Embassy of the United States

Security Affairs

Arms Control & Disarmament Archive

MOST WOULD USE FORCE TO STOP IRANIAN NUKES.
Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. October 6, 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 8 pages]

According to the Pew survey, the public approves of direct negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, although most Americans are not hopeful the talks will succeed. And a strong majority – 61% – says that it is more important to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, even if it means taking military action. Far fewer (24%) say it is more important to avoid a military conflict with Iran, if it means that the country may develop nuclear weapons.

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NUCLEAR CHALLENGE FROM PAKISTAN AND IRAN – PART II.
YaleGlobal. Leonard S. Spector. October 7, 2009.
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Iran’s surprise revelation of a nuclear facility near the city of Qom was not such a surprise given that Western intelligence agents already knew of the site. The consensus analysis was that Iran revealed the existence of the site precisely because it had been discovered. But Leonard S. Spector, Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, believes the revelation was motivated by a different concern, which does come as a surprise.

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NUCLEAR CHALLENGE FROM PAKISTAN AND IRAN – PART I.
YaleGlobal. October 5, 2009.
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This past summer, advances of the Pakistani Taliban toward the capital Islamabad caused wide concern in the media. Though the Pakistani army vigorously pushed back, reclaiming Swat Valley and an American drone killed the top Taliban leader in Pakistan, the threat to the regime remains, according to the report.

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AA09317
Dunn, Lewis A. THE NPT: ACCESSING THE PAST, BUILDING THE FUTURE (Nonproliferation Review, vol. 16, no. 2, July 2009, pp. 143-172)
Online link to PDF Full Text

This article provides an analysis of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s (NPT) successes and failures to date. The author, who works as a senior vice-president for Science Applications International Corporation, also examines the prospects for the upcoming May 2010 NPT Review Conference. Ambassador Dunn suggests 15 possible steps to strengthen the treaty. He recommends pursuing three plans of action to establish a roadmap between the 2010 meeting and the next review conference in five years. The first plan would be organized around non-proliferation goals. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be the focus of the second plan. The last one would explore the broader ramifications of nuclear disarmament.

THE LENGTHENING LIST OF IRAN SANCTIONS.
Council on Foreign Relations. Greg Bruno. September 23, 2009.
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Decades of economic and diplomatic sanctions have failed to substantively alter the actions of the Iranian regime, especially regarding its nuclear program. But experts say they remain an important tool to isolate and pressure Iran.

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REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT AT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SUMMIT ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.
The White House. September 24, 2009.
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The President Obama makes statement on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament at the United Nations Headquarters.

AA09309
Slawter, Bruce PAY TO PLAY (American Interest, September-October 2009)
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The U.S. commercial nuclear power industry has languished for years, notes the author, a result of huge cost overruns on plants built in the 1970s and 1980s, and of notable accidents such as those at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. The decline of expertise and research in the U.S. nuclear power industry is now translating into erosion of our ability to influence nonproliferation internationally, notes Slawter, as other countries, notably France, Japan, Russia and now China surpass the U.S. in certain areas of reactor development. Slawter notes that what is emerging is a “pay-to-play” arrangement -- in order to be recognized as a nuclear authority, countries have to invest in their own nuclear technology. He notes that President Obama has become increasingly pragmatic with respect to nuclear power, which will put him at odds with many of his Democratic supporters. In order to maintain the U.S. lead in safety and nonproliferation, Slawter writes that the Obama administration should redouble its efforts in conjunction with France and Japan to develop new-generation reactors, conduct further research into closing the nuclear fuel cycle, and strengthen existing international frameworks, and provide a global fuel repository, so that countries aspiring to nuclear energy do not develop a nuclear fuel cycle on their own.

AA09269
Fuhrmann, Matthew SPREADING TEMPTATION: PROLIFERATION AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENTS (International Security, vol. 34, no. 1, Summer 2009, pp. 7-41)
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Fuhrmann, assistant professor of political science at the University of South Carolina, notes that “proliferation-proof” nuclear assistance does not exist. Transfer of nuclear technology and know-how for peaceful purposes invariably leads to the development of weapons programs, and countries that have received such assistance are more likely to produce nuclear weapons, especially when facing security threats. A study of two thousand civilian nuclear cooperation agreements over the past half-century bears this out. Fuhrmann writes that the link between civilian nuclear cooperation and proliferation is surprisingly broad, and casts doubt on convention wisdom. He argues that major nuclear suppliers such as the U.S. should reconsider their willingness to assist other countries in peaceful nuclear cooperation.

AA09254
Cirincione, Joseph U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY: THE OPEN WINDOW FOR TRANSFORMATION (Harvard International Review, vol. 31, no. 1, Spring 2009, pp. 42-46)
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The author, former vice president of National Security and International Policy at the Center of American Progress as well as former director for non-proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says that the U.S. has an opportunity to reshape its nuclear policy under the Obama administration. Cirincione says that President Obama needs to be bold in implementing a strategy that would reduce nuclear proliferation and also address the four categories of nuclear threats. Cirincione lists the four most critical threats -- first, the possibility of a terrorist group obtaining a nuclear weapon; second, the chance of “an accidental, unauthorized or intentional” use of a weapon by a nuclear-armed state; third, the emergence of a new armed state; finally, the end of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The author says Obama recognizes the interrelation between these threats and has developed his nuclear policy accordingly. Cirincione, however, warns that damage caused by the Bush doctrine demands that Obama act quickly in implementing his policy.

NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR AND MISSILE TESTS AND THE SIX-PARTY TALKS: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Brookings Institution. Richard C. Bush. June 17, 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 10 pages]

In testimony before Congress on June 17, Richard Bush describes how North Korea’s recent nuclear and missile tests have transformed the challenge faced by the international system. Dr. Bush testified that it is now clear that North Korea bases its security on nuclear weapons, and the hope that it will abandon the nuclear option has disappeared.

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DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION GLOBAL PROGRAMS.
National Nuclear Security Administration. 2009.
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The global map shows different nonproliferation programs, ranging from plutonium production reactor shutdown to plutonium disposition, throughout the world.

NUCLEAR ABOLITION AND THE NEXT ARMS RACE.
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. April 21, 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 37 pages]

The author looks at various scenarios on nuclear nonproliferation. According to the author, the concern is while Russia and the United States look to reduce nuclear weapons deployment and stockpiles, there is nuclear proliferation.

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NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: 1949-PRESENT.
Manhattan Project, U.S. Department of Energy]. 2009.
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The site looks at the history of nuclear proliferation since 1945.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IN THE NEAR TERM TO STRENGTHEN THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME?
Council on Foreign Relations. Dennis Gormley et al. May 2009.
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Dennis Gormley, senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies/Monterey Institute of International Studies; Paul Lettow, adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; Lawrence Scheinman, distinguished professor at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies/Monterey Institute of International Studies; and Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center discuss the nonproliferation.

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AMERICA’S STRATEGIC POSTURE: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES.
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the U.S. & U.S. Institute of Peace. Web posted May 6, 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 360 pages]

The final report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States provides over 100 findings and recommendations on critical issues related to U.S. nuclear strategy. Key themes on which recommendations are focused include (1) challenges and opportunities inherent in the current security environment; (2) the roles, functions, and projection of U.S. nuclear forces, including missile defense; (3) the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear stockpile; (4) the state of the nuclear weapons complex; (5) arms control and nonproliferation; and (6) additional steps for the prevention of proliferation and the protection against nuclear use.

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FROM COUNTERFORCE TO MINIMAL DETERRENCE.
Federation of American Scientists & The Natural Resources Defense Council. Hans M. Kristensen et al. April 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 35 pages]

The report calls for fundamental changes to U.S. nuclear war planning, a prerequisite if smaller nuclear arsenals are to be achieved. It seeks to abandon the almost five-decade-long central mission for U.S. nuclear forces, which has been and continues to be “counterforce,” the capability for U.S. forces to destroy an enemy’s military forces, its weapons, its command and control facilities and its key leaders.

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NORTH KOREAN BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES.
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Steven A. Hildreth. February 24, 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 9 pages]

The report briefly reviews North Koreas ballistic missile program. In summer 2007, North Korea tested modern, short-range missiles. In February 2009, South Korea reported the DPRK had deployed a new intermediate-range missile.

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSE TO A NUCLEAR DETONATION: FIRST EDITION.
Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President. Web posted January 29, 2009.
Full Text [PDF format, 97 pages]

It is incumbent upon all levels of government, as well as public and private parties within the United States, to prepare for any nuclear detonation through focused nuclear attack response planning. Nuclear explosions present substantial and immediate radiological threats to life. Local and State community preparedness to respond to a nuclear detonation could result in life-saving on the order of tens of thousands of lives.

The guidance provides emergency planners with nuclear detonation-specific response recommendations to maximize the preservation of life in the event of an urban nuclear detonation.

NORTH KOREA AFTER KIM.
Council on Foreign Relations. Jayshree Bajoria. January 28, 2009.
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Speculation over Kim Jong-Il’s health has prompts discussion about the future of the isolated country and its nuclear weapons program. Most experts believe a post-Kim North Korea regime would remain a tough nuclear negotiator.

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U.S. WEAPONS AT WAR 2008.
New America Foundation. William D. Hartung and Frida Berrigan. Web posted January 16, 2009.
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The report finds that United States arms transfers are undermining human rights, weakening democracy and fueling conflict around the world. U.S. arms sales reached $32 billion in 2007, more than three times the level obtained when President Bush first took office. The author says, “It’s not just the volume of U.S. weapons exports that matters, it is how these weapons are likely to be used.”

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NUCLEAR SECURITY SPENDING: ASSESSING COSTS, EXAMINING PRIORITIES.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Stephen I. Schwartz. January 2009.
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The United States spent over $52 billion on nuclear weapons and related programs in fiscal year 2008, but only 10 percent of that went toward preventing a nuclear attack and slowing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. According to the report, the United States has never tracked nuclear weapon-related spending comprehensively, hindering effective oversight and public understanding of the government’s nuclear priorities.

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WORLD AT RISK: THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM.
Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. Bob Graham et al. December 2, 2008.
Full Text [PDF format, 161 pages]

The report calls on the President-elect and the next Congress to immediately initiate several concrete actions, unilaterally and with the international community, to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that pose the greatest peril: nuclear and biological weapons. The Commission centered its findings on several areas where it determined the risks to the United States are increasing: the crossroads of terrorism and proliferation in the poorly governed parts of Pakistan, the prevention of biological and nuclear terrorism, and the potential erosion of international nuclear security, treaties and norms as we enter a nuclear energy renaissance.

AA08431
Kapur, S. Paul TEN YEARS OF INSTABILITY IN A NUCLEAR SOUTH ASIA (International Security, Vol. 33, no. 2, Fall 2008, pp. 71-94)
Full text available from your nearest American Library

Kapur, professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, writes that the tenth anniversary of India’s and Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests provides an opportunity to examine nuclear weapons’ impact on South Asian security. The author believes that some optimistic analyses of nuclear proliferation’s beneficial effect in stabilizing Indo-Pakistani relations are mistaken. Nuclear weapons have had two destabilizing effects on the South Asian security environment. First, nuclear weapons’ ability to shield Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation, and to attract international attention to Pakistan’s dispute with India, encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior. This, in turn, provoked forceful Indian responses, ranging from large-scale mobilization to limited war. Although the resulting Indo-Pakistani crises did not lead to nuclear or full-scale conventional conflict, this was not guaranteed and did not result primarily from nuclear deterrence. Second, these Indo-Pakistani crises led India to adopt a more aggressive conventional military posture toward Pakistan. This development could exacerbate regional security dynamics and increase the likelihood of Indo-Pakistani conflict in years to come. Thus, nuclear weapons not only destabilized South Asia in the first decade after the nuclear tests -- they may damage the regional security environment well into the future.

ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD LEAD.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. George Perkovich. Web posted October 24, 2008.
Full Text [PDF format, 8 pages]

Efforts to re-invigorate a movement to abolish nuclear weapons are rising on the international agenda. For states without weapons, talk of nuclear disarmament is embraced as a welcome change, but viewed with skepticism. The author outlines four security areas where the long-term project of abolishing nuclear weapons would best serve U.S. interests: preventing proliferation, preventing nuclear terrorism, reducing toward zero the threat of nuclear annihilation, and fostering new optimism for U.S. global leadership.

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MEETING THE CHALLENGE: U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRANIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT.
Bipartisan Policy Center. Web posted October 15, 2008.
Full Text [PDF format, 117 pages]

The development of nuclear weapons capability by the Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the most critical national security challenges facing the United States. The study includes a primer on the complex historical, political, social, economic, military, legal and technological issues that underlie and influence the current situation.

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IAEA ILLICIT TRAFFICKING DATABASE (ITDB).
International Atomic Energy Agency. Web posted September 26, 2008.
Full Text [PDF format, 7 pages]

Established in 1995, the ITDB is the IAEA’s information system on incidents of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials. The scope of the ITDB information is broad and includes, but is not limited to, incidents involving the illegal trade and movement of materials across borders. The Database tracks events that occurred intentionally or unintentionally, with or without crossing international borders, as well as unsuccessful or thwarted acts.

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LANDMINE CASUALTY DATA: BEST PRACTICES GUIDEBOOK.
Mine Action Information Center, James Madison University. Suzanne Fiederlein. Web posted September 23, 2008.
Full Text [PDF format, 79 pages]

The report is a reference tool designed to assist people in creating a mine/Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) victim information system or enhancing an existing system. It examines the advances in casualty data collection and management and offers lessons for countries to reflect upon as they undertake the challenging task of building mine/ERW victim information systems. The report integrates information from a wide variety of sources and presents detailed case studies, recommended best practices, lessons learned and contacts and resources for victim assistance information management and program planning.

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AA08301
Mills, Marie GETTING A PIECE OF THE PIE: LEBANESE WOMEN BECOME DEMINERS (Journal of Mine Action, vol. 11, no. 2, Spring 2008, pp. 17-19)
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After the conflict between Israel and Hizbollah ended in the summer of 2006, the Lebanese Army and the community of non-governmental organizations sought to address the huge problem of remaining unexploded ordnance in southern Lebanon. The Swedish Rescue Services Agency attracted a surprising number of women recruits for demining training. They formed the first all-women demining team in the Middle East in February 2007, modeled on female demining teams employed previously in Kosovo. Another NGO, DanChurchAid, helped establish a second female team. In Lebanon, the author says, it helped that women were not unaccustomed to tackling physically challenging work outside their homes. Mills said women with ordnance clearing skills should have equal access to employment. Those establishing teams for women should keep in mind that men and women may face different consequences if they are injured by explosive ordnance. And, organizers must consider whether women will be placed at risk if their employment takes them “outside accepted societal norms.”

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND MISSILES: STATUS AND TRENDS.
Congressional Research Service, RL30699, Library of Congress. Paul K. Kerr. Web posted August 25, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 31 pages]

The United States has long recognized the dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and missiles. The report analyzes NBC weapons programs’ potential threat around the globe. The total number of NBC weapons in the world is shrinking as the major powers scale back their inventories, but other countries and groups still try to acquire these weapons. The potential for secondary proliferation markets has grown, and concern about the ability of individuals to peddle nuclear technology has grown considerably. The will to acquire or to produce NBC weapons may decrease if diplomacy, arms control treaties, nonproliferation regimes, and security and assistance strategies are effective.

AA08283
Chivers, Daniel, et al. BEFORE THE DAY AFTER: USING PRE-DETONATION NUCLEAR FORENSICS TO IMPROVE FISSILE MATERIAL SECURITY (Arms Control Today, vol. 38, no. 6, July/August 2008, pp. 22-28)
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The authors write that the next U.S. administration will face many challenges, but none likely more pressing than combating the threat of nuclear terrorism. They say the international community lacks clear, enforceable standards for fissile material protection now with more than 3,700 tons stored under varying methods. They assert that there is a need for a global campaign to improve physical protection standards for countries that have weapons-usable material in order to prevent the sale, theft or diversion of fissile material. The science of nuclear forensics can be used to insure accountability of materials and to identify perpetrators of nuclear attacks if they occur and to deter follow-on attacks. They recommend a comprehensive international database with countries voluntarily sharing information; this would greatly aid the ability to determine the source of interdicted fissile material or material collected in a post-nuclear attack. Creating such a database would mean working out procedural issues to confirm the veracity of the data.

NORTH KOREA DENUCLEARIZATION REQUIRES RIGOROUS VERIFICATION SYSTEM.
Heritage Foundation. Bruce Klingner. July 16, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 4 pages]

The six-party talks nations agreed on July 12 to broad measures for verifying North Korea's pledge to abandon its nuclear weapons programs. North Korea did agree to verification measures that included "visits to facilities, review of documents, interviews with technical personnel and other measures." But there is no indication to date that Pyongyang has accepted any verification requirements other than at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. The report suggests three conditions: insist North Korea fulfill its existing requirement, require more detailed follow-on joint statements, and implement a rigorous and intrusive verification mechanism.

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AA08250
Lugar, Richard REVVING UP THE COOPERATIVE NONPROLIFERATION ENGINE (Nonproliferation Review, vol. 15, no. 2, July 2008, pp. 349-352)
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Lugar, Republican Senator from Indiana and co-sponsor of legislation that created the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program which helped dismantle nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the former Soviet Union, says the scope of the program should now be expanded.  Lugar believes that the program should be expanded beyond strategic weapons and be used to address the threat from conventional systems.  He also says the program should continue to expand geographically.  Senator Richard Lugar says that breakthrough disarmament talks with North Korea could pave the way for CTR use, but right now the only U.S. program that can be used to help secure and dismantle North Korean's nuclear program is the State Department's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund.  He says the Nunn-Lugar program, as the CTR program is also known, should be given sufficient flexibility so that it, too, can aid in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.  Lugar writes that a number of nations such as Indonesia and Afghanistan are interested in setting up Nunn-Lugar programs. 

AA08235
Pickering, Thomas NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR NONPROLIFERATION (Arms Control Today, vol. 38, no. 5, June 2008, pp. 11-14)
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The author, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, says that the next administration needs to form a broad strategy on the issues associated with nonproliferation, disarmament, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. He advocates a careful blend of multilateral initiatives, bilateral agreements and unilateral actions. The former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations also emphasizes the importance of concluding a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Ambassador Pickering also proposes advancing an international nuclear fuel regime. “We should try to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether,” he says, starting with steps to strengthen U.S.-Russian bilateral arms control and to preserve the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. Pickering, who served as ambassador to Moscow, also suggests that the two nations consider reducing and eliminating tactical nuclear weapons. He also says more serious thought should be given to the role of the U.N. Security Council with respect to proliferation.

AA08182
Niemeyer, Sidney; Smith, David K. FOLLOWING THE CLUES: THE ROLE OF FORENSICS IN PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM (Arms Control Today, vol. 37, no. 6, July/August 2007, pp. 14-15)
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Smith, the State Department’s scientific advisor on international nuclear forensics, and Niemeyer, physicist at the Department of Homeland Security’s National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center, say now is the time to enhance the utility of using forensics to prevent nuclear terrorism. The authors note that several international conventions are in place to advance forensic capabilities, such as U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. They point to several U.S.-led efforts to use nuclear forensics to help ensure responsible nuclear stewardship, including the Nuclear Trafficking Response Group and the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative. Nuclear forensics can be used as a deterrent against smuggling or to identify a perpetrator in the event of nuclear or radiological attack. The authors advocate expanding international cooperation to further develop and refine the discipline, as well as using it for active investigations to trace the illicit transfer of nuclear materials. Given that there are over 50 trafficking incidents annually, the authors say governments should make greater investments in their nuclear forensic capabilities. That way, warning signs of nuclear terrorist activities can be detected, it might be possible to “connect the dots” and head off a multi-pronged attack, or respond to a credibly identified perpetrator of an attack.

DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR THE ADOPTION OF A CONVENTION ON A CLUSTER MUNITIONS.
United Nations. Web posted May 31, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 18 pages]

In a meeting in Dublin, Ireland, more than half the world’s governments agreed to ban the production, use, stockpiling and export of all existing cluster munitions. Cluster munitions are designed to kill or maim every living thing in an area large as two football fields. The vast majority of victims of cluster bombs have been civilians. The new international treaty commits the signatory governments to stop using these weapons and to destroy their existing stockpiles within eight years.

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TO WALK THE EARTH IN SAFETY.
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State. June 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 31 pages]

The report describes efforts by the Department of State, Department of Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development’s Leahy War Victims Fund to clear mines and explosive remnants of war, most of which are of non-U.S. origin. The programs also teach mine risk education and assist conflict survivors. The results of the efforts in the past year include the reduction in reported casualties from landmines and explosive remnants of war worldwide to 5,751, down from about 26,000 just four years before.

ISRAELI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
Center for Strategic & International Studies. Anthony H. Cordesman. June 2, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 32 pages]

Israel’s nuclear capabilities and the efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction are some of its most secret and controversial developments. Many estimates of Israel's nuclear weapons trace back to rough estimates made a decade ago. No official Israeli data or credible outside reports data have emerged on the details of Israel's strategic doctrine, targeting plans, or systems for planning and executing nuclear strikes, or how these have changed in recent years. However, a great deal of speculation has emerged over how Israel might act in a war or crisis.

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AA08124
Kimball, Daryl; Pomper, Miles A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: AN INTERVIEW WITH NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE CO-CHAIRMAN NUNN (Arms Control Today, vol. 38, no. 2, March 2008, pp. 6-12)
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Former Senator Sam Nunn discusses a range of topical issues relating to strategic and tactical nuclear weapons as well as U.S.-Russian and Russian-NATO relations in a wide-ranging interview with the magazine’s editors. He says one of the stumbling blocks for nuclear weapons states to reduce their stockpiles even further is a psychological dependency on them. If those weapons are made less important and relevant, then associated reductions will be easier to achieve, he says. Nunn also emphasize how important it is to work with Russia on missile defense. He also advocates extending the missile launch times for the United States and Russia and warns of the danger to both countries of having their command-and-control systems penetrated by hackers -– either individuals or rogue organizations or governments.

AA08101
Scoblic, J. Peter DISARMAMENT REDUX (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 64, no. 1, March/April 2008, pp. 35-39)
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Scoblic, executive editor of The New Republic, writes that the subject of nuclear disarmament has only recently again become a subject of polite conversation in Washington, due in part to recent Wall Street Journal by former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Senator Sam Nunn. With decades of foreign policy experience among them, Scoblic says these “eminences grises” garner respect from both sides of the political aisle. His article effectively tracks the ebb and flow of U.S. political interest in the subject and points to recent legislation introduced by Senator Dianne Feinstein calling for a nuclear policy review by the president and a nuclear posture review by the Defense Department. He quotes a recent University of Maryland survey indicating that 73 percent of Americans support the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, while noting that such opinion does not generally translate into mainstream of political action. Introducing a dose of realism, the author says that “the deeper one cuts into nuclear arsenals, the harder it becomes to cut any more.”

UNITED NATIONS ARMS EMBARGOES: THEIR IMPACT ON ARMS FLOWS AND TARGET BEHAVIOUR.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Damien Fruchart, et. al. Web posted March 20, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 76 pages]

This report is the first analysis of the 27 United Nations arms embargoes that have been imposed since 1990. UN arms embargoes have been criticized as having a limited impact on reducing arms flows to their targets or improving target behavior. Against this background the report offers a reassessment of the embargoes, their objectives, and their effects. It considers the impact of the Interlaken (1999–2001), Bonn–Berlin (2000–2001) and Stockholm (2001–2003) processes, which offered a range of proposals for developing the focus and implementation of arms embargoes. The report is the first comprehensive assessment of UN arms embargoes implemented since the innovations deriving from these processes were introduced.

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DON'T PANIC ABOUT SPACE WEAPONS.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Wall Street Journal. Ashley J. Tellis. February 22, 2008; Web posted March 10, 2008.
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When the U.S. launched a missile to destroy a dead satellite that would have otherwise re-entered the atmosphere and possibly threatened populated areas with a toxic load of hydrazine fuel, it resurrected fears about the so-called weaponization of space. Carnegie Associate Ashley J. Tellis comments in the Wall Street Journal on the ongoing “space weapon” debate and praises the Bush administration for rejecting a joint Russian-Chinese arms treaty aimed at banning such weapons.

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COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY: ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS.
Congressional Research Service, RL34394, Library of Congress; via Federation of American Scientists. Jonathan Medalia. February 28, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 78 pages]

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would ban all nuclear explosions. As of February 2008, 178 nations had signed it and 144 had ratified. To enter into force, 44 specified nations must ratify it; 35 have done so. The U.S. Senate rejected the treaty in 1999; the Bush Administration opposes it. The United States has observed a nuclear test moratorium since 1992. Several measures have been introduced in Congress regarding the treaty, so it could become an issue in the presidential election.

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NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND MISSILES: STATUS AND TRENDS.
Congressional Research Service, RL30699, Library of Congress. Paul K. Kerr. Web posted March 3, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 31 pages]

The total number of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the world is shrinking as the major powers scale back their inventories through unilateral reductions and arms control, but other countries and groups still try to acquire these weapons. The United States has long recognized the dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. This report analyzes the potential threat patterns around the globe.

COMBATING ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN NUCLEAR AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL: TECHNICAL GUIDANCE REFERENCE MANUAL.
IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 6, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Web posted January 22, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 156 pages]

Measures to detect and respond to illicit trafficking and theft of nuclear material are essential components of a comprehensive nuclear security program. This report is designed to be used by individuals or organizations whose function involves such measures.

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NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: DOE’S PROGRAM TO ASSIST WEAPONS SCIENTISTS IN RUSSIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES NEEDS TO BE REASSESSED. GAO-08-189, U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO). Web posted January 11, 2008.
Full Text [pdf format, 84 pages]

This report evaluates the impact and effectiveness of the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention directed by the Department of Energy. GAO criticizes the DOE, claiming that it has “overstated accomplishments for 2 critical measures it uses to assess the IPP program’s progress and performance.”

CHINA AND PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND MISSILES: POLICY ISSUES.
Shirley A. Kan. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. Updated December 13, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 60 pages]

Congress has long been concerned about the role the People’s Republic of China (PRC) plays in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the past, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea have been recipients of China’s technology. This report discusses the security issues, China’s role in weapons proliferation, and U.S. policy responses to these actions.

DEFENSE TRADE: STATE DEPARTMENT NEEDS TO CONDUCT ASSESSMENTS TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS INEFFICIENCIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE ARMS EXPORT PROCESS.
U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO). Web posted January 3, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 34 pages]

The Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) reviews and authorizes arms exporting licenses. GAO found three key trends that this Office is “under stress”: (1) between 2003 and 2006, the number of arms export cases processed increased by 20 percent; (2) during the same time period, processing times almost doubled; and (3) the number of open arms export cases increased by 50 percent. GAO recommends that State conduct a systematic analysis to help increase efficiency in processing arms export cases. State concurs with this recommendation.

U.S. ARMS SALES: AGREEMENTS WITH AND DELIVERIES TO MAJOR CLIENTS, 1999-2006. Richard F. Grimmett. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. December 20, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 10 pages]

“This report provides background data on United States arms sales agreements with and deliveries to its major purchasers during calendar years 1999-2006.” It lists the total dollar values of government-to-government arms sales agreements with its top five purchasers in five specific regions, and the total dollar values of U.S. arms deliveries to its top five purchasers. Additionally, the report contains “tables listing the total dollar values of U.S. government-to-government arms agreements with and deliveries to its top 10 purchasers worldwide for the periods 1999-2002, 2003-2006, and for 2006 alone.”

UNDERSTANDING THE KEY JUDGMENTS IN THE NEW NIE ON IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Revised: December 4, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 9 pages]

This report assesses the new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report on Iran. The NIE shows that Iran suspended its nuclear weapons efforts in 2003, and it provides solid evidence that Iran had an active nuclear weapons program. However, the NIE is not an intelligence report, it does not describe the analytic methods used, and it does not mention Iran’s progress in nuclear weapon design prior to 2003 nor to date.

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

AA08031
Herby, Peter; La Haye, Eve HOW DOES IT STACK UP? THE ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION AT 10 (Arms Control Today, vol. 37, no. 10, December 2007, pp. 6-10)
Full Text [html format]

The authors, who work for the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva, describe the 1997 Ottawa Convention to ban anti-personnel landmines as “one of the most successful multilateral arms treaties of recent times.” The development of the convention and the ensuing decade of implementation, they say, has “provided a model for cooperative engagement among states, international agencies, civil society organizations, and specialist NGOs in achieving results that none could have achieved alone.” Its example offers insights or lessons learned for tackling other global humanitarian problems, according to Herby and La Haye, since the accord grew from a simple dream to a commitment by 156 nations. The article, which includes a chart listing anti-personnel mine stockpiles for eight countries, describes the convention as “a living process” with a humanitarian program of action that has successfully mobilized thousands of individuals worldwide.

AA08020 Hosford, Zachary M. THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND ARMS CONTROL (Arms Control Today, vol. 37, no. 10, December 2007, pp. 31-34)
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The U.S. presidential campaign has given voice to a range of views on arms control and nonproliferation topics, ranging from ballistic missile defense to the status of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The author points out that many of the candidates’ positions reflect posturing for the primaries, and the rhetoric may be different once nominees have been endorsed at the Democratic and Republican conventions. Hosford also points out that world events may cause candidates to alter their positions in the final run-up. Still, there is general agreement among the candidates about certain issues, such as that Iran should not be equipped with nuclear weapons. Various candidates see different ways to prevent the advent of nuclear terrorism, but Republican Governor Mitt Romney advocates creating new international laws to make nuclear trafficking a crime against humanity. He and Democratic Senator Hillary Clinton have said they will create a senior position to fight the spread of nuclear terrorism. Former Democratic Senator John Edwards says he will create a new “Global Nuclear Compact” to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and close any gaps that might allow rogue states to divert nuclear materials or misuse nuclear facilities. Democratic Senator Barack Obama supports an NPT provision to automatically trigger strong international sanctions against potential treaty violators. But Republican Senator John McCain disagrees with the proposition that nuclear technology can be shared responsibly without the potential threat of proliferation. He is equally tough on missile defense, saying he dismisses Russia’s objections. Republican candidate Rudy Giuliani also vows to press ahead on the program while Republican Senator Ron Paul sees it as unnecessary.

NONPROLIFERATION: U.S. EFFORTS TO COMBAT NUCLEAR NETWORKS NEED BETTER DATA ON PROLIFERATION RISKS AND PROGRAM RESULTS. U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO). Web posted October 31, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 63 pages]

The U.S. has tried to impede nuclear proliferation networks on a national and international level. The GAO was asked to examine these efforts and to review bilateral assistance provided to countries from U.S. agencies. 

After the review, GAO recommended that the Department of State “assess countries receiving U.S. funding and document its risk analyses.” Additionally, GAO recommended that other agencies modify their nuclear proliferation data collection processes.

GLOBAL FISSILE MATERIAL REPORT 2007: SECOND REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PANEL ON FISSILE MATERIALS. International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM). Web posted October 26, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 174 pages]

This Panel is an independent group of arms-control and nonproliferation experts from 16 countries. The report shows that the U.S. and Russia retain stockpiles of approximately 10,000 nuclear weapons and that seven other countries have nuclear weapons. The report also provides an overview of fissile-materials stocks, describes current progress in reducing and consolidating global stocks, and discusses initiatives aimed at strengthening international controls over these materials.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: PAST, PRESENT, AND PROSPECTS. Amy F. Woolf. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. October 29, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 25 pages]

The Bush Administration outlined a strategy of “tailored deterrence” regarding the role of nuclear weapons. Since there are many unanswered questions about this strategy, Congress may review the concept of “tailored deterrence.” This report provides an overview of the nuclear strategy, weapons employment policy, new capabilities, and war plans.

AA07414
Mueller, John RADIOACTIVE HYPE (National Interest, no. 91, September/October 2007, pp. 59-65)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

The author, a professor of political science at Ohio State University and author of THE REMNANTS OF WAR (2004) and OVERBLOWN (2006), contends that “the obsessive quest to control nuclear proliferation ... has been substantially counterproductive and has often inflicted dire costs.” In fact, the effort to prevent proliferation has made obtaining nuclear weapons more attractive to some regimes. Pointing out that the risk of “unfathomably fierce” retribution against a country that provided nuclear weapons to terrorists makes such an action extremely unlikely. Many “alarmists” argue that newly nuclear countries would use nuclear weapons to dominate their region, but Mueller counters, “Exactly how this domination business is to be carried out is never made very clear.” Although he considers it to be desirable to dissuade countries from obtaining nuclear weapons, he sees the threat posed by proliferation as exaggerated.

DISABLING DPRK NUCLEAR FACILITIES. David Albright and Paul Brannan. Working Paper, U.S. Institute of Peace. October 23, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 27 pages]

On October 3, 2007, six-party talks outlined a “roadmap for the disablement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (CPRK) core nuclear facilities.” This paper establishes a definition for the term “disablement,” and outlines the steps that need to be taken at “facilities in the DPRK to achieve various disablement objectives.”

THE ISRAELI “NUCLEAR REACTOR STRIKE” AND SYRIAN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A BACKGROUND ANALYSIS. Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). October 24, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 24 pages]

“The circumstances surrounding an Israeli strike on what may have been a Syrian nuclear reactor are still unclear.” This paper provides a summary of Syria’s positions, and its nuclear efforts as well as the status of its conventional arms capabilities.

AA07367
Chestnut, Sheena ILLICIT ACTIVITY AND PROLIFERATION: NORTH KOREAN SMUGGLING NETWORKS (International Security, vol. 32, no. 1, Summer 2007, pp. 80-111)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

The author draws attention to North Korea’s well-established transnational smuggling networks, which keeps the country stocked with hard currency, distributes counterfeit money and goods internationally, and, it is feared, gives Pyongyang the “means and motivation” to be a key player on the global nuclear black market. These smuggling operations, linked to criminal gangs and even terrorist networks, highlight the need for increased attention to tracking and curtailing them, since their activities ultimately exceed the control of the supplier states, making them a major proliferation danger. Law enforcement agencies must team with counter-proliferation experts to meet the threat of these illicit criminal networks.

SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2007: GUNS AND THE CITY. Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies. Web posted August 28, 2007.
Full Text by Chapters [html format, various pagings]

This report provides new and updated information on small arms production, stockpiles, transfers, and measures. This edition has a special focus on transfer controls, and its thematic section explores the issue of urban violence based on case studies in Burundi and Brazil. The report also has chapters on “lessons learned from the tracing of ammunition, the relationship between gun prices and conflict, and the role of small arms in South Sudan.”

This is the seventh annual report, and it is the primary source of information and analysis on small arms and armed violence. This report is available in Arabic, English, French, German, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish.

ANNUAL REPORT 2006. Board of Governors, International Atomic Energy Agency, United Nations. Web posted August 9, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 103 pages]

The International Atomic Energy Agency “facilitates the exchange of nuclear information and knowledge, builds capacity, and transfers technology to its Member States. . .” The Agency’s aim is to contribute to the safe use of nuclear science and technologies to meet the socioeconomic needs of its members. The annual report reviews the results of the Agency’s “three pillars”--technology, safety, and verification. It also covers notable developments that occurred during 2006.

AA07341
Salama, Sammy; Weber, Heidi. ARAB NUCLEAR ENVY (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 63, no. 5, September/October 2007, pp. 44-49)
Full text [pdf format, 7 pages]

The authors, with the California-based James Martin Center for Nonproliferation, say that a number of Arab nations have become increasingly insecure in the face of Iran’s nuclear quest. These countries may be willing to “rethink their non-nuclear status as Iran edges closer to becoming a threshold state.” Drawing on primary sources in the Middle East, the authors note that “Arab envy of Iran’s technological progress has increased, along with overt calls for Arab governments to achieve technological and nuclear parity with Iran and Israel as a matter of Arab nationalism and pride.” As an example of some of this thinking in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood advocates Egyptian nuclear weapons acquisition as a means to safeguard the country’s national interests and it views such acquisition as Egypt’s sovereign right. The Arab public is well aware that the West has extended generous offers of cooperation to Iran, despite its lack of transparency on nuclear issues and its acquisition of sophisticated technology from the illicit A.Q. Khan nuclear network. Interest in civilian nuclear programs by members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League are “a direct consequence of Iran’s budding nuclear program and the international community’s inability to stop it.” The article is illustrated by Iranian folk dancers allegedly displaying sealed samples of enriched uranium.

AA07322
Dueck, Colin; Takeyh, Ray. IRAN'S NUCLEAR CHALLENGE (Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 122, No. 2, Summer 2007, pp. 189-205)
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Dueck, assistant professor of public and international affairs at George Mason University, and Takeyh, senior fellow in Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, write that Iran has legitimate reasons for wanting a nuclear deterrent, and the most promising route for the U.S. to take is that of containment, supplemented by direct bargaining. Iran’s regime has numerous factions, but they all agree on the need for a nuclear protection from threats they see from Israel, other neighboring countries, and the U.S. The impact of the Iran-Iraq war on Tehran’s nuclear calculations cannot be underestimated. “The international indifference to Saddam’s war crimes and Tehran’s lack of an effective response has led Iran’s war-veteran President to perceive that the security of his country cannot be predicated on global opinion and treaties,” the authors write. Iran is “not an irrational rogue state” seeking the bomb as an instrument of an aggressive foreign policy, nor is it likely to hand over an “Islamic bomb” to terrorist organizations, the authors argue, noting that Iran has long possessed chemical weapons and has yet to transfer such arms to its terrorist allies. “Since the U.S. is not about to invade and occupy Iran, an unwillingness to engage in diplomacy with its government amounts to tacit consent as Tehran develops the bomb,” the authors say, recommending containment and “direct, hard bargaining” as the only chance to prevent Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.

AA07270
Hymans, Jacques. NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR NEUROSIS (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 63, no. 3, May/June 2007, pp. 44-49)
Full text [pdf format, 7 pages]

Hymans, professor of international affairs at Smith College, examines North Korea’s history and psyche to figure out what led up to Pyongyang’s October 2006 nuclear test.  He says Kim Jong Il wanted to make “a loud bang” to deter adversaries, “but ended up with a fizzle” when the explosion achieved only 10 percent of its four-kiloton nuclear yield. North Korea’s declaration that it is a nuclear state, the author writes, doesn’t necessarily make it so.  For Kim, Hymans says, building a nuclear weapon was about national self-expression and identity.  With implications for other authoritarian societies, Hymans says once the leadership gives an order such as to start a nuclear program, the scene is set institutionally and psychologically –- no one dares question the decision, which becomes irrevocable, save only when complete disillusionment with the regime occurs, or when the regime falls apart.

The author categorizes Kim as an oppositional nationalist, or, a leader who is intensely fearful of an external enemy, while also very proud of his nation’s ability to face down an enemy.  Nuclear development programs tend to falter in countries where all power and authority are consolidated in the position of a single individual, Hymans says, because successful programs require lots of money and access to sophisticated technology, as well as “the ability to instill an ethic of scientific professionalism and a long-term planning perspective” both of which are often inhibited in a regime where the cult of personality prevails. 

UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE: A STRATEGY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY. George Perkovich, Jessica T. Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, and Jon B. Wolfsthal. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. June 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 281 pages]

The authors’ premise when developing this document was that the U.S. could not solve the nuclear proliferation challenge alone. The greatest possible international support would be needed. The strategy was developed using a four-stage, eighteen-month process that included consultations and peer review of drafts. The authors then weighed the inputs and decided what would be the most effective policy, the possible problems, and the best solutions.

AA07261
Sahimi, Muhammad CONCESSIONS ON IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM WOULD HELP MODERATES (New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 24, no. 2, Spring 2007, pp. 19-21)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

Dignified treatment of Iran and the offering of concessions – even symbolic ones – in return for suspension of its nuclear programs would help Iran’s moderates, according to Sahimi, professor of engineering at the University of Southern California and a close associate of Nobel Prize-winning human-rights lawyer Shirin Ebadi. The vast majority of Iranians, according to Sahimi, “despises their country’s ruling hardliners” but supports Iran’s nuclear program because it has become a source of national pride. Closing the Natanz facilities, where Iran is researching uranium enrichment, is not the solution to international community’s security concerns, he says. Sahimi estimates that without an alternative energy source, Iran may become a net importer of oil by 2015. Enriched uranium could be safely supplied to Iran’s reactors through a multinational fuel consortium safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a proposal that was made by IAEA in 2005, and which is similar to a 1975 proposal by the administration of President Gerald Ford. “Thus, a diplomatic solution to the problem of Iran’s uranium enrichment program is in hand, and only awaits serious negotiations,” says Sahimi, who has written extensively on Iran’s nuclear programs and their political impact.

AA07260
Johnson, Reuben WHAT PUTIN STANDS FOR (Weekly Standard, Vol. 12, No. 30, April 23, 2007, pp. 11-13)
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The author, a defense and aerospace writer, says a popular joke in Russia about President Vladimir Putin portrays him as a politician for sale. The reality, though, goes much further. “The entirety of state-owned and –controlled enterprises are run by and for the benefit of the cabal around Putin,” he says. Putin is already in his second term as president, all he is constitutionally allowed. On March 30, the speaker of the Russian parliament’s upper chamber proposed amending the constitution to allow him a “presidency without end.” As matters now stand, the top of the Russian government controls the natural gas monopoly, the Yukos oil company, all foreign arms and military equipment sales (including MiG fighter jets and other high-tech aircraft). Johnson notes that Russia has sent $3.5 billion worth of fighter aircraft, attack and transport helicopters, assault rifles and other equipment to Hugo Chavez’s Venezuelan regime, while at the United Nations Russia deleted the proposed ban on all arms exports to Iran as its price for agreeing to the latest sanctions resolution.

AA07259
Fuhrman, Matthew MAKING 1540 WORK: ACHIEVING UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROL STANDARDS (World Affairs, vol. 169, no. 3, Winter 2007, pp. 143-152)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

Preventing hostile regimes and terrorists for shopping the globe for WMD is at the heart of instituting an effective international export control regime. The author traces the experiences of Russia and India in the 1990s to present best practices for the United States to encourage others to adhere to UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which contributes to the international control of WMD and related materials. He advocates a two-stage approach, where the United States establishes a state’s willingness to comply, offering outreach, incentives, or sanctions as needed, then enhancees their ability to comply through training, equipment, and expertise to help states develop the legislation and facilities needed to keep WMD out of the wrong hands.

Allen, Craig THE LIMITS OF INTELLIGENCE IN MARITIME COUNTERPROLIFERATION OPERATIONS (Naval War College Review, Vol. 60, no. 1, Winter 2007, pp. 35-52)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

The author writes that naval forces have long been at the vanguard of global counter-proliferation efforts. They have also been at the heart of several recent maritime interceptions carried out as part of the Proliferation Security Initiative. Allen, professor of law at the University of Washington, says the legitimacy of PSI operations must be grounded in accurate intelligence. He examines the intelligence requirements of maritime counter-proliferation efforts as well as the degrees of risk management associated with operational decision making, and points to President Bush’s assertion that maritime interdiction should be carried out in a way that doesn’t “unnecessarily interfere with maritime commerce or the freedom of navigation.” The multilateral aspect of PSI operations and intelligence sharing is another factor for consideration. Allen says some PSI nations are on record as saying they will never reveal some successful interdiction activities to prevent illicit proliferators from taking advantage of such information to probe for weaknesses. The downside to this, he writes, is that the public and non-participating PSI states may never fully learn of the initiative’s accomplishments. He concludes that national security decision makers should not accept less than the best intelligence when dealing with weapons of mass destruction, but “they must also be prepared to make timely decisions when that intelligence falls short of certainty.”

AA07247
Valencia, Mark, J. THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE: A GLASS HALF-FULL (Arms Control Today, vol. 37, no. 5, June 2007, pp.17-21)
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The author says the PSI’s focus on interdiction has constrained some trade in weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related material or has forced “rogue traders” to change tactics. The initiative, with over 80 supporting nations, has evolved from maritime interdiction to port inspections and aerial interdictions, as well as coordinated efforts to disrupt financial networks that could supply this trade. He also points to ship-boarding agreements the United States has concluded bilaterally with seven countries covering about 70 percent of the world’s commercial fleet measured by tonnage. Valencia, a senior fellow with a Malaysian government-sponsored policy research institute, says that secrecy surrounding PSI interdictions and methods make it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the four-year-old initiative. Greater transparency would help, he said, as well as bringing PSI into the United Nations system.

AA07206
Forden, Geoffrey AFTER CHINA’S TEST: TIME FOR A LIMITED BAN ON ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS (Arms Control Today, vol. 37, no. 3, April 2007, pp. 19-23)
Full text

On January 11, a Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon destroyed one of the PRC’s obsolete Feng Yun-1C weather satellites in a direct strike, creating more than 1,000 pieces of debris of sufficient size to be tracked from the ground. Debris from the test has been identified at altitudes as high as 3,600 kilometers which the author says is four times higher than the position of the original target. He says the international community has expressed its grave concern regarding this debris, which poses an increased risk to both manned space flights and commercial assets in space. “The real danger lies less in the military realm,” Forden says, “than in the long-term risk to civilian communications, weather forecasting and pure scientific research conducted by all space-faring nations.” He points to the evolving Code of Conduct for Space-Faring Nations, which contains a pledge that nations would endorse, agreeing to abstain from generating space debris. The author says this would help protect global economic interests in outer space “by instituting an international taboo against creating dangerous space junk.” He suggests that the timing is right to conclude a treaty banning the most dangerous ASAT systems.

AA07115
Moore, Wesley J. AERIAL INTERDICTION OF WMD SHIPMENTS
(Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 44, First Quarter 2007, pp. 34-38)
Full text [pdf format, 5 pages]

The author says that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one the gravest threat facing the United States and its allies. Existing and effective maritime interdiction tools, he says, may force potential proliferators into the skies where there is little room for error in trying to divert or force the landing of aircraft. Air Force Lieutenant Moore writes that the policymakers and lawyers must work together to develop the necessary doctrine to support successful future interdictions. The United States has the opportunity to show leadership in building capabilities and international consensus. “By developing aerial interdiction doctrine in the open and in dialogue with allies,” Moore says, “America will improve its readiness and stimulate international thought by emphasizing that when Washington speaks of aerial interdiction of WMD, it is generally not talking about shooting down aircraft.” This process will also pave the way to develop public diplomacy themes and messages for future operations.

AA07113
Choe, Julia. PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT: IRAN, NORTH KOREA, AND THE NPT
(Harvard International Review, vol. 28, no. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 38-41)
View article on ProQuest (password required)

The author, associate editor of the Harvard International Review, focuses upon the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a solution to the problem created by nuclear weaponry. The major weakness of the NPT is in the enforcement of its policies -- Iran and North Korea illustrate the NPT's ineffectiveness in the current world order. Iran's non-compliance and North Korea's withdrawal should be addressed in future revisions of the NPT. However, the difficulties in NPT enforcement are not necessarily the fault of the treaty, but may be intrinsic to the very nature of arms control.

CHINESE VIEWS: BREAKING THE STALEMATE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.
Special Report, U.S. Institute of Peace. Web posted February 9, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 12 pages]

The test of a nuclear device by North Korea on October 9, 2006, caused Chinese leaders much unease since the Chinese tried to discourage North Korea from conducting the tests. Consequently, China has taken stronger measures against Pyongyang such as cracking down on its illicit financial activities. The debate now centers on whether China will lessen its support to North Korea in order to maintain good relations with the U.S.

This report draws on discussions from two international conferences.

ROSOBORONEKSPORT: ARMS SALES AND THE STRUCTURE OF RUSSIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY.
Stephen J. Blank. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. January 31, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 108 pages]

Russian observers believe that Washington imposed sanctions on Russian arms sellers and producers because these firms’ sold arms to Venezuela. They also feel that sales to such dangerous states make it imperative that the U.S. analyze the Russian defense export program as well as the entire structure of the defense industry.

RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION POLICY AND THE KOREAN PENNINSULA.
Yong-Chool Ha and Beom-Shik Shin. Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College. Web posted January 25, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 40 pages]

In this paper, the authors present their views on the difficulties of the six-party negotiations on the Northeast Asian nuclear proliferation. Russia is one member of the six-party talks, “but its views on how to deal with this problem do not agree with those of the U.S. Government.” The authors offer information on the two major differences between Washington and Moscow.

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS TREATY.
Amy F. Woolf. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. Updated January 3, 2007.
Full Text [pdf format, 30 pages]

The U.S. and Russia signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (Treaty of Moscow) in 2002. It entered into force on June 1, 2003, and would reduce strategic nuclear weapons by December 31, 2012. According to official and unofficial reports, the implementation of the treaty has gone smoothly even though there have not been as many planned consultations as originally proposed.

The two nations have had discussions on the 2009 demise of the START Treaty. “Russia has suggested that the two sides replace START with a new, formal treaty; the United States has rejected this proposal.” Congress has the opportunity to review and oversee these discussions. 

AA07013
Krepon, Michael THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT: MEANS OF REJUVENATION
(Arms Control Today, vol. 36, no. 10, December 2006, pp. 18-22)
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Krepon, co-founder of the Washington-based Henry L. Stimson Center, says that the forum in Geneva that has negotiated treaties setting norms against nuclear weapons testing and prohibitions against chemical and biological weapons “has fallen on hard times.” Ambassadors assigned to the Conference on Disarmament “now moonlight” on other diplomatic assignments in Switzerland, whereas they once worked on tight deadlines “to hammer out key provisions governing on-site inspections and schedules of prohibited substances.” Unfortunately, Krepon says, the CD has outgrown its mission. Even though the CD continues to be deadlocked by outmoded consensus rules, he says there is still a role for coalitions of the willing -- made up of government and non-government experts -- to meet periodically in Geneva to lay out the groundwork for agreements (not necessarily treaties) on issues such as fissile materials or security in space. Informal meetings might usefully pursue interim steps, the author adds. Doing this and offering workshops to promote better understanding of important technical arms control issues and challenges is one way for the forum to achieve at least some progress in the absence of broader consensus. With some adaptation, he says the once distinguished CD could again have “a useful future.”

AA07014
Lavoy, Peter R. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION OVER THE NEXT DECADE: CAUSES, WARNING SIGNS AND POLICY RESPONSES
(Nonproliferation Review, vol. 13, no. 3, November 2006)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

In July 2006 the author organized a conference at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey that attracted some 60 scholars, non-governmental experts, military officers and U.S. government officials who were asked to look out over the horizon for the next 10 to 15 years to consider what factors might influence nuclear weapons proliferation in 2016. He provides an introduction to an entire edition of the Review devoted to nuclear proliferation in the coming decade at the very time that there are heightened concerns in the international community about nuclear plans by Iran and North Korea. Lavoy, director of the School’s Center for Contemporary Conflict, looks at what might motivate new countries in the Middle East or Northeast Asia to go nuclear. His article looks at early warning indicators that could suggest that a nation might be pursuing a nuclear program and at a variety of policy measures that might usefully be adopted to prevent or head off potential proliferant states. One of the key findings is that individuals make the decisions necessary to pursue nuclear weapons “so understanding the psychological mindsets of individual leaders is crucial to nonproliferation efforts.” Another critical finding is that diplomatic engagement with nuclear problem states can frequently “buy enough time for the international community to develop long-term nonproliferation solutions, or, for other unforeseen forces, such as the change of national leadership, or a severe economic crisis, to reorient the priorities of the proliferating state.”

RUSSIA, IRAN AND THE NUCLEAR QUESTION: THE PUTIN RECORD.
Robert O. Freedman. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. War College. Web posted December 6, 2006.
Full Text [pdf format, 62 pages]

This paper is another in the series of papers from the conference entitled “The U.S. and Russia: Regional Security Issues and Interest.” This monograph analyzes the Russo-Iranian relationship which is important to U.S. foreign policy and its relationship with Moscow. “The Russo-American dimension of the Iranian crisis adds to the complexity of the myriad issues and regional challenges to security, and the enduring difficulties in the Russo-American relationship.”

Vladimir Putin inherited a strong Russian-Iranian relationship. Boris Yeltsin had made major arms agreements and sold Tehran jet planes, tanks, and submarines, and helped build a nuclear reactor. The two countries also cooperated on regional issues such as Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Putin strengthened the relationship and Iran emerged as Putin’s most important ally in the Middle East. Moscow became Iran’s protector against sanctions by the U.S. and the European Union.

“Putin’s policy on Iran, however, contained some serious risks for Moscow, including a sharply deteriorating relationship with the United States and the possibility that newly-elected Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad, an Islamic fundamentalist, might one day challenge Russia over its policy in Chechnya.”

IRAN, IRAQ, AND THE UNITED STATES: THE NEW TRIANGLE’S IMPACT ON SECTARIANISM AND THE NUCLEAR THREAT. Sherifa D. Zuhur. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. November 28, 2006.
Full Text [pdf format, 88 pages]

“What is the best possible response to growing Iranian influence in Iraq? How does this issue relate to the crisis over Iran’s efforts to obtain nuclear capabilities? These are only two of the questions this report tries to analyze. It also offers recommendations and tries to clarify the new developments in this area.

“Perhaps there is no optimal response to an Iran determined to acquire nuclear capabilities, nor to an Iraq Shi`i revival fostered or enhanced by Iranian “soft power.” Still, to understand the dire predictions about the growth of Shi`a power, or to offer constructive advice about the trilateral relations of Iran, Iraq, and the United States, we must consider Iraqi-Iranian popular, religious, and state-level dynamics. If we appreciate the strongly varying interests and political experience of the Shi`a of Iraq and Iran, our fears of the dire scenarios predicted in the Arab world may diminish.”

NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR TEST: MOTIVATIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND U.S. OPTIONS.
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Sharon Squassoni. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. October 24, 2006.
Full report [pdf format, 22 pages]

On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced it conducted a nuclear test. After several days of evaluation, U.S. authorities confirmed that the underground explosion was nuclear, but that the test produced a low yield of less than one kiloton. As the United Nations Security Council met and approved a resolution condemning the tests and calling for punitive sanctions, North Korea remained defiant, insisting that any increased pressure on the regime would be regarded as an act of war. China and South Korea, the top aid providers to and trade partners with the North, supported the resolution, but uncertainty remains as to whether the two countries will strictly enforce the sanctions and/or cut off other economic cooperation and aid considered crucial to the regime. The sanction regime depends heavily on individual states' compliance with the guidelines. Economists argue that the only definitively effective punishment on North Korea would be the suspension of energy aid from China, which reportedly supplies about 70 percent of North Korea's fuel.

The most fundamental U.S. goals of the confrontation with North Korea are to prevent the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to prevent an attack - either nuclear or conventional - on the United States or on its allies in the region. Both actions would dramatically diminish U.S. security. The Bush Administration appears to be divided on how to best achieve these goals, with one group favoring negotiation to shape North Korea's behavior and another group advocating measures that will weaken the regime and ultimately lead to its collapse.

The authors present various U.S. goals and policy options, and provide a synopsis of each: Maintain Status Quo; Explicitly Accept North Korea as a Nuclear; New Approach Through Bilateral Talks with North Korea; Continue Diplomacy via Six-Party; Escalate Economic and Legal Pressure on Regime; Unilateral Financial and Legal Measures; Strengthen Proliferation Security Initiative; Adoption of Regime Change Policy by Non-Military Means; Military; Limited Withdrawal.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO DEVELOPING NATIONS, 1998-2005.
Richard F. Grimmett. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. October 23, 2006.
Full report [pdf format, 98 pages]

CRS prepares this report annually to provide Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its various policy oversight functions. As used in this report, the "developing nations" category includes all countries except the United States, Russia, European nations, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. A list of countries located in the regions defined for the purpose of this analysis - Asia, Near East, Latin America, and Africa - is provided at the end of the report.

Among the principal findings of the report:

• The value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide (to both developed and developing nations) in 2005 was nearly $44.2 billion. This is a notable increase in arms agreements values over 2004, and is the highest total for arms agreements during the last eight years.
• The value of all international arms deliveries in 2005 was $25.4 billion. This is a notable decrease in the total value of arms deliveries from the previous year (a fall of $7.3 billion), and the lowest deliveries total for the 1998-2005 period. Moreover, the total value of such arms deliveries worldwide in 2002-2005 ($124.1 billion) was substantially lower than the value of arms deliveries by all suppliers worldwide from 1998-2001 ($162.3 billion, a decline of over $38 billion).
• Developing nations from 2002-2005 accounted for 67.8% of the value of all international arms deliveries. In the earlier period, 1998-2001, developing nations accounted for 68.6% of the value of all arms deliveries worldwide. In 2005, developing nations collectively accounted for 69.9% of the value of all international arms deliveries.
• In 2005, the United States ranked first in the value of all arms deliveries worldwide, making nearly $11.6 billion in such deliveries or 45.6% of the total. This is the eighth year in a row that the United States has led in global arms deliveries. The United Kingdom ranked second in worldwide arms deliveries in 2005, making $3.1 billion in such deliveries. Russia ranked third in 2005, making $2.8 billion in such deliveries. These top three suppliers of arms in 2005 collectively delivered nearly $17.5 billion, 68.8% of all arms delivered worldwide by all suppliers in that year.

AA06417
RUSSIA RULES THE WORLD'S ARMS BAZAAR
Ahrari, Ehsan. (Asia Times Online, Posted October 31, 2006)
Available online

The author, head of a defense consultancy based in Alexandria, Virginia, cites a recent report by the Congressional Research Service and the Pentagon’s 2006 Annual Report to Congress in his analysis of recent developments in world arms trading. He notes that last year, Russia surpassed the U.S. and France as the leading supplier of arms to the developing world, racking up USD 7 billion in weapons sales to Asia, Africa and Latin America, an increase from $5.4 billion the year before. Russia's top customers are China, India and Iran. China’s arms sales are another source of concern since Iran and North Korea are reportedly among their missile technology customers. He notes that the Bush administration hopes that “Iran's neighbors in the Persian Gulf will read this latest arms-transfer report closely and start to share America's threat perception related to Iran's military preparedness.”

AA06401
THEY ALL FALL DOWN.
Allison, Graham (Foreign Policy, web exclusive, posted October 2006)
Available online (with registration)

According to the author, professor of government and director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, “In the battle of wills between North Korea and the United States, the score is Kim Jong Il, 8; George W. Bush, 0. And yet, the White House doggedly pursues a strategy that has repeatedly failed to achieve American objectives. Despite the overwhelming power of the United States and the abject weakness of North Korea, David has so far bested Goliath with superior strategy and tactics. It’s a situation no one should applaud.” Countries around the world should think carefully about how North Korea’s new nuclear status affects their own national interests.

North Korea’s test is a blow to the nonproliferation regime; it is also likely to trigger proliferation in East Asia, particularly in Japan and South Korea, in spite of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and increases the risk that terrorists will explode a nuclear weapon in the U.S. Since China is the only actor with real leverage, the U.S. will need to “endorse Chinese-led assurances that North Korea will not be attacked as long as it observes agreed-upon constraints.” And to reduce the risk of North Korea selling nuclear weapons to terrorists, “the United States and its allies should announce a new policy of nuclear accountability. Kim Jong Il must be put on notice that the explosion of any nuclear weapon or material of North Korean origin on the territory of the United States or its allies will be treated just like a North Korean nuclear attack and will be met by a full retaliatory response that guarantees that this could never happen again.”

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 1718 [SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNATION OF THE NUCLEAR TEST BY DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)]
United Nations Security Council, October 14, 2006.
Available online [html format, 11 printed pages]

This is the text of the Security Council resolution condemning North Korea's nuclear test, as well as statements by the UN representatives from the United States, France, China, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, Argentina, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. Also recorded are the responses of the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: CURRENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES.
[Congressional Hearing] United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations. September 26, 2006.
Download [Table of Contents, individual documents in pdf format, various pagings]

The hearing examines the importance of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the appropriate steps needed to strengthen the NPT regime. Witnesses addressed the following questions:

1. What steps should be taken to strengthen compliance under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?
2. Why has the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty failed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons?
3. Why do some countries lack confidence in the non-proliferation regime?

The testimonies of the following witnesses are available via the URL provided below:

• Dr. Hans Blix, Chairman, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission
• William H. Tobey, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Proliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), U.S. Department of Energy
• Andrew K. Semmel, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN), Department of State
• Jack David, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Negotiations Policy, U.S. Department of Defense
• Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Office
• Thomas Graham, Jr., Chairman, Bipartisan Security Group, Global Security Institute
• Baker Spring, F.M. Kirby Research Fellow for National Security Policy, Heritage Foundation
• Jonathan Granoff, President, Global Security Institute
• Henry D. Sokolski, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
• Professor Frank von Hippel, Co-Chairman, International Panel on Fissile Materials

AA06368
Hochman, Dafna REHABILITATING A ROGUE: LIBYA'S WMD REVERSAL AND LESSONS FOR US POLICY
(Parameters, vol. 36, no. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 63-78)
View on publisher's website

The author cites Libya as a role model for other rogue nations that wish to engage in voluntary disarmament. This approach recognizes motivation for voluntary disarmament as attributable to multiple causes. In Libya's case, this motivation came from three sources: Libyan concern about al-Qaeda caused a desire to ally with the U.S.; Libyan preoccupation with its reputation and international image; and the pressure exerted on Congress by the families of the victims of Pan Am Flight 103. The combination of these threats caused Libya to perceive greater danger in maintaining its nuclear and chemical programs than in destroying them.

AA06369
Sagan, Scott D. HOW TO KEEP THE BOMB FROM IRAN
(Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 5, September/October 2006, pp.45-59)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

As an open supporter of terrorism with strong anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments, a nuclear Iran would pose a grave threat to the United States and its allies. Scott D. Sagan, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, describes the dangers of "deterrence optimism" and "proliferation fatalism" when approaching the problem of Iran's nuclear program. He argues that, with "no viable military option at hand," the only way to effectively prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon is for the United States and other global players to understand and help satisfy the concerns that drove Iran to develop a nuclear program in the first place.

AA06268
Carter, Ashton B. AMERICA'S NEW STRATEGIC PARTNER?
(Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 4, July/August 2006, pp. 33-44)

View on publisher’s website

The U.S.-India deal, in which the U.S. acknowledges India as a legitimate nuclear power, has inspired much debate focused on nuclear issues. Opponents claim that Bush's concessions to India could seriously injure the integrity of the international nonproliferation regime. Ashton Carter, a Harvard professor, admits that while the deal is not balanced, damage done to nonproliferation is limited and overstated. The U.S. government insists the deal is a broader strategic agreement, not an arms treaty. Washington gave way on the nuclear front in order to "gain much more on other fronts," in particular, gains in security down the road in dealing with Iran, Pakistan, and potentially China. Many of the benefits, however, are contingent on India's future, with "no guarantees," as India will have its "own opinions about how best to live up to the deal -- or not."

AA06249
SEVEN QUESTIONS: NORTH KOREA'S NUKES -- INTERVIEW WITH DON OBERDORFER
(Foreign Policy, Web Exclusive, Posted June 28, 2006)
View article on publishers website

In response to the international reaction to North Korea's expressed intention to test a ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States, Foreign Policy interviewed Don Oberdorfer, former Washington Post correspondent and currently distinguished journalist in residence at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. According to Oberdorfer, North Korea has taken this step primarily for domestic reasons. Some of the sanctions that were lifted in 1998 in response to North Korea's agreement to a moratorium on further tests have been reimposed and they are not receiving the benefits they expected from the agreement. He sees military strikes against North Korea as "very foolish" and sees Vice President Cheney's comments as indicating that the administration sees this issue the same way. He does not see an imminent economic collapse of North Korea, but he does see the possibility of Japan's "moving toward a more robust military posture" due to North Korean provocation. He also supports direct U.S. talks with the North Koreans.

REAPPRAISING NUCLEAR SECURITY STRATEGY.
Rensselaer Lee. Cato Institute. June 14, 2006.
Download [pdf format, 16 pages]

There are various combinations of methods to narrow the proliferation window in Russia and the other states that were once part of the Soviet Union. This paper recommends a strengthened proactive and intelligence-based nuclear security policy -- one that complements existing programs but enables authorities to better target potential adversaries seeking to obtain nuclear materials.

The author recommends the following measures to close the proliferation gaps:

• Construction of a "vulnerability profile" of each Russian facility that stores, produces, or works with weapons-usable nuclear materials.
• Broadening the definition of nuclear security beyond the concept of containment, concentrating "more attention and resources on the demand side of the proliferation equation."
• Strengthening collaboration with Russian and other former Soviet security organizations.

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN.
Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Board of Governors. June 8, 2006.
Download [pdf format, 3 pages]

According to this report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran began a new phase of uranium enhancement during the week of June 2. The report also avers that Iran is pushing ahead with installing more cascades of centrifuge enrichment machines. The report says that on June 6th Iran resumed feeding UF6 uranium gas into its pilot 164-centrifuge cascade in Natanz on Tuesday after a pause of several weeks to do test runs of the machines without UF6.

This report covers developments since IAEA's report of April 28, 2006. An earlier report by Dr. ElBaradei was submitted on 28 April to the Board and UN Security Council. [Item# 06AD087

]

THE NUCLEAR DILEMMA AND LESSONS FROM CHERNOBYL. Anne Fitzpatrick. Federation of American Scientists (FAS). April 2006.
Download [pdf format, 17 pages]

As fossil fuel costs escalate and nuclear weapons materials proliferate across the globe, nuclear energy as an alternative to fossil fuels is once again the topic of international political and scientific discussions. Fuel reprocessing, new reactor designs, and talk of international control of atomic energy are the focus of political leaders and scientists. In this paper Fitzpatrick asserts that the lesson of Chernobyl are still urgently relevant to current global nuclear energy policy. She argues that the biggest lesson to take away from Chernobyl is that "our nuclear waste products are not going to just disappear whether we build more power reactors or phase out nuclear energy entirely. These highly radioactive by-products will need to go somewhere, and for a long time." She urges governments to tackle this issue directly, and now.
[Note: Contains copyrighted material]

AA06195
Drell, Sidney D. THE SHADOW OF THE BOMB, 2006 (Policy Review, No. 136, April/May 2006, pp. 55-68)
View on publisher's website

The author fears that terrorists or rogue states are acquiring nuclear weapons, and wants the U.S. to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and also wants universal adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol. However, some details are faulty, he asserts -- the number of nuclear weapon states hasn't grown in two decades, though Pakistan did not test a nuclear weapon until 1998. He labels the Proliferation Security Initiative, now nearly three years old, to be a mere proposal; he argues against a U.S. development of a nuclear earth-penetrating weapon, a program that the Bush administration dropped in October 2005. He argues that North Korea is currently violating the Agreed Framework, which in fact ended with Pyongyang's 2002 assertion that it had secretly been building nuclear weapons for years.

AA06196
Gormley, Dennis M. CRUISE CONTROL (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 62, no. 2, March/April 2006, pp. 27-33)
View on publisher's website

Gormley calls attention to recent advances in cruise missiles, which he argues is a considerably greater strategic threat than ballistic missiles. Cruise missiles are cheaper, faster, and better at evading enemy defenses than ever before, says Gormley, as illustrated in recent progress by Pakistan, Taiwan, and Japan in upgrading their arsenals. By overlooking cruise missiles, strategic planners risk developing insufficient missile defense systems, incomplete export control regimes for on weapons components, and in an age where "doctrines of preemption" are becoming more widely accepted, a greater likelihood that adversaries may give into the temptation of using cruise missiles in hopes of rapidly resolving future conflicts.

AA06199
Sims, Nicholas BACK TO BASICS: STEERING CONTRUCTIVE EVOLUTION OF THE BWC (Arms Control Today, vol. 36, no. 3, April 2006, pp. 13-17)
View on publisher's website

The author points to the opportunity in November 2006 for the first full review of the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) since 1991. The 155-member convention bans the development, acquisition or stockpiling of bacteriological or toxin weapons. Sims says that efforts to encourage states to sign and ratify the BWC have so far been "diffuse and spasmodic." Sims, who authored "The Evolution of Biological Disarmament" in 2001, notes that only 16 states have ratified the convention even though they signed it 30 years ago and more than 20 haven't even signed it yet. The writer says a scientific advisory body needs to be created to provide states that are party to the convention with expert information on scientific and technological developments relevant to the treaty. He also says it is important to build confidence in this still-vital treaty and in states' compliance with associated treaty obligations. He says it is essential for the sixth BWC Review Conference to produce a final declaration. His article is accompanied by sidebars on treaty verification as well as listings of states needing to ratify the treaty as well as non-signatories.

IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. Sharon Squassoni. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated April 12, 2006.
Report [pdf format, 6 pages]

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed almost two decades' worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. Iran agreed in 2003 to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities in exchange for promises of assistance from Germany, France, and the UK (EU-3), but negotiations broke down in August 2005. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in noncompliance with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement (GOV/2005/77) and voted (GOV/2006/14) on February 4 to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council issued a presidential statement on March 29 that called upon Iran to reinstitute its voluntary suspension of enrichment and reprocessing and asked the IAEA to report on Iran's compliance by April 28. On April 11, Iranian officials announced that they had enriched some uranium to 3.5% enrichment (fuel-grade).

Uranium enrichment can be used for both peaceful (nuclear fuel) and military (nuclear weapons) uses. At the heart of the debate lie two issues: doubt about Iran's intentions, magnified by revelations of almost two decades of clandestine activities, and whether the international community can adequately verify the absence of enrichment for nuclear weapons or should further restrict access to sensitive nuclear technologies.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Board of Governors. April 28, 2006.
Report [pdf format, 8 pages]

The IAEA has repeatedly requested Iran to provide additional information on certain issues related to its uranium enrichment program. In February 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors directed Iran to implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, to include access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the IAEA [the Agency] may request in support of its ongoing investigations.

This report notes that "gaps remain in the Agency's knowledge with respect to the scope and content of Iran's centrifuge programme. Because of this, and other gaps in the Agency's knowledge, including the role of the military in Iran's nuclear programme, the Agency is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. . . After more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern. Any progress in that regard requires full transparency and active cooperation by Iran - transparency that goes beyond the measures prescribed in the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol - if the Agency is to be able to understand fully the twenty years of undeclared nuclear activities by Iran. Iran continues to facilitate the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement and had, until February 2006, acted on a voluntary basis as if the Additional Protocol were in force. Until February 2006, Iran had also agreed to some transparency measures requested by the Agency, including access to certain military sites. Additional transparency measures, including access to documentation, dual use equipment and relevant individuals, are, however, still needed for the Agency to be able to verify the scope and nature of Iran's enrichment programme, the purpose and use of the dual use equipment and materials purchased by the PHRC [Physics Research Centre], and the alleged studies which could have a military nuclear dimension."

AA06177
Kuperman, Alan J. BOMB-GRADE BAZAAR: HOW INDUSTRY, LOBBYISTS, AND CONGRESS WEAKENED EXPORT CONTROLS ON HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 62, no. 2, March/April 2006, pp. 45-49)
View on publisher's website

In this cover story, Kuperman explores the creation of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, specifically the Burr amendment, which loosened restrictions on exports of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which could be used by would-be proliferators and terrorists in future attacks. The amendment, argues Kuperman, marked a significant undermining of efforts since the late 1970s to stop exporting HEU and encourage countries to convert their power plants to utilize less bomb-grade nuclear fuels. Kuperman says that several HEU suppliers mounted a massive lobbying campaign, enlisting support from medical groups that were persuaded by the HEU providers that they would be negatively affected by limits on HEU. Kuperman recommends the immediate repeal of the Burr amendment and to limit the export of HEU on condition that industry continues to develop less-enriched fuel alternatives.

AA06099
Litman, Leah. A QUESTION OF CHEMISTRY: CONTROLLING THE SPREAD AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
(Harvard International Review, vol. 27, no. 3, Fall 2005, pp. 32-34)
View article on ProQuest (password required)

Litman, editor-in-chief of the Harvard International Review, traces the history and use of chemical weapons in warfare. She also provides background on international efforts to control chemical weapons, including the Geneva Protocols and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The author feels a multi-layered monitoring mechanism, that can adapt to meet changing circumstances, is essential to control the current and future threat of chemical weapons.

U.S. NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH INDIA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS.
Sharon Squassoni. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. January 12, 2006.
Full text: [pdf format, 25 pages]

The author examines what impact U.S.-India civil nuclear energy cooperation could have on both U.S. nonproliferation policies, and the global nonproliferation regime. She writes that Administration officials have described such cooperation as a "win" for nonproliferation because it would bring India into the nonproliferation mainstream. By contrast, some experts have suggested that the potential costs to U.S. and global nonproliferation policy of bringing India into the mainstream via a cooperation agreement, may far exceed the benefits.

Because India does not meet existing nonproliferation criteria under current U.S. law, significant U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation would require consent by Congress. The author describes the three legislative options Congress can utilize to authorize its consent -- comply with existing law, amend existing law, or propose stand-alone legislation. She also suggests several substantive questions that Congress may want to raise in its consultations with the Administration over implementation of a U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation agreement.

AA06048
Morton, David. GUNNING FOR THE WORLD (Foreign Policy, No. 152, January/February 2006, pp. 58-67)
View article on ProQuest (password required)

The National Rifle Association (NRA), the organization of gun owners in the U.S., is one of the most powerful and well-funded lobbying groups in the country. However, in recent years, it has become a savvy global lobby, advocating gun ownership rights at the United Nations, and assisting pro-gun groups in countries such as Australia and Brazil defeat national gun-control initiatives with slick, well-crafted messages in the local media. The author traces the rise of the NRA on the world stage to the formation of the loose international coalition of groups in the 1990s to combat the trafficking in small arms. The NRA realized that successful gun-control legislation in other countries might embolden American gun-control groups, resulting in passing similar laws in the U.S.

AA05353
THE WRATH OF KHAN. Langewiesche, William. (Atlantic Monthly, vol. 296, no. 4, November 2005, pp. 62-85.)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is a source of great national pride, and Abdul Qadeer Khan, the scientist who built up the country's nuclear-weapons program, is regarded as a national hero. Atlantic correspondent Langewiesche writes that A.Q. Khan had "become something of a demigod" in Pakistan, wealthy and with an outsize ego to match, openly flaunting his prominence and giving large amounts of money to foundations and charities. His downfall began in January 2004, when the U.S. intercepted a German ship, the BBC China, carrying nuclear materials bound for Libya, and Libya, subsequently renouncing its nuclear ambitions, named the Khan Research Laboratories as the supplier. Pakistani Pres. Pervez Musharraf rebuked Khan, who publicly apologized and was then put under indefinite house arrest. Langewiesche extensively chronicles the rise of A.Q. Khan in this first of two articles on Pakistan's nuclear program and its role in the spread of nuclear technology.

AA05299
Scobell, Andrew; Chambers, Michael THE FALLOUT OF A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA (Current History, vol. 104, no. 683, September 2005, pp. 289-294)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

The authors outline Pyongyang's efforts to become a nuclear power. They begin by showing North Korea's history of developing WMDs; North Korea has possessed chemical and biological weapons for at least several decades and they have pursued a nuclear program for almost 50 years. The authors argue that Pyongyang is not doing this to extract economic concessions, but in accord with their ideology of extreme self-reliance; they see nuclear weapons as the way to control their own destiny. The author displays two possible routes that North Korea could take to become a nuclear power. In the first, described as the "striptease" approach, Pyongyang continues to gradually reveal pieces of its nuclear program. This approach is effective because it creates divisions among the countries involved in the multilateral talks -- the U.S. would seek sanctions before the entire program had been revealed, but China and South Korea would resist that request. The other approach would be to simply test a nuclear bomb and end the debate immediately -- but this tactic would not be effective it would immediately unite all the members of the multilateral talks against Pyongyand. The authors conclude that North Korea will probably continue to use their "striptease" approach.

AA05275
Kouzes, Richard T. DETECTING ILLICIT NUCLEAR MATERIALS (American Scientist, vol. 93, no. 5, September-October 2005, pp. 422-427)
Full Text available from your nearest American Library

According to the author -- who works on disarmament, nonproliferation and homeland security at the Department of Energy Pacific Northwest National Laboratory -- installing radiological monitoring equipment in the United States and overseas is helping thwart nuclear terrorism. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, fear has grown that the wrong people might acquire dangerous nuclear materials. The possibility became more frightening after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. U.S. and European authorities have worked to keep terrorists from acquiring materials they could use to build a nuclear weapon or a dirty bomb -- one that disperses radioactive debris over a wide area. A major part of the effort involves outfitting U.S. and overseas shipping ports and other border crossings with equipment that can detect nuclear materials' telltale radiation. The author outlines the many-layered program the U.S. in now undertaking and describes some technical challenges.

AA05276
Blechman, Barry M. POST-NUCLEAR STRATEGY (The National Interest, No. 80, Summer 2005, pp. 86-92)
View article on ProQuest (password required)

Co-founder and chairman of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, DC, Blechman recognizes that although "nuclear weapons are overrated" and represent "no magic talisman" to guarantee survival of a regime, they are nonetheless a "great equalizer in international affairs." He acknowledges the continued threat of Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals, as well as the present and future threat posed by nations like North Korea and Iran and by extremists. These threats require that the U.S. redouble supply-side restraints such as the Comprehensive Threat Reduction program, strengthen IAEA safeguards, and promote multilateral cooperation. His strongest argument is to reverse the Senate's opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and wield it against China, North Korea and others who seek to advance their nuclear weapon designs and capabilities.

AA05281
Winner, Andrew C. THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE; THE NEW FACE OF INTERDICTION (Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2, Spring 2005, pp. 129-144)
Download the document [pdf format, 16 pages]

The author, an associate professor of strategic studies at the U.S. Naval War College, writes that the two-year old Proliferation Security Initiative uses different tools and a different focus than in the past to interdict WMD materials, by doing so in the "transport phase" -- after they have left a dock, airport, or warehouse -- well before reaching their intended destination. He says PSI reflects the Bush administration's preference for less formal, multilateral arms control partnerships. Winner says PSI uses multilateral exercises to combat proliferation through the twin strategies of deterrence and denial. The initiative, he said, was conceived to operate clearly within existing legal bounds. "The challenges of strengthening and enforcing the PSI," the author says, "are not greater than attempting to stop or slow down WMD proliferation in an era when a state is only a few turns of a centrifuge away from processing a nuclear weapon."

ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS.
Bureau of Verification and Compliance. United States Department of State. August 30, 2005.
Download the document [pdf format, 111 pages]

This Congressionally mandated report reflects the importance the Administration and the U.S. Congress place upon compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments.

A primary objective of the report is to highlight cases of noncompliance or of compliance concern, so that policymakers can focus their attention upon returning violators to full compliance as rapidly as possible. Another key objective is to make it very clear that the United States takes compliance assessment seriously, and applies only the highest standards of analytical rigor in making its compliance findings. The report's clarity and detail are designed to set the global standard for compliance assessment.

The report, in turn, addresses U.S. compliance; compliance by Russia and other successor states of the Soviet Union with treaties and agreements concluded bilaterally with the Soviet Union; compliance by other countries that are parties to multilateral agreements with the United States; and compliance with commitments made less formally that bear directly upon arms control, nonproliferation, and/or disarmament issues.

Although the Report primarily reflects activities that occurred from January 1, 2002, through January 1, 2004, every effort has been made to include significant developments that have occurred more recently. Unless otherwise noted, compliance issues that first came to light after that period will be addressed in the Noncompliance Report due to Congress on April 15, 2006.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO DEVELOPING NATIONS, 1997-2004.
Richard F. Grimmett. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. August 29, 2005.
Download the document [pdf format, 94 pages]

This report is prepared annually to provide unclassified quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years. Some general data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world.

Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers. During the years 1997-2004, the value of arms transfer agreements with developing nations comprised 62.7% of all such agreements worldwide. More recently, arms transfer agreements with developing nations constituted 57.3% of all such agreements globally from 2001-2004, and 58.9% of these agreements in 2004.

The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2004 was nearly $21.8 billion. This was a substantial increase over 2003, and the highest total, in real terms, since 2000. In 2004, the value of all arms deliveries to developing nations was nearly $22.5 billion, the highest total in these deliveries values since 2000 (in constant 2004 dollars).

In 2004, the United States ranked first in arms transfer agreements with developing nations, with nearly $6.9 billion or 31.6% of these agreements. Russia was second with $5.9 billion or 27.1% of such agreements. In 2004, the United States ranked first in the value of arms deliveries to developing nations at nearly $9.6 billion, or 42.6% of all such deliveries. Russia ranked second at $4.5 billion or 20% of such deliveries. France ranked third at $4.2 billion or 18.7% of such deliveries.

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: THE U.S.-RUSSIAN AGENDA.
Amy F. Woolf. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated August 8, 2005.
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By the late 1990s, arms control negotiations were not as important to the U.S.-Russian relationship as they were to the U.S.- Soviet relationship during the Cold War. Nevertheless, the United States and Russia continued to implement existing nuclear arms control agreements and to pursue negotiations on further reductions in their strategic offensive weapons and modifications to limits on ballistic missile defenses. This issue brief summarizes these agreements and tracks progress in their ratification and implementation.

AA05260
Stohl, Rachel J. FIGHTING THE ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF SMALL ARMS
(SAIS Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, Winter-Spring 2005, pp. 59-68)
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The author notes that illicit trafficking in small arms is a transnational phenomenon. Terrorist groups are dealing in small arms on a global scale, and combating this trade is critical to the U.S. campaign against extremism. Stohl writes that the line is often blurred between the legitimate and illicit trade in small arms, aided by the lack of strict international controls; she also points out that the profits from illegal exploitation of resources such as timber, drugs and diamonds in developing countries perpetuates conflicts and corruption. Arms brokers operate freely because they are able to circumvent national arms controls and international arms embargoes or to obtain official protection. Stohl argues that policing the illicit trafficking in small arms cannot be done in a vacuum or by the United States unilaterally. Other countries must also develop stronger controls over the legal sales and illicit trade of small arms.

Schapiro, Mark. THE MIDDLEMAN [South Africa's link to the nuclear black market] (Mother Jones, Vol. 30, No. 3, May-June 2005)
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Asher Karni, an Israeli national and South African businessman, was arrested in the United States in late 2004 and charged with exporting certain restricted devices without a proper licence. The devices, triggered spark gaps, are used for a number of purposes including medical treatment. They may, however be used to to ignite a nuclear explosion in the appropriate application.

The buyer was a Islamabad businessman with close ties to Pakistan's military and (according to U.S. government officials) to militant Islamic groups. Karni has a background in South Africa's military electronics trade. During the sanction busting apartheid years he proved to be highly skilled and successful in sourcing items. The intrigue of the Pakistani deal is covered in some detail. A final issue raised is that is entirely possible for third country conduits to channel American dual use technology to unfriendly governments or hostile groups using conventional trade methods.

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Levi, Michael A.; O'Hanlon, Michael E. THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005, 190 pp.)
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The new global security risk posed by terrorism requires a shift in dialog on arms control from bilateral accords and multinational regimes to coordinated international efforts to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of those who would willingly use them, postulate authors Michael Levi and Michael O'Hanlon. They propose initiatives to strengthen managerial controls over nuclear and biological weaponry and improve transparency for timely detection of illicit transfers. Extending security guarantees to nations willing to remain non-nuclear and including within arms control agreements planned, coercive responses to violations are also among their recommendations. Modern arms control, they argue, must also involve addressing the proliferation of small arms, as well as humanitarian needs, in developing countries.

AA05163
Platteborze, Peter L. RATIFICATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS (Military Review, March-April 2005, pp. 55-57)
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Platteborze, a U.S. army major with the Tripler Army Medical Center Laboratory in Honolulu, argues that implementation and ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention remains the best means available of preventing legitimate chemicals from falling into the hands of covert violators. He says that, compared with earlier treaties like the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the CWC has deep and broad verification mechanisms and state-party-initiated challenge inspections. And the CWC is the first multilateral arms control treaty to require the elimination of an entire category of WMD under strict international monitoring. The convention is approaching universal acceptance and the establishment of an international standard against chemical-weapons possession and use. He argues that ratification of the treaty is highly desirable for military, political and economic reasons.

BIOTERRORISM COUNTERMEASURE DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES IN PATENTS AND HOMELAND SECURITY. [RL32917]
Wendy H. Schacht and John R. Thomas. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. May 6, 2005.
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Congressional interest in the development of bioterrorism countermeasures remains strong, even after passage of legislation establishing Project BioShield. In the 109th Congress, several bills have been introduced, including S. 3, the Protecting America in the War on Terror Act, and S. 975, the Project Bioshield II Act, that would generate additional incentives for the creation of new technologies to counteract potential biological threats. These bills propose reforms to current policies and practices associated with intellectual property, particularly patents, and the marketing of pharmaceuticals and related products.

Encouraging the development of new counterterrorism technologies and ensuring affordable access to new drugs and medical devices are both significant goals. These aspirations may potentially conflict, however. Introducing augmented patent- and exclusivity-based incentives may stimulate innovative firms to engage in the research and development (R&D) for new countermeasures, as well as to shepherd these products through time-consuming and costly marketing approval procedures. Commentators have expressed concern, however, over whether such heightened protections for innovators will be in proportion with the risks and costs of developing new countermeasures. The authors say that striking a balance between encouraging the development of new countermeasures and maintaining the traditional goals of the U.S. public health system is a central concern of the current discussion with respect to homeland security.

DIVERSION OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS EXPERTISE FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: UNDERSTANDING AN EVOLVING PROBLEM.
John V. Parachini, David E. Mosher, John C. Baker, Keith Crane, Michael S. Chase and Michael Daugherty. RAND. Web-posted May 23, 2005.
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Since the early 1990s, the United States has been concerned about the diversion of expertise and sensitive information from the nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons complexes of the former Soviet Union (FSU). The U.S. has established a number of important programs to address the threat of NBC weapons proliferation. Several of these programs are managed by the Russian Transition Initiative (RTI) in the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. This document offers a structured assessment of the threat of NBC weapons proliferation and examines each of its key components. It examines the countries and individuals that seek to illicitly acquire expertise and sensitive knowledge as well as the institutions and types of individuals who have them.

The authors note that the scope and the nature of the problem have changed considerably since the conceptualization and initiation of a number of U.S. government programs designed to reduce the risk of illicit diversion of expertise and sensitive information from FSU weapons complexes. While the situation in Russia and in the other Newly Independent States (NIS) of the FSU has changed, assessments of the potential problem of diversion of expertise and sensitive information have remained static and, as a consequence, are dated. This document also argues that the problem is larger in scope than just weapons scientists. The RTI's programs, they say, must also focus on highly skilled technicians, retirees, and key administrative and support personnel who can provide critical key information. Finally, this document argues that a simple market model of supply and demand does not fully capture all the dimensions of the danger posed by diversion of NBC weapons expertise and knowledge. A simple supply-and-demand model overlooks the critical role that barriers and disincentives have played in keeping the actual number of cases of diversion relatively low.

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SECURING THE BOMB: THE NEW GLOBAL IMPERATIVES.
Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier. Harvard University, Project on Managing the Atom; Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). May 5, 2005.
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This new report calls for a fast-paced global partnership to secure all nuclear stockpiles worldwide. Meeting that objective, it says, will require "sustained leadership and political heavy lifting" from Presidents Bush and Putin and their counterparts around the world.

The report outlines three essential elements of this vital global effort:

• Accelerating and strengthening the effort in Russia, where the largest stockpiles of potentially vulnerable materials still exist.
• Removing the material entirely from the world's most vulnerable sites.
• Building a fast-paced global coalition to improve security for the remaining nuclear stockpiles around the world.

The authors offer detailed recommendations to strengthen current international efforts. The report also calls for specific steps that the G8's Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction should take, leading up to their meeting in Scotland in July; recommendations for actions by the current Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference; and options for action by the U.S. Congress. The report urges President Bush to "appoint a senior full-time White House official, with the access needed to walk in and ask for presidential action when needed, to lead these efforts, to keep them on the front burner at the White House every day, to set priorities, to eliminate gaps and overlaps, and to seize opportunities for synergy."

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ALL TOOLS AT OUR DISPOSAL: ADDRESSING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN A POST-9/11 WORLD (U.S. Congress, House Policy Committee, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, January 2005, 20 pp.)
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This report, the result of a year-long review of U.S. nonproliferation programs and policy, notes that the spread of nuclear materials and technology to previously non-nuclear nations, and to non-state entities, such as terrorists, has become one of the most serious threats to U.S. national security. It acknowledges that existing international nonproliferation treaties and organizations are unlikely to deter a national government or terrorist group intent on developing a clandestine nuclear program or obtaining nuclear weapons, nor will they dissuade black-market networks from trafficking in nuclear contraband. The report argues that the current treaties must be augmented with a range of multilateral efforts, including information sharing, disruption of nuclear proliferation and trafficking, foreign assistance, and a system of incentives and disincentives.

The authors call for a broader approach to nuclear nonproliferation, and have identified seven strategies for doing so: strengthening existing regimes to limit the legal spread of nuclear technology; expanding international cooperation to eliminate black-market trafficking; securing nuclear materials and keeping expertise off the market; making clear the consequences of nuclear proliferation, as well as the advantages of positive behavior; improving detection technology and human intelligence; working with nations whose interests or sense of urgency are divergent from ours; and assuring our non-nuclear allies that they can rely on U.S. strength.