies in Europe and Asia to achieve its global goals. "In the face of transnational dangers, the United States will need to promote alliances that are defined in broader terms than the classical geographically-based model. Transregional linkages among allies and alliances need to be forged in response to global threats." Sherwood-Randall recommends the networking of key U.S. alliance relationships into an "alliance of alliances."

SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY CHALLENGES: AMERICA'S RESPONSE?
Marvin C. Ott. National Defense University (NDU), Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS). October 2006.
Full text [pdf format, 8 pages]

Citing the examples of counterterrorism and tsunami relief, the author avers that the United States has effective policies and initiatives regarding Southeast Asia, but argues such efforts to not constitute a security strategy. The recent signing of a U.S.-ASEAN framework document pledging active efforts to strengthen economic ties and work toward a summit is a useful first step, says Ott, but the U.S. should also develop a new attitude towards the region - "less lecturing, less dictating, more listening, more consultation, more respect." He proffers some initiatives that he believes would bolster security strategies in the region. Among them are his suggestions that the U.S.:

• systematically think through U.S. interests, goals, and the challenges/threats to them;
• judge the degree to which the United States is willing to accommodate the growth of Chinese power and influence in the region;
• clarify U.S. thinking regarding sea lanes (Malacca Straits and South China Sea routes) as to their status under international law, U.S. vital interests at stake, and the circumstances in which the United States would act militarily to defend those interests.
• propose/initiate a security dialogue with each of the Southeast Asia countries to be conducted at whatever level the counterpart government prefers.

MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006.
[S. 3930] United States Senate. Signed into law (Pub. L. 109-366) by the President on October 17, 2006.
Full report [pdf format, 38 pages]

[Note: Although unusually long, the entire text of the CRS summary of this Act is provided below, to ensure that synopses of all sections are included. The text of that summary as presented below is available online

]

"Military Commissions Act of 2006 - (Sec. 2) States that the authority under this Act to establish military commissions (commissions) may not be construed to alter or limit the President's authority under the Constitution or laws of the United States to establish commissions for areas declared to be under martial law or in occupied territories should circumstances so require.

(Sec. 3) Amends the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to codify and establish procedures governing the use of commissions to try alien unlawful enemy combatants (combatants) engaged in hostilities against the United States for violations of the law of war and other offenses specifically made triable by commissions under this Act. Defines an "unlawful enemy combatant" as a person who has: (1) engaged in or supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant; or (2) been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or other tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense (Secretary). Defines a "lawful enemy combatant" as a person who is a member of: (1) the regular forces of a State party engaged in hostilities against the United States; (2) a militia, volunteer corps, or organized resistance movement belonging to a State party engaged in such hostilities, which are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the law of war; or (3) a regular armed force who professes allegiance to a government engaged in such hostilities, but not recognized by the United States.

Authorizes the President to establish such commissions. Prohibits commission findings, holdings, and other precedents from being introduced or considered in any proceeding of a court-martial convened under the UCMJ. Prohibits a combatant subject to trial by commission from invoking the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights. Allows commissions to impose upon any person found guilty any punishment not forbidden under the UCMJ, including the death penalty. Requires an annual report from the Secretary to the congressional defense committees on any trials conducted.

Makes eligible to serve on a commission any commissioned officer of the Armed Forces on active duty. Requires to be detailed to each commission a military judge, trial and military defense counsel, and reporters and interpreters. Requires at least five members in each commission.

Outlines commission pre-trial procedures, including charges and specifications. Prohibits a person from being required to testify against himself (compulsory self-incrimination) at a commission proceeding. Prohibits (with a limited exception) a statement obtained by the use of torture from being admissible against the accused.

Prescribes commission trial procedures, including: (1) rules of evidence; (2) duties of trial and defense counsel; (3) pleas of the accused; (4) opportunity to obtain witnesses and other evidence; (5) the defense of lack of mental responsibility; and (6) the record of trial. Requires: (1) a two-thirds commission member vote for conviction; (2) a three-fourths member vote for a sentence of life imprisonment or confinement of more than ten years; and (3) a unanimous vote by at least 12 members in a case in which the death penalty is sought. Prohibits any sentence from including cruel or unusual punishments such as flogging, branding, or marking or tattooing of the body.

Prescribes commission post-trial procedures, including: (1) review by the convening authority; (2) appeal by the United States; (3) rehearings; (4) reviews by the Court of Military Commission Review, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Supreme Court; and (5) the execution of sentences.

Makes the following offenses triable by commissions: (1) murder of protected persons; (2) attacking civilians; (3) attacking civilian objects; (4) attacking protected property; (5) pillaging; (6) denying quarter; (7) taking hostages; (8) employing poison or similar weapons; (9) using protected persons as a shield; (10) using protected property as a shield; (11) torture; (12) cruel or inhuman treatment; (13) intentionally causing serious bodily injury; (14) mutilating or maiming; (15) murder in violation of the law of war; (16) destruction of property in violation of the law of war; (17) using treachery or perfidy; (18) improperly using a flag of truce; (19) improperly using a distinctive emblem; (20) intentionally mistreating a dead body; (21) rape; (22) sexual assault or abuse; (23) hijacking or hazarding a vessel or aircraft; (24) terrorism; (25) providing material support for terrorism; (26) wrongfully aiding the enemy; (27) spying; (28) conspiracy; (29) perjury and obstruction of justice; and (30) contempt.

Requires a report from the Secretary to the defense committees setting forth commission procedures prescribed under this Act.

(Sec. 4) Makes inapplicable to commissions UCMJ provisions concerning: (1) contempt; (2) speedy trial; (3) self-incrimination warnings; and (4) pretrial investigations.

(Sec. 5) Prohibits a person from invoking the Geneva Conventions in any habeas corpus or other civil action to which the United States, a current or former officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a party as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its states or territories.

(Sec. 6) Authorizes the President to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions and to promulgate standards and regulations for violations of treaty obligations which are not grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Directs the President to issue such interpretations through Executive Orders.

Amends the federal criminal code to include the following as violations of the War Crimes Act: (1) torture; (2) cruel or inhuman treatment; (3) performing biological experiments; (4) murder; (5) mutilation or maiming; (6) intentionally causing serious bodily injury; (7) rape; (8) sexual assault or abuse; and (9) taking hostages. Prohibits any person in the custody or control of the United States, regardless of nationality or physical location, from being subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

(Sec. 7) Amends federal criminal justice provisions to deny any court or judge jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of, or to hear or consider any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, treatment, or trial of, an alien detained outside the United States who is or was detained by the United States and has been determined to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination. Makes the provisions of this section effective upon enactment, and applicable to all cases, without exception, pending on or after enactment which relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained by the United States since September 11, 2001.

(Sec. 8) Amends provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 relating to the protection of U.S. government personnel engaged in authorized interrogations to: (1) require (currently authorizes) the U.S. government to provide counsel and pay the legal fees of any such personnel with respect to any civil action or criminal prosecution arising out of an authorized interrogation; and (2) make such provisions effective with respect to actions occurring between September 11, 2001, and December 30, 2005.

(Sec. 9) Amends the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 to make reviews of all judgments of commissions (currently, only judgments involving a capital case or a case in which the alien was sentenced to imprisonment of ten years or more) a matter of right.

(Sec. 10) Includes all aliens detained by the United States (currently, only those detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) under the authority for the review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia of a decision of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal that an alien is properly detained as an enemy combatant."

STRIKING FIRST: PREEMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE ATTACK IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY.
Karl P. Mueller, Jasen J. Castillo, Forrest E. Morgan, Negeen Pegahi, and Brian Rosen. RAND. October 13, 2006.
Full Report [pdf format, 345 pages]

Summary [pdf format, 19 pages]

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. national security policymakers announced that in the future the United States would take advantage of opportunities to strike at potential adversaries before they attack. This doctrine of "preemption" has two facets. True preemptive attack occurs when a country strikes an enemy to foil or mitigate the effects of an imminent attack against it (such as when Israel struck Egyptian airfields at the beginning of the Six Day War in 1967). Preventive attack, which is historically more common, involves striking an enemy to avert an apparently inevitable threat from materializing in the longer term (such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq).

This report analyzes the potential role of striking first in the contemporary security environment, drawing on historical cases in which countries have either contemplated or have actually carried out first strikes. The researchers drew the following conclusions:

• Large-scale first strikes like Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are likely to remain infrequent.
• A strategic emphasis on striking first does not require a major shift in U.S. defense planning.
• A first-strike strategy requires outstanding strategic intelligence.
• U.S. first-strike strategy may have unintended consequences.

DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS.
Jennifer K. Elsea and Richard F. Grimmett. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS). Updated August 11, 2006.
Download [pdf format, 115 pages]

Congress and the President have enacted 11 separate formal declarations of war against foreign nations in five different wars. Each declaration has been preceded by a presidential request either in writing or in person before a joint session of Congress. The reasons cited in justification for the requests have included armed attacks on United States territory or its citizens, and threats to United States rights or interests as a sovereign nation.

On a number of occasions, Congress and the President have also enacted authorizations for the use of force instead of declarations of war. Most commonly, such measures have authorized the use of force against either a named country or unnamed hostile nations in a given region. In most cases, the President has requested the authority, but Congress has sometimes given the President less than what he asked for. In contrast to the declarations of war, not all authorizations for the use of force have resulted in actual combat. Both declarations and authorizations require the signature of the President in order to become law.

This report provides historical background on the enactment of declarations of war and authorizations for the use of force, and analyzes their legal effects under international and domestic law. It also sets forth their texts in two appendices.

Because the statutes that confer standby authority on the President and the executive branch potentially play such a large role in an armed conflict to which the United States is a party, the report includes an extensive summary of the statutes that are triggered by a declaration of war, a declaration of national emergency, and/or the existence of a state of war. The report also summarizes the congressional procedures applicable to the enactment of a declaration of war or authorization for the use of force, and to measures under the War Powers Resolution.

AA06339
De Nevers, Renee THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THE NEW WARS
(Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 121 No. 3, Fall 2006, pp. 369-395)
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This article explores how the Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1949, apply to "new wars," such as the fight against terrorism, where those directly involved in fighting include non-traditional soldiers such as warlords, child soldiers and private security companies. The author argues that, although the nature of war and those who fight wars has changed dramatically since the conventions were adopted, the conventions should not be abandoned, but rather should address these changes. Applying the Geneva Conventions, she argues, will create greater international support for the U.S. war on terrorism because it will protect U.S. soldiers and citizens, garner multilateral support, and protect victims of war everywhere. "To ensure the cooperation that it needs to pursue terrorists, and to regain the high ground in this fight, the United States should lead the way...in creating a stronger framework to protect people from dangers they face in conflict zones and lawless societies," she writes.

THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONS: COLLOQUIUM REPORT.
Richard A. Chilcoat, Joseph R. Cerami and Patrick B. Baetjer. United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). Web-posted August 28, 2006.
Download [pdf format, 122 pages]

A March 2006 conference -- "The Future of the Transatlantic Relations" -- addressed changes in U.S. and European defense and foreign policy in the aftermath of the war in Iraq. Texas A&M University's Bush School of Government and Public Service, Bush Presidential Library Foundation, and European Union Center of Excellence, partnering with the Department of the Army's Eisenhower National Security Series and the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, convened the conference to examine key dimensions of the transatlantic relationship, which has major implications for global as well as regional security.

The conference report includes papers on the following panel topics:

• Force Structure and Power Projection for the Region and Beyond.
• Overview of Trends, Themes, and Grand Strategy.
• Homeland Security and Terrorism.
• Realigning American Forces in Europe.
• Demise or Rebirth of the Atlantic Alliance.

THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR: CULTURAL BARRIERS TO SUCCESSFUL COUNTERINSURGENCY.
Jeffrey Record. Cato Institute. September 1, 2006.
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The author reviews recent U.S. military actions and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of great military power in the face of insurgent movements.

He states his main position succinctly:
"Barring profound change in America's political and military culture, the United States runs a significant risk of failure when it enters small wars of choice, and great power intervention in small wars is almost always a matter of choice. Most such wars, moreover, do not engage core U.S. security interests other than placing the limits of American military power on embarrassing display. Indeed, the very act of intervention in small wars risks gratuitous damage to America's military reputation. The United States should abstain from intervention in such wars, except in those rare cases when military intervention is essential to protecting or advancing U.S. national security."

IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS? OPTIONS FOR SANCTIONS AND MILITARY STRIKES.
Anthony H. Cordesman & Khalid R. Al-Rodhan. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). August 30, 2006.
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The authors make the point that it is unclear what kind of a nuclear power Iran is, or will seek to be. It may be that Iran would seek to use nuclear weapons as a passive deterrent. Or it may threaten its neighbors, directly or through implication, in order to exact goals or objectives that would otherwise be impossible. The report states: "Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons is not simply a struggle over issues of national prestige or 'rights.' It has a major potential impact on regional stability and future war fighting."

In the view of Cordesman and al-Rhodan: "Iranian possession of nuclear weapons . . . would change the military map of the region. It would almost certainly lead to contingency planning by other nuclear powers to attack Iran -- certainly Israel and possibly Pakistan and India. . . . US and allied forces in the Gulf would have to plan for nuclear war or the risk of nuclear escalation, and for preventive, preemptive, deterrent, and retaliatory options. . . The risk of misunderstandings, misperceptions, and miscalculations would be significant in a crisis or war. "

HIZBOLLAH'S OUTLOOK IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT (PART ONE): MOTIVES, STRATEGY, AND OBJECTIVES.
Amal Saad-Ghorayeb. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. August 2006.
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The author, a Lebanese political analyst writing from Beirut, draws on interviews she carried out with Hizbollah officials both before and after the outbreak of fighting in mid-July. Some of her main conclusions are:

• Hizbollah's July 12 attack on an Israeli convoy was intended to provoke a prisoner exchange; it was not an Iranian-directed effort to trigger a wider conflict.
• Although prepared for it, Hizbollah did not expect a massive Israeli counter-strike.
• Hizbollah perceives Washington as the engineer of Israel's current offensive and now views itself as in direct confrontation with the overall U.S. agenda for the region.
• Hizbollah aims to compromise the perception of Israeli military supremacy in the region, with the hope of undermining the stability of Israel itself.

STRING OF PEARLS: MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF CHINA'S RISING POWER ACROSS THE ASIAN LITTORAL.
Christopher J Pehrson. United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). July 2006.
Download [pdf format, 36 pages]

A 2005 report entitled "Energy Futures in Asia," produced by the defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton, first outlined what is now known as China's "string of pearls" strategy: "China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China's energy interests, but also to serve broad security objectives..."

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the "string of pearls" from within the context of the post-Cold War global security environment. The author proposes regional security cooperation and military-to-military programs with China. He sums up his view of the situation: "The 'String of Pearls' is more than a naval or military strategy. It also is more than a regional strategy. It is a manifestation of China's ambition to attain great power status and secure a self-determined, peaceful, and prosperous future. For the United States, a rising China presents great opportunity, but this opportunity is fraught with potential risks. With bold leadership and prudent foresight, the United States and China can reap the rewards of strategic cooperation and avert the calamity of a hostile confrontation."

AA06271
Holmes, James R.; Yoshihara, Toshi CHINA AND THE COMMONS: ANGELL OR MAHAN?
(World Affairs, vol. 168, no. 4, Spring 2006, pp. 172-191)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

While acknowledging the difficulty in seeing clearly into China's top military policy circles, the authors argue that Chinese strategists seem increasingly inured to the early-twentieth-century paradigms of geopolitics, particularly in regard to reforming its naval forces. If this is the case, the question is whether they will adopt the approach of U.S. Admiral Thayer Mahan, who advocated the aggressive use of sea power to ensure security of shipping lanes or English academic Norman Angell, who believed that military force was in nobody's best economic interest. The authors consider scenarios involving Taiwan, Korean unification, and the pursuit of energy security and how they may influence the influence of geopolitics on the country's approach to maritime issues. How China ultimately chooses to address control of the "commons" -- sea, air, and space -- will determine the regional security situation in the coming decades

AA06231
Henry, Ryan TRANSFORMING THE U.S. GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE
(Naval War College Review, Vol. 59, No. 2, Spring 2006, pp. 12-28)
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The author, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, served in the military for 24 years and also worked in the private sector with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Pointing out that "the security environment at the start of the twenty-first century is perhaps the most uncertain it has been in our nation's history," he focuses on the factors that are driving the continuing transformation to allow the military to deal with this uncertainty and the changes involving the Defense Department concerning "our relationships and partnership capabilities around the world." He provides some historical background about transformation and describes four types of security challenges - traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive. He also discusses the five key themes of the global defense posture strategy and provides a region-by-region synopsis of the changes that are taking place, and concludes, "Collectively, proposed posture changes provide a framework for our alliance and defense commitments overseas and for harmonizing our forces' skill sets with the shifting uncertainties of that new landscape. Global, geopolitical circumstances will continue to change, our relationships with allies and partners will evolve, and our capabilities will mature.".

POWS AND MIAS: STATUS AND ACCOUNTING ISSUES. Charles A. Henning. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. June 1, 2006.
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There has been a long-running controversy about the fate of certain U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) and service members missing in action (MIAs) as a result of various U.S. military operations. While few people familiar with the issue feel that any Americans are still being held against their will in communist countries associated with the Cold War, more feel that some may have been so held in the past in the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, or North Vietnam. Similarly, few believe there has been a "conspiracy" to cover up the existence of live POWs, but many would maintain that there was, at least during the 1970s, U.S. government mismanagement of the issue.

Normalization of relations with Vietnam exacerbated this longstanding debate. Supporters contend that Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue has greatly increased. Opponents argue that cooperation has in fact been much less than supporters say, and that the Vietnamese can only be induced to cooperate by firmness rather than conciliation. There are those that believe Americans are now held, or were after the war ended, even if no specific report of live Americans has thus far met rigorous proofs. Others, who doubt live Americans are still held, or were after the war ended, argue that despite vast efforts, only one live American military prisoner remained in Indochina after the war (a defector who returned in 1979). The U.S. government indicates the possibility that Americans are still being held in Indochina cannot be ruled out. Some say Americans may have been kept by the Vietnamese after the war but killed later. Increased U.S. access to Vietnam has not yet led to a large reduction in the number of Americans still listed as unaccounted for.

There is considerable evidence that prisoners from the end of World War II, the Korean War, and "Cold War shootdowns" of U.S. military aircraft may have been taken to the USSR and not returned. The evidence about POWs from Vietnam being taken to the Soviet Union is more questionable. There is evidence that Navy pilot Scott Speicher, shot down on the first night of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and until recently listed as "killed in action" rather than "missing in action," was almost certainly captured by the Iraqis. Information about his fate has not yet been discovered by U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. All American POWs captured by the Iraqis during the initial stage of the current war were returned to U.S. control; the remains of all others listed as MIA have been recovered. One U.S. Army soldier, captured by Iraqi insurgents on April 9, 2004, is currently listed as a POW; there has been no word about his fate since his POW status was confirmed by the Department of Defense on April 23, 2004.

AA06210
Barno, David W. CHALLENGES IN FIGHTING A GLOBAL INSURGENCY (Parameters, vol. 36, no. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 15-29)
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The author, director of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, notes that Western militaries need to adapt as war becomes increasingly strategy-based. Entering into a new era of war, known as Fourth Generation Warfare or "netwar" (named for its use of all available networks), this "evolved" insurgency strives to convince enemy political decision makers that their strategic goals are unachievable or too costly. While global insurgents, notably al-Qaeda, develop their strategic and operational efforts, the U.S. continues its traditional "warfighting" approach based heavily on tactical efforts. Barno argues that this is not a "war-winning" strategy because in this era, winning more tactical-level battles does not lead to winning the war -- how do we justify accruing tactical capabilities when fighting an enemy with no tanks, air force, or navy? In a war of ideas, the ability to shape perceptions in an infinitely different culture is an enormous challenge. The author declares we must understand military victories will not ensure strategic success and accept the full range of war, down to the strategic level, against an enemy committed to an "unlimited war of unlimited means."

TRUSTED PARTNERS: SHARING TECHNOLOGY WITHIN THE U.S.-UK SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. Pierre Chao and Robin Niblett. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). May 26, 2006.
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The United Kingdom and the United States are each other's closest ally and security partner. The UK and U.S. governments have also drawn similar conclusions about the new threats of the twenty-first century. There are, however, significant differences in viewpoints about the extent to which defense-related technologies can and should be exchanged between the two countries. From the perspective of each country, the authors present the basic "irritants" that hinder further cooperation.

This paper argues that the US and UK need to come to agreement on a broader framework for the exchange and transfer of defense technologies between the two countries. This framework would not be limited to one particular program, but would serve to enable the two sides to work together in a predictable, efficient, and secure environment into the future.

OPTIONS FOR THE NAVY'S FUTURE FLEET. Congress of the United States. Congressional Budget Office. May 2006.
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The main conclusion of this Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis is that unless shipbuilding budgets increase significantly in real (inflation-adjusted) terms or the Navy designs and builds much cheaper ships, the size of the fleet will fall substantially. In some cases, however, the fleet's capability would not decline commensurately with the decrease in size. In fact, by such measures as the number of long-range naval guns and helicopters available in peacetime or wartime and the number of targets that could be attacked each day by carrier-based aircraft, the Navy would be more capable in 2035 under one or more of the options presented in this report than at present.

The Navy's more-expensive shipbuilding plan would provide greater capability than most of those options by most measures of capability. But even under the Navy's plan, the number of covert-mission days provided by submarines, the number of vertical launch system (VLS) cells for firing missiles, and the fleet's capacity to transport or store equipment for Marine Corps units would be lower in 30 years than they are today.

MILITARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2006. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS. United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense. May 23, 2006.
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The U.S. welcomes the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China, but is taking note as the Asian nation systematically modernizes its military capabilities, according to this Department of Defense report on Chinese military power. The report, submitted in response to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, addresses (1) China's grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy; (2) developments in China's military doctrine and force structure, to include developments in advanced technologies which would enhance China's military capabilities; and, (3) the security situation in the Taiwan Strait. According to the report, the People's Liberation Army is in the process of a long-term transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to a more modern force capable of fighting short, high-intensity conflicts.

AA06193
Conrad C. Crane BEWARE OF BOLDNESS (Parameters, Vol. 36, No. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 88-97)
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The author, Director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA, and former history professor at West Point, argues against the recent emphasis on bold and innovative leaders in the military, saying, "Leaders, especially at higher levels, rarely need to be innovative themselves; instead, they must be prepared to recognize valuable contributions from others and incorporate them into the practices of the larger organization." He suggests "We may already be paying a price in Iraq for this new emphasis on boldness ... Instead of promoting boldness, we should be advocating the aggressive exploitation of opportunities, with due concern to mitigate risks." He proposes George Patton as a "fine role model for future leaders." In contrast, he says, "There has been no military leader in American history bolder than George Armstrong Custer, and his fate emphasizes the common eventual cost of boldness ... In the end, there is no substitute for decision-making based on a thorough evaluation of intelligence, comprehensive situational awareness, and sound judgment. Destiny is not a method."

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De Maio, Jennifer MANAGING CIVIL WARS: AN EVALUATION OF CONFLICT PREVENTION STRATEGIES IN AFRICA (World Affairs, vol. 168, no. 3, Winter 2006, pp. 131-144
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In a preliminary study, the author seeks to critically assess successes and failures in "preventative diplomacy" as applied by the international community in to Somalia (failure, 1988-91), Rwanda (failure, 1994), and South Africa's KwaZulu-Natal (success, 1994). De Maio concludes that in addition to the need for an "early warning system," to identify impending civil conflicts, nations need an effective analytical framework adapted to local conditions in order to correctly interpret the situation and form a winning mediation strategy. Domestic actors must be drawn into the preventive diplomacy proceedings and given incentives to stay engaged, typically the clear impression that violence will prove too costly to their long-term aims.

REPOSTURING THE FORCE: U.S. OVERSEAS PRESENCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. Carnes Lord, Editor. United States Department of the Navy. Naval War College. 2006.
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This collection of papers condenses some of the analysis that has stemmed from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's Global Defense Posture Review [GDPR], initiated in 2001-2002. Focal points of the GDPR include the overall political and military relationship between the United States and host governments, activities conducted on foreign soil by U.S. forces, legal arrangements governing military access (overflight rights, for example), the pre-positioning of equipment overseas, and the global management of U.S. forces in deployments within or across theaters of operations.

The papers in this document collectively deal with the basing requirements mandated under the GDPR: to improve flexibility to deal with uncertainty; to strengthen allied roles and build new partnerships for cooperative security; to create the capacity to act both within and across regions; to develop rapidly deployable capabilities; and to focus on effective military capabilities, not simply numbers.

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT. U.S. Department of Defense. Secretary of Defense. February 2006.
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[Note: The legislation mandating the Quadrennial Defense Review is the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996, Public Law 104-201. The relevant sections fall under "Subtitle B-Force Structure Review," sections 921-926]

This Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) articulates a vision for the transformed force fully consistent with the demands of the anticipated security environment in 2025. The 2006 QDR defines two fundamental imperatives for the Department of Defense:

• Continuing to reorient the Department's capabilities and forces to be more agile in this time of war, to prepare for wider asymmetric challenges and to hedge against uncertainty over the next 20 years
• Implementing enterprise-wide changes to ensure that organizational structures, processes and procedures effectively support its strategic direction.

To meet the key challenges in this period, the main foci are: to shape and sustain the Armed Forces to most effectively fight the War on Terrorism; to transform and quickly redeploy as necessary during wartime; to strengthen U.S. joint warfighting; and to improve the quality of life of U.S. Service members and their families.

INTELLIGENCE ISSUES FOR CONGRESS. Richard A. Best, Jr. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. April 10, 2006.
Report [pdf format, 19 pages]

P.L. 108-458 was designed to address the findings of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, that there has been inadequate coordination of the national intelligence effort and that the Intelligence Community, as then-organized, could not serve as an agile information gathering network in the struggle against international terrorists. The Commission released its report in late July 2004 and Congress debated its recommendations through the following months. A key issue was the extent of the authorities of the DNI, especially with regard to budgeting for technical collection systems managed by Defense Department agencies. In the end, many of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission regarding intelligence organization were adopted after a compromise provision was included that called for implementing the act "in a manner that respects and does not abrogate" the statutory authorities of department heads.

On April 6, the House Intelligence Committee reported its version of the FY2007 intelligence authorization bill (H.R. 5020). Although spending levels and many details are described only in the classified annex to the accompanying report (H.Rept. 109-411), the committee noted that "this year's budget request was the first that was fully determined by the DNI [Director of National Intelligence], and that effort by the DNI to create an Intelligence Community that is greater than the sum of its parts is beginning to bear fruit." A key concern of the committee is overhead imagery capabilities, and the bill reportedly provides for fundamental change in this area that is expected to cause "some discomfort within the Intelligence Community." Furthermore, the committee would direct DOD not to begin the process of terminating the U-2 aircraft program until it can certify that there will be no loss in surveillance capabilities while transitioning to the Global Hawk UAV.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. United States National Security Council. March 2006.
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The President's National Security Strategy (NSS) explains the strategic underpinning of the administration's foreign policy. In remarks about the President's second-term NSS, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley said: "America's policy -- and its purpose -- is to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world" (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060316-8.html)

. The NSS, he said, lays out the President's vision of how to achieve the latter goal.

According to the National Security Advisor, important themes of the President's strategy include recognition that:

• America is at war and protecting the American people remains the first duty of the President of the United States. The NSS renews the President's commitment to maintain an American military without peer that can dissuade, deter, and defeat a wide variety of potential threats.
• The global war on terror is both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. In the battle of ideas, freedom and democracy directly counter the ideology of the terrorists.
• The journey to effective democracy is long. The NSS highlights practical ways America supports countries as they make this journey.

In addition, the President's strategy promotes economic freedom on a global scale, through a free trade agenda to foster prosperity among both developing and developed nations. It also highlights ways in which effective democracies can cooperate for the greater good.

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Worden, Simon HIGH ANXIETY: FORGET ABOUT SPACE DOMINANCE: U.S. INTERESTS SHOULD START FOCUSING ON SPACE COMPETENCE (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 62, no. 2, March/April 2006, pp. 21-23)
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A U.S. push to develop space-based weapons remains highly unlikely in the near future, but the author identifies a serious shortfall in efforts to secure infrastructure in an increasingly interconnected world dependant upon satellites. The war on terrorism is a "multi-decade war of ideas," which will require secure communications infrastructure to win. Government and industry in the United States must pay closer attention to space security issues and watch other countries' efforts to develop technologies that could be fielded offensively against America's telecommunications infrastructure.

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Nolt, James H. THE PENTAGON PLAYS ITS CHINA CARD
(World Policy Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3, Fall 2005, pp. 25-33)
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The author, a senior fellow at the World Policy Institute who writes about China and Taiwan, argues that the July 2005 Pentagon report on China's military capability presents "an exaggerated case for a Chinese military threat" in order to make a case for funding advanced and expensive weapons systems." In an article with informative subheadings such as "China's Relative Military Decline," China's Weakness in Air Power," Impossibility of an Invasion of Taiwan," Reciprocal Dangers of a Naval Blockade," "A Nuclear Option?," and "Robust Deterrence," he stresses the "incentives against war in East Asia" and contends, "By pretending that China could use force with impunity ... the report actually encourages reckless action by China."

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Copley, Gregory R. PREPARING FOR THE POST-TERRORISM ERA (Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, vol. 33, no. 9, September 2005, pp. 2-4)
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Now is the time for our national planners to look beyond the current age of terrorism, notes the author; because terrorism is a response to a social condition that will pass, policymakers must plan for the future. This future may not include nation-states as the primary form of sovereignty. Transnational organizations may supplant traditional nation-states, but the role of conventional forces will remain important.

PRECEDENTS, VARIABLES, AND OPTIONS IN PLANNING A U.S. MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT STRATEGY FROM IRAQ. W. Andrew Terrill and Conrad C. Crane. United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). October 2005.
Download the document [pdf format, 68 pages]

In his forward, the SSI Director writes that questions of how to empower the Iraqis most effectively and then progressively withdraw non-Iraqi forces from that country is a complex issue that often has been oversimplified in many of the current media debates. He finds that there are too few serious discussions of problems, opportunities, and meaningful precedents that might be useful in developing guidelines and considerations for U.S. policy in Iraq.

This monograph by Drs. W. Andrew Terrill and Conrad C. Crane seeks to present the U.S. situation in Iraq in all of its complexity and ambiguity. They consider previous instances of U.S. military occupation of foreign countries and the difficulty of maintaining domestic support for such operations. While the authors view the empowerment of a viable Iraqi central government and a security force to defend its authority as vital to the future of that country, they also suggest that there are severe constraints on the United States' potential to sustain its military presence at the current level. They conclude that the United States must be prepared to withdraw from Iraq under non-optimal conditions, and that the chief U.S. goal should be to devise an exit strategy for Iraq that focuses on bolstering Iraqi government legitimacy. The authors strongly reject the idea of withdrawing from Iraq according to a formal timetable.

Pfaff, William. WHAT WE'VE LOST: GEORGE W. BUSH AND THE PRICE OF TORTURE (Harpers Vol. 311, No. 1866, November 2005, pp. 50-56)
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American government policy and practice has departed from national as well as international norms of justice by permitting and supporting the use of torture on those detained by the military. "The new White House policy authorized American officers to commit acts for which the second World War Allies had hanged Gestapo and SS officers and Japanese prison-camp commanders", states the author. He proceeds to detail the White House's and Pentagon's maneuvering around the obstacles of law and international conventions, the development of torture methodology and its implementation to achieve the ends of instilling fear, shock and awe in perceived enemies of the United States. Many within the U.S. government are highly critical of these developments in a country previously respected for its human rights practices.

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Kristensen, Hans M. THE ROLE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS; NEW DOCTRINE FALLS SHORT OF BUSH PLEDGE (Arms Control Association, Vol. 35, No. 7, September 2005, pp. 13-19)
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Kristensen writes that the new Bush administration draft doctrine on nuclear weapons relies heavily on nuclear weapons possibly paving the way for pre-emptive use should it become necessary. The author writes that a limited, pre-emptive nuclear option derives from a belief by military planners that nuclear deterrence could fail at some future date and that the U.S. needs to be capable technically of striking before the enemy does. Instead of reducing the role of nuclear weapons, Kristen says, the new doctrine will result in a significant number of weapons remaining on high alert. Conventional forces would complement, not replace, nuclear weapons.

Kristensen points to a section on theater nuclear operations, noting that the distinction made in earlier guidance between long-range strategic and short-range non-strategic nuclear weapons has now become blurred. He said the emerging doctrine, which is supposed to be completed before the end of 2005, also describes missile defense as a way "to enhance survivability of nuclear forces and increase offensive capabilities." Kristensen writes that the new nuclear doctrine marks a shift towards making nuclear weapons "...just another tool in the toolbox." He suggests that terrorism and the risk of proliferating weapons of mass destruction seems to have "spooked" the administration into continuing and deepening its reliance on nuclear deterrence.

AA0536
Miskel, James F. GRAND STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH OTHER STATES IN THE NEW, NEW WORLD ORDER (Naval War College Review, vol. 58, no. 1, Winter 2005, pp. 63-75)
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Miskel, with the Naval War College, analyzes the allocation of American security-related assistance to other states. He concludes that it would be most effective to base this allocation upon the other country's potential contribution to specific efforts in the war on terrorism. Currently, state-to-state assistance programs are allocated on the basis of assumptions about the role a particular nation plays in the global war on terrorism. Countries are categorized as either pivotal, buffer or failing states and aid is allocated accordingly. This approach is inconsistent with the security threat that the U.S. faces in the early twenty-first century

AA05336
Sarotte, Mary TRANSATLANTIC TENSION AND THREAT PERCEPTION (Naval War College Review, Vol. 58, No. 4, Autumn 2005, pp. 25-37)
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Sarotte, professor of political science at the University of Cambridge, discusses why Americans and Europeans often "talk past each other" in discussions about security issues. Americans tend to see the primary role of the federal government as defending the nation's territorial integrity (homeland security), whereas Europeans expect much more from their national leaders, such as free (or low-cost) health care and university-level education, national news broadcasting and public transportation. When the U.S. describes the threats that it perceives -- terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction -- it faces a great deal of skepticism due to the failings by U.S. intelligence prior to the Iraq war. For many European political leaders, terrorism is an "old problem," and they feel more threatened by Russia than by WMD in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. If both sides better understand these perceptual differences, Sarotte notes, they will be better able to deal with each other in the future.

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Stossel, Scott NORTH KOREA: THE WAR GAME (The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 296, no. 1, July/August 2005, pp. 97-107)
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Atlantic Monthly magazine convened a North Korea war game that assembled a group of participants with a variety of political viewpoints. There were several major lessons learned during this exercise that should be incorporated into U.S. policy on North Korea. The first lesson is that the North Korean situation will not get better with time, and that the U.S. must act on this urgent situation now. The second lesson of the North Korea war game is that the U.S. should make a concerted effort to negotiate with the North Koreans before any military action is taken. The third lesson is that the transfer of nuclear material to terrorists from the North Koreans is now the biggest danger that we face in this situation.

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Kwok, James. MENDING NATO: SUSTAINING THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP
(Harvard International Review, vol. 27, no. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 36-39)
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The author, Associate Editor of the Harvard International Review, focuses on the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in U.S.-European relations. Although NATO was established, during post-World War II, to protect Europe from the Soviets, it was never intended as a purely military organization. Today, NATO remains a touchstone in the transatlantic relationship. European opinion is important to the United States and NATO provides a crucial, multilateral forum in which to work on common goals, including the spread of democracy.

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Payne, Keith B. THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT (Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3, Summer 2005, pp. 18-20)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

The author, former deputy assistant secretary of defense in 2002-03, says that criticisms of the Bush administration's 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) are "errors of fact or interpretation" because they are based on "a strategic environment that no longer exists." He avers that deterrence has not been abandoned in favor of war-fighting. Payne notes that the NPR does not presume rogue leaders to be inherently irrational -- he believes that improving understanding of potential adversaries can reduce errors and surprises. Importantly, nuclear capabilities that minimize threat to civilians may be critical to deterrence. He writes that America now has many opponents with varying perceptions of the nuclear threshold, and that the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent is essential to nonproliferation.

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Rosecrance, Richard. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (The National Interest, No. 80, Summer 2005, pp. 65-73)
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Rosecrance, a political science professor at UCLA and a senior fellow of the Belfer Center at Harvard University, argues that just as private companies in the business world merge with like-minded firms to cope with a competitor, so too must the United States and the European Union form a coalition to address a growing economic and commercial superpower -- China. Fortunately for the West, notes the author, Beijing will be unable to establish a similar merger with Far Eastern countries due to the authoritarian and unpredictable nature of its regime. He concludes that, "The United States can neither attack nor occupy China. Nor can the U.S. or Europe grow quickly enough to offset Chinese economic gains between now and 2030...the appropriate recourse of the two Western power blocs is successful merger with each other."

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Darley, William M. (Col.). WAR POLICY, PUBLIC SUPPORT, AND THE MEDIA (Parameters, Vol. 35, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 121-134)
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According to Darley, director of strategic communications at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, experts are constantly examining the relationship between press reporting, public opinion and war policy. Despite large misperceptions within the general public, some researchers found virtually no evidence to support a causal relationship between editorial tone and bias in media with a decline of public support for war. Others found a decline in support for war among the general public, yet concluded that television's impact was not significant enough to reduce support for the war below levels attained by the Korean War.

The author believes that the "rally around the flag" phenomenon during wartime contradicts the notion of media domination of policy formulation, noting the high public opinion polls for both presidents during Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Darley cites the military strategist Clausewitz, who noted that public support for wars is more like a collective emotional reaction toward an enemy attack.

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Levi, Michael NUCLEAR BUNKER-BUSTER BOMBS (Scientific American, vol. 291, no. 2, August 2004, pp. 66-73)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

Potential adversaries of the U.S. learned an important lesson during the 1991 Gulf War, in which precision-guided munitions rained down on Iraqi military facilities -- that key military assets had to be located in fortified underground bunkers. U.S. military planners have proposed nuclear earth penetrators to destroy such underground targets, and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review of December 2001 advocated such technology. While there has been much debate if such a program will be counterproductive to our nonproliferation efforts, the author notes that there has been little discussion on whether nuclear bunker-busters have any advantage over their conventional counterparts which might achieve the same ends with less risk.

Levi notes that a one-kiloton nuclear explosion must be conducted at least 90 meters underground to contain the fallout; today's best penetrator missiles can reach to a depth of only about 6 meters. He notes that atomic fallout has escaped from nuclear tests that have been conducted at depths of 275 meters. The utility of destroying bunkers may be questionable, as military intelligence may want to examine them, so sealing the entrances with conventional explosives may be the best option. Levi believes that there are far fewer advantages to nuclear bunker-busters than their supporters usually suggest, and that U.S. policymakers must decide on these programs "not on the basis of wishful thinking, but hardheaded reality."

MODERNIZING CHINA'S MILITARY: OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS.
Keith Crane, Roger Cliff, Evan Medeiros, James Mulvenon and William Overholt. RAND. Web-posted May 19, 2005.
Full Report: [pdf format, 298 pages]

Summary: [pdf format, 17 pages]

U.S. analysts and policymakers have raised concerns about the potential for China to mount a serious strategic challenge to the United States in Asia, especially in the western Pacific, sometime in the course of the next two decades. These concerns are based on China's expanding economy: The rapid economic growth of the past three decades has dramatically increased the resources the Chinese government has available to devote to military spending. For these concerns to become reality by 2025, a number of intervening events must take place:

• First, the economy will have to continue to grow.
• Second, the government will have to be able to extract revenues from the economy for military expenditures.
• Third, to increase military spending dramatically, the government will have to ward off competing pressures for higher expenditures on pensions, health care, and education, and more public investment in infrastructure.
• And fourth, China's defense industries will have to be able to produce the sophisticated weaponry that China would need to seriously challenge U.S. forces.

The authors project future growth in Chinese government expenditures as a whole and on defense in particular, evaluate the current and likely future capabilities of China's defense industries, and compare likely future expenditure levels with recent defense expenditures by the United States and the U.S. Air Force in particular. The authors forecast that Chinese military spending is likely to rise from an estimated $69 billion in 2003 to $185 billion by 2025 -- approximately 61 percent of what the U.S. Department of Defense spent in 2003.

Note: Contains copyrighted material.

COMBAT AIRCRAFT SALES TO SOUTH ASIA: POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS.
Christopher Bolkcom, Richard F. Grimmett and K. Alan Kronstadt. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. May 19, 2005.
Download the document [pdf format, 6 pages]

On March 25, 2005, the Bush Administration announced that it was willing to resume sales of F-16 Falcon combat aircraft to Pakistan after a 16-year hiatus. Estimates of potential quantities range from 18 to 71 new fighters. Some believe that this sale is being considered, in part, to reward the Pakistani Government for the role it has played in support of U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts. As many as 126 F-16s, or potentially F/A-18E/F Super Hornets could be offered for sale to India. If completed, such sales would have implications for political-military relations among the United States, Pakistan, and India; for combat aircraft proliferation; and for the U.S. defense industrial base.

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Talbott, Strobe IRAN MIGHT OPT FOR "EXISTENTIAL DETERRENT" (New Perspectives Quarterly, vol. 22, no. 1, Winter 2005, pp. 46-49)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

In this interview, Talbott, current President of the Brookings Institution and former Deputy Secretary of State, discusses the Indian test of nuclear weapons that took the world into a new era of proliferation. North Korea and Iran must now be kept from crossing the threshold of nuclear testing. Iran may settle for keeping a bomb as an "existential deterrent", with other countries perceiving that they have it and will use it if they have to. Iran must then be kept from getting into a hair-trigger crisis where they would feel it necessary to use nuclear weapons.

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Kaplan, Robert. HOW WE WOULD FIGHT CHINA (Atlantic Monthly, vol. 295, no. 3, June 2005, pp. 49-64)
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The author believes that China's rise as a global military power will be the preeminent challenge that the U.S. will face in the twenty-first century -- a new Cold War that could last for several generations. While their armed forces and navy are currently nowhere near a match to the U.S., China is modernizing its military rapidly, and it is only a matter of time before they expand into the Pacific. Kaplan predicts that China will be a far more formidable adversary than the Soviets were -- the Chinese military is "an avid student of the competition, and a fast learner", and that China is a master of indirect influence, such as establishing business connections and signing construction and trade agreements. At the center of the U.S. response to China's growing influence is the Honolulu-based U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), which is forging military ties with Pacific Rim nations. Kaplan, who has spent several years traveling in Asia and the Pacific region to observe U.S. military operations there, believes that a Bismarck-style network of alliances is crucial to dissuade China from overt military action and draw it into PACOM's orbit, much as NATO did to defuse the Soviet threat.

THE TRANSATLANTIC DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE: RESTRUCTURING SCENARIOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS.
Terrence R. Guay. United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). April 2005.
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This report argues that cooperation between U.S. and European industrial bases would provide greater benefits for both, but that there are currently deep divides between the defense sectors on either side of the Atlantic. Opportunities for the construction of a transatlantic defense sector are tangible, but significant obstacles may accelerate the formation of a bipolar industrial base. Guay says that while market forces played a key role in the transformation and consolidation of these sectors in recent years, political considerations are largely responsible for a restructuring process that has been almost entirely among U.S. firms in the United States and among European Union companies in Europe.

He examines the forces that have shaped the restructuring of the U.S. and European defense industries since the end of the Cold War, and presents factors that will influence further restructuring and consolidation in the short- and medium-terms. He contends that a transatlantic defense industrial base is preferable to a bipolar one, and recommends that the U.S. Government open its defense equipment market to more European firms, and that European governments reciprocate. Additionally, military forces should put greater effort into coordinating procurement requirements and needs, and firms should explore expanding transatlantic links.

AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY AFTER 9/11: AN ASSESSMENT.
Stephen D. Biddle. United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). April 2005.
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Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, says Stephen Biddle, the current administration has yet to arrive at a clear definition of the enemy or the aim in the War on Terrorism. To date, he says, American policy has combined ambitious public statements with ambiguity on critical particulars. "Heretofore, the costs of pursuing such ambitious but ill-defined goals have been high but tolerable. The ongoing insurgency in Iraq, however, is increasing the costs of grand strategic ambiguity to the point where fundamental choices can no longer be deferred."

The author posits two broad alternatives for resolving these ambiguities and creating a coherent and logically sufficient grand strategy: rollback and containment. Rollback would retain the ambitious goals implicit in today's declaratory policy and accept the cost and near-term risk inherent in pursuing them. Containment would settle for more modest goals in exchange for lower costs and lower near-term risks. Neither alternative dominates the other on analytical grounds - both involve serious costs as well as benefits. Most important, argues Biddle, "the choice between them turns on a series of basic value judgments on the acceptability of risk, the relationship between near-term and long-term risk, and the ultimate degree of security the [U.S.] should seek."