Security Affairs
Military-Civilian Relations Archive
RECONSTRUCTION UNDER FIRE: UNIFYING CIVIL AND MILITARY COUNTERINSURGENCY.
RAND Corporation. David C. Gompert et al. June 15, 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 159 pages]
Effective civilian relief, reconstruction, and development work can help convince people to support their government against insurgency. Knowing this, insurgents will target such work, threatening both those who perform it and those who benefit from it. The authors set out to learn how civilian counterinsurgency, civil COIN: essential human services, political reform, physical reconstruction, economic development, and indigenous capacity-building, could be conducted more safely in the face of active insurgency, when it can do the most good.
[Note: contains copyright material.]
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Cronin, Patrick IRREGULAR WARFARE: NEW CHALLENGES FOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (Strategic Forum, No. 234, October 2008, pp. 1-12)
Full Text [PDF format; 12 pages]
Cronin, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, notes that success in the highly political and ambiguous conflicts likely to dominate the global security environment in the coming decades will require a framework that balances the relationships between civilian and military leaders and makes the most effective use of their different strengths. These challenges are expected to require better integrated, whole-of-government approaches, the cooperation of host governments and allies, and strategic patience. A third significant challenge is how to forge integrated strategies and approaches. Professional relationships, not organizational fixes, are vital to succeeding in irregular war. In this sense, the push for new doctrine for the military and civilian leadership is a step in the right direction to clarifying the conflated lanes of authority.
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Kohn, Richard COMING SOON: A CRISIS IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (World Affairs, vol. 170, no. 3, Winter 2008, pp. 69-80)
Full Text (EbscoHost; password required)
The author, Professor of History and Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, writes that the next president will face a fallout in relations between the armed forces and the civilian leadership almost as bad as the crisis that nearly sank the Clinton administration in 1993. The military leadership has become deeply suspicious of the civilian political class, for many reasons, including the bungled Iraq occupation, dislike of former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, an overstretched Army and Marine Corps, and the absence of offspring of the elites in military ranks. Unsustainable military budgets, the mismatch between current threats and a Cold-War-era military structure, and social issues, such as gays in the military and the spread of evangelical Christianity in the ranks will add to the tensions facing the next administration. The author urges the next President to appoint a Secretary of Defense who is knowledgeable and politically skilled, insulate the military from partisan politics and make frequent visits to military bases to help mend frayed relations.
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Williams, John Allen THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY BEYOND THE POSTMODERN ERA (Orbis, vol. 52, no. 2, Spring 2008, pp. 197-216)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library
Williams, professor of political science at Loyola University, Chicago, notes that there are new security challenges resulting from the Sept. 11 attacks and there is a renewed focus on the military's role in defending U.S. interests and homeland. As a result, U.S. military forces (and perhaps in the West generally) are evolving from their Cold War and immediate post-Cold War perspectives to confront transnational and sub-national non-state dangers. These changes have significant implications for military professionalism and the relations between the military and society. The author puts these changes into a wider theoretical context, and modifies the “Postmodern Military” model, as the “Hybrid” model. Williams updates it to reflect changes in the threat and civil-military relations in the United States as well as in other countries.
POLITICAL PROGRESS IN IRAQ DURING THE SURGE.
Rend Al-Rahim Francke. Special Report, U.S. Institute of Peace. Web posted December 14, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 20 pages]
The military surge has decreased sectarian violence, curtailed insurgency, and reduced terrorist attacks. Although the security situation has improved, the political process has lagged far behind. Intra-sectarian rivalries have increased, Iraqi institutions have lost ground, and sectarian blocs are not as cohesive.
A competent national government is essential for long-term stability. The author believes that more effort and more resources are needed to strengthen the competence and effectiveness of the Iraqi government.
This report is based on conversations with a large number of Iraq political leaders, senior government officials, members of Parliament, and Iraqi citizens.
PCR PROJECT SPECIAL BRIEFING: ROUNDTABLE ON PROPOSED CIVILIAN RESERVE CORPS. Dane F. Smith. PCR Project Special Briefing, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Web posted November 8, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 12 pages]
In 2004, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was created in the State Department. Its purpose is to organize interagency processes for reconstruction and stabilization projects. This paper outlines the challenges in building the civilian reserve corps and summarizes the roundtable discussions held at CSIS in July.
U.S. POLICE IN PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS. Robert M. Perito. Special Report, U.S. Institute of Peace. August 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 12 pages]
This report explains why the U.S. should create a federal-level police unit for international peace and stability operations. Historically, the U.S. has needed a capable police force and relied on civil police or commercial contractors for crowd and riot control. The federal-level police unit could provide security for a civilian population and perform police functions to control civil unrest. Additionally, current State Department plans call for creation of a Civilian Reserve Corps that has a police component.
NATO IN AFGHANISTAN: A TEST OF THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE. Paul Gallis. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. Updated July 16, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 26 pages]
NATO in Afghanistan is a “test of the alliance’s political will and military capabilities.”
The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) faces such obstacles as shoring up a weak government, using military capabilities in a distant country, and rebuilding a country devastated by years of war.
The allies agree on ISAF’s mission, but differ on how to accomplish it. Thus far, ISAF has tried to stabilize the country in stages, but most experts predict that ISAF will need at least five years to accomplish this goal. “U.S. leadership of the alliance as well as NATO credibility are at issue,” and U.S. leadership “may well affect NATO’s cohesiveness and its future.”
INITIAL BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT. Executive Office of the President. July 12, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 25 pages]
This report to Congress provides an assessment of how the Iraqi government is moving toward a series of benchmarks set by the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28). This assessment should not be considered as a single source of all information on the efforts and/or strategies for the U.S., its Coalition Partners, or the Iraqi government.
IRAQ FOUR YEARS AFTER THE U.S.-LED INVASION: ASSESSING THE CRISIS AND SEARCHING FOR A WAY FORWARD. Faleh A. Jabar. Policy Outlook, Carnegie Middle East Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. July 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 14 pages]
“Iraq is stalemated between two trends: one bent on escalating sectarian violence into full-fledged civil war; the other on transforming the conflict into peaceful institutional politics.” The present U.S. strategy is to break this stalemate. This paper “examines the viability of the current U.S. strategy in the context of domestic (Iraqi), regional, and international factors.”
ENLISTING MADISON AVENUE: THE MARKETING APPROACH TO EARNING POPULAR SUPPORT IN THEATERS OF OPERATION. Todd C. Helmus, Christopher Paul, and Russell W. Glenn. National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation. July 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 241 pages]
Counterinsurgency and other stabilizing military operations will be part of the military scene for some time. As a result, military actions can either “foster positive attitudes” or “undermine opportunities for success.” The authors review the military challenges and then apply commercial marketing practices to these actions.
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Mock-Bunting, Logan. THEIR WAR (Washington Post Magazine, July 22, 2007, pp. 10-15, 22-28)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library
The author chronicles the growing gulf between the U.S. military and the civilian world. While the general public’s respect for the military is as great as ever, they are still uncomfortable with the military, and few parents are eager to see their children enlist. The military-civilian gap began to grow during the college protest days of the Vietnam War, when major universities stopped giving academic credit to the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) program. More and more Army officers were educated in the isolated environment of the military academies, and the absence of military science courses in the top universities meant that future civilian leaders would learn less about the officers that they would some day command. Says the wife of an Air Force colonel: “we are disconnecting from our society.” The author writes that military leaders do not advocate reviving conscription, since that would entail training a flood of unwilling draftees in an increasingly technical military. Unlike the military, there is no system place to educate civilian leaders about integrating civilian-military capabilities.
RUSSIAN-AMERICAN SECURITY COOPERATION AFTER ST. PETERSBURG. Richard Weitz. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. May 7, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 65 pages]
“Until Russia and the United States experience a change on government in 2008, the prospects for additional strategic arms control agreements, limits on destabilizing military operations, and joint ballistic defense programs appear unlikely. Yet, near-term opportunities for collaboration in the areas of cooperative threat reduction, third-party proliferation, and bilateral military engagement do exist.”
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: A YEAR WITH THE 101st AIRBORNE IN IRAQ. John Laurence. Columbia Journalism Review. May/June 2007
Full text
John Lawrence, veteran journalist of the Vietnam War, Cambodia and Operation Deset Storm, relates his experience of being "embedded" with the 101st Airborne near predominatly Sunni city Samarra. Along with a camera crew, his intention was to film a documentary feature covering "most aspcts of soldier's lives- professional and personal". He provides the tragic but expected account of the conflict that includes suicide bombings and the deaths of soldiers and civilians. The real interest, though, is the lives of the soldiers and his interaction with them. This includes their distrust and hostility when he contemplates publishing a contentious piece on the suspected torture of detainees in a prison within the regiment's area of control.
A interesting and contrasting companion piece to this article is "Soldiers' Stories"
by Alia Malek, journalist for the Military Times. She describes the military media's sense of duty towards the tight knit and often vulnerable military community as being the "voice of the troops". Decisions within the military and beyond that affect the lives, safety, effectivity and morale of the community are revealed in "solid investigative pieces" ranging from the issuance of defective body armour to calling for the resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsveld for his responsibility for the Iraqi conflict.
IRAQI PERCEPTIONS OF THE WAR: PUBLIC OPINION BY CITY AND REGION. Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Updated May 2, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 75 pages]
“The patterns of conflict in Iraq have grown steadily more complex with time, adding sectarian and ethnic conflicts to what began as a largely Ba’athist dominated resistance in mid-2003. There are now five major patterns of violence:”
- Sunni Islamist extremist insurgents;
- Iraqi Arab Sunni versus Arab Shi’ite;
- Iraqi Arab versus Iraqi Kurdish ethnic;
- Arab Shi’ite on Arab Shi’ite; and
- Arab Sunni on Arab Sunni.
Additionally, many Iraqis have divided and/or multiple loyalties. This poll provides insights into the trends in Iraq. It also shows how Iraqis differ by major city and province.
THE AFTERMATH OF CIVIL WAR.
Siyan Chen, Norman V. Loayza, and Marta Reynal-Querol. Policy Research Working Paper, The World Bank. Web posted April 9, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 29 pages]
“Using an “event-study” methodology, this paper analyzes the aftermath of civil war in a cross-section of countries. It focuses on those experiences where the end of conflict marks the beginning of a relatively lasting peace. The paper considers 41 countries involved in internal wars in the period 1960-2003.” The authors used several factors such as economic performance, health and education, political development, demographic trends, and conflict and security issues to develop a comprehensive evaluation. The authors determined that recovery and improvements can be achieved if war establishes lasting peace.
INSURGENCY AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENT IN AUTOCRACIES AND DEMOCRACIES.
Philip Keefer. Policy Research Working Paper, The World Bank. April 1, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 29 pages]
“This paper suggests a new factor that makes civil war more likely; the inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society. Lacking this ability, both elected and unelected governments pursue public policies that leave citizens less well-off and more prone to revolt. At the same time, these actors have a reduced ability to build an anti-insurgency capacity in the first place, since they are less able to prevent anti-insurgents from themselves mounting coups. But while reducing the risk of conflict overall, increasing credibility can, over some range, worsen the effects of natural resources and ethnic fragmentation on civil war. Empirical tests using various measures of political credibility support these conclusions.”
PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN IRAQ.
Robert M. Perito. Special Report, U.S. Institute of Peace. Web posted March 22, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 12 pages]
This report is based on a panel discussion held at the U.S. Institute of Peace on February 14, 2007, and on interviews of government agencies conducted by the author.
The U.S. has experimented with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in both Afghanistan and Iraq. These teams combine civilian and military personnel to assist with security, governance, and reconstruction thus enabling civilians to work in insecure areas. This report examines the PRT experience and suggests ways the teams could be more effective.
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN LIBERIA: DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD.
Dorina Bekoe and Christina Parajon. USIPeace Briefing, U.S. Institute of Peace. Web posted March 30, 2007.
Full Text [sections in html format, various pagings]
Security Sector Reform (SSR) is one of the four major objectives of the Liberian government. At a recent meeting of the Liberian Working Group, an initiative of the U.S. Institute of Peace, the members discussed innovative approaches the Liberian government and the international community used to reform Liberia’s security. This briefing highlights the central points of this meeting and summarizes its recommendations which centered on reform of Liberia’s army and its police.
POLITICAL WARFARE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: U.S. CAPABILITIES AND CHINESE OPERATIONS IN ETHIOPIA, KENYA, NIGERIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA.
Donovan C. Chau. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. March 26, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 83 pages]
The U.S. and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been “vying for influence over African governments and people” for years. The primary means of influence has been the use of nonviolent instruments such as economic aid, development assistance, and training and equipping the military and security forces. The author suggests that China “has used political warfare as its leading grand strategic instrument in Africa and offers a concise, detailed overview of U.S. capabilities to conduct political warfare in Africa in four of its nation-states”—Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa.
DEATH OF A CONTRACTOR
Dan Halpern. Rolling Stone, no. 1021, March 8, 2007.
Full text (html format)
"Ryan Manelick went to Iraq to join thousands of fast-buck operators eager to cash in on the U.S. invasion- but he was soon caught up in a web of greed and betrayal. Did the war's rampant corruption cost him his life?" writes the author. In the tradition of Rolling Stone's investigative journalism, the writer visits Iraq to put together the pieces from interviews with Ryan's business partners, the military and his father. While relating Ryan's story, his trouble character is revealed, with its convoluted relationships with family and colleagues and unrealistic dreams of wealth. What also emerges is the story of the flawed reconstruction of Iraq from the perspective of small time entrepreneurs.
THE IRAQ WAR: LEARNING FROM THE PAST, ADAPTING TO THE PRESENT, AND PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE.
Dr. Thomas R. Mockaitis. Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College. February 23, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 70 pages]
This monograph examines how the U.S. military’s (including factors beyond its control) approach has affected operations in Iraq. The author drew from “experiences of other nations particularly the United Kingdom to identify lessons that might inform the conduct of this and future campaigns.” He also documents how the military has adapted to the challenges in Iraq, and how it has been incorporated into “both historic and contemporary lessons into the new counterinsurgency doctrine contained in the Field Manual 3-24.”
INTEGRATING INSTRUMENTS OF POWER AND INFLUENCE IN NATIONAL SECURITY: STARTING THE DIALOGUE.
Robert E. Hunter and Khalid Nadiri. National Security Research Division, RAND Corporation. January 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 17 pages]
Over the past several years, the U.S. has faced a number of complex challenges requiring new forms of effective interaction; such as, political Islam and ethnic intolerance. “These interactions among U.S. military and civilian agencies, foreign allied governments, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and multinational bodies have been most extensive at the field level, but have largely occurred without clear, precise, and comprehensive direction from the senior leadership in Washington. How this field-level cooperation occurs is valuable and informative in evaluating obstacles to, and making recommendations for, integration of U.S. instruments of power at the senior level. This report highlights those obstacles, evaluates possibilities, surveys “best practices,” and makes recommendations.”
EMBASSIES AS COMMAND POSTS IN THE ANTI-TERROR CAMPAIGN.
Richard G. Lugar, Chairman. Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate. Web posted December 15, 2006.
Full Text [pdf format, 31 pages]
“Protecting Americans from terrorist attacks within the United States depends, to a great extent, on U.S. success overseas. The task is vast and worldwide. It requires enlisting host country policy to track and capture terrorists, uncovering terrorist financing, sharing intelligence with foreign partners, strengthening border surveillance in remote and unpopulated regions and building partnerships with foreign militaries. In the longer run, it requires convincing entire societies to reject terrorist propaganda and recruitment. A successful counterterrorism policy depends on strong relationships with foreign governments and the people residing in countries on every continent.”The committee staff members visited selected embassies to ascertain whether the State and Defense Departments were working together. The staff found:
- Blurred lines of authority between State and Defense departments which could undermine the effectiveness of U.S. policy against terrorism;
- “As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, however, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense’s focus on ware fighting.”
- “The increases of funding streams, self-assigned missions, and realigned authorities for the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders are placing new stresses on inter-agency coordination in the field.”
- “There is evidence that some host countries are questioning the increasingly military component of America’s profile overseas.”
The committee made a number of recommendations for (1) the role of the ambassador; (2) organizing foreign assistance; (3) rationalizing missions and money; and (4) regional strategic initiatives.
SECURING TYRANTS OR FOSTERING REFORM?: U.S. INTERNAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO REPRESSIVE AND TRANSITIONING REGIMES.
Seth G. Jones, Olga Oliker, Peter Chalk, C. Christine Fair, Rollie Lal, and James Dobbins. National Security Research Division, RAND Corporation. Web posted January 9, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 233 pages]
“This report examines U.S. government assistance to the police and internal security agencies of repressive and transitioning states.” The authors believe “that security, human rights, and accountability are deeply interconnected. We disagree with those who argue that security interest should trump human rights in situations where states face significant security threats, such as terrorism. We also disagree with those who argue that the United States should never provide internal security assistance to repressive states.”
The authors used case studies to examine post-conflict environments in Afghanistan and El Salvador where the U.S. and other international players exerted pressure to encourage change.
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Wrona, Richard M. A DANGEROUS SEPARATION: THE SCHISM BETWEEN AMERICAN SOCIETY AND ITS MILITARY
(World Affairs, vol. 169, no. 1, Summer 2006, pp. 25-38)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library
The author, an Army officer and instructor at the United States Military Academy , advocates universal military conscription as a means to mitigate the widening culture gap between the U.S. military and American society. Wrona provides an historical overview of American attitudes toward the military as well as polling data suggesting that military personnel see themselves as increasingly isolated, conservative, and moving away from their traditional apolitical role in society. These factors, combined with the increasing use of private military firms and the tendency for elected officials to use the military as backdrops for photo-ops. The best way to manage the civil-military gap, the author argues, is to narrow it by instituting a system of universal service, which would expose a wider segment of American society to military culture, and shift attitudes away from "rights" in favor of the "responsibilities" that underpin democratic societies.
IRAQI PERSPECTIVES PROJECT: A VIEW OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM FROM SADDAM'S SENIOR LEADERSHIP.
Kevin M. Woods, et. al.
United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned (JCOA). Web-posted March 2006.
Download the document [pdf format, 230 pages]
This unclassified historical study of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) incorporates the Iraqi civilian and military leadership's perspective of events. In the foreword, Brigadier General Anthony Cucolo III writes that the project team utilized dozens of interviews with senior Iraqi leaders and thousands of official Iraqi documents to craft a "substantive examination of Saddam Hussein's leadership and its effect on the Iraqi military decision-making process." He calls this project "an important first step," and while acknowledging that the history of OIF is far from complete, says that this study seeks to "contribute to a more fully developed history of the war, and allow all concerned to get closer to ground truth."
The chapters are entitled:
- The Nature of the Regime
- Skewed Strategy
- Military Effectiveness
- Crippled Operational Planning
- The Regime Plans for War
- Doomed Execution
The document includes an annex describing the project's methodology and information sources, and its references.
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Goddard, Stacie E. UNCOMMON GROUND: INDIVISIBLE TERRITORY AND THE POLITICS OF LEGITIMACY (International Organization, vol. 60, no. 1, Winter 2006, pp. 35-68)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library
In Jerusalem, Ireland, Kosovo, and Kashmir, indivisible territory underlies much of international conflict. The author notes that whether or not territory appears indivisible depends on how actors legitimate their claims to territory during negotiations. She asserts that although actors choose their legitimations strategically, in order to gain a political advantage at the bargaining table, such strategies can have unintended structural consequences. Legitimations can either build ties between coalitions and allow each side to recognize the legitimacy of each other's claims, or else lock actors into bargaining positions where they are unable to recognize the legitimacy of their opponent's demands. The authors believes that when the latter happens, actors come to negotiations with incompatible claims, constructing the territory as indivisible. Goddard applies this legitimation theory to Ulster, arguing this territory's indivisibility was not inevitable, but a product of actors' legitimation strategies as they battled for support over the issue of Ireland's right to self-rule.
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Thompson, Mitchell J. BREAKING THE PROCONSULATE: A NEW DESIGN FOR NATIONAL POWER (Parameters, Vol. 35, No. 4, Winter 2005, pp. 62-75)
View article on the publisher's web site
Lt. Col. Thompson (USA Ret.), instructor at the Defense Intelligence Agency's Joint Military Attache School, notes that the poor interagency coordination during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom and the relative success of CORDS [Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support], which created a single civilian authority over the entire US pacification effort in Vietnam, indicate that "nothing less than a Goldwater-Nichols act for the interagency structure will suffice to meet the challenge" of the war on terrorism. He writes that our experience in Afghanistan and Iraq shows that the barriers that prevent cooperation between military and civilian agencies are very difficult to overcome, and that the institutions need to be transformed in order to change the culture. Thompson argues that the existing geographic Combatant Commands should be redesigned into interagency organizations under civilian leadership, which he believes is essential for harnessing and projecting America's 'soft' power, "arguably the most potent weapon in [our] arsenal."
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THE NINE PRINCIPLES OF RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT. Natsios, Andrew S. Parameters, Vol. 35, No. 3, Autumn 2005, p. 4-20.
Download the document [pdf format, 17 pages]
Natsios, Administrator for the U.S. Agency for International Development, says the U.S. foreign assistance community is in the midst of the most fundamental shift in policy since the Marshall Plan at the end of World War II. The Bush administration has made development work a national security priority; further, the dynamics of today's asymmetrical warfare, in which military success increasingly depends on successful economic development, require much greater collaboration between the military and development communities, he states. Natsios reviews the Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development -- ownership, capacity-building, sustainability, selectivity, assessment, results, partnership, flexibility, and accountability -- which are inspired by the military's Nine Principles of War. Foremost among the principles is ownership, writes Natsios, because reconstruction/development is simply not effective if local populations do not feel a sense of ownership toward donor programs.
PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS: MILITARY RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN.
Michael J. Dziedzic and Colonel Michael K. Seidl. United States Institute of Peace. September 2005.
Download the document [pdf format, 16 pages]
This report stems from a joint project conducted by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the RAND Corporation that resulted in the publication of the book Aid During Conflict: Interaction Between Military and Civilian Assistance Providers in Afghanistan, September 2001-June 2002, and an October 2005 conference.
The report examines Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, and the complications that arise when international civilian and military personnel are simultaneously involved in providing humanitarian relief or reconstruction assistance in the midst of combat or in other nonpermissive environments. Among the concerns that repeatedly arise are security, the proper role of the military in providing assistance, information sharing, coordination, and preservation of the "humanitarian space" that NGOs and International Organizations rely upon to perform their tasks.
After reviewing the deployment and evolution of the PRTs, the authors describe the different perspectives from which international civilian assistance providers and military actors view these issues. The report concludes with specific recommendations for PRTs, and general suggestions for enhancing the quality of the relationship between military forces and civilian assistance providers.